CVE-2026-56424

MISP core contained multiple broken access-control flaws where authorization checks were performed against the wrong entity, or where ownership/editability checks were missing on write paths. In affected subsystems, a lower-privileged authenticated user with the relevant feature permission could cause the application to authorize one object but mutate another, or could modify objects that were merely visible rather than editable by the user’s organization.

The affected paths included:

• Event Reports tag removal: the route-authorized report could differ from the report ID used for tag detachment, enabling cross-organization tag removal from another event report

• Collection Elements bulk deletion: bulk deletion authorized against a collection whose ID matched the collection-element row ID, rather than the element’s actual parent collection, enabling deletion of elements from collections the user did not own.

• Analyst Data capture/update: nested analyst data updates could overwrite an existing record without applying the normal canEditAnalystData ownership check, enabling cross-organization overwrite of analyst data records.

• Template Elements editing: editing authorized against a template whose ID matched the template-element ID, rather than the element’s actual parent template, enabling unauthorized edits to another organization’s template elements.

• Decaying Model editing and mappings: write paths loaded models using view-scope access but did not verify edit ownership, enabling users to edit or remap visible models owned by another organization. 

Successful exploitation could allow an authenticated user with subsystem-specific permissions to perform unauthorized cross-organization modifications or deletions of MISP data, resulting in integrity loss, unauthorized tampering with shared intelligence, and disruption of analyst workflows.

MISP core contained multiple broken access-control flaws where authorization checks were performed against the wrong entity, or where ownership/editability checks were missing on write paths. In affected subsystems, a lower-privileged authenticated user with the relevant feature permission could cause the application to authorize one object but mutate another, or could modify objects that were merely visible rather than editable by the user’s organization.

The affected paths included:

• Event Reports tag removal: the route-authorized report could differ from the report ID used for tag detachment, enabling cross-organization tag removal from another event report

• Collection Elements bulk deletion: bulk deletion authorized against a collection whose ID matched the collection-element row ID, rather than the element’s actual parent collection, enabling deletion of elements from collections the user did not own.

• Analyst Data capture/update: nested analyst data updates could overwrite an existing record without applying the normal canEditAnalystData ownership check, enabling cross-organization overwrite of analyst data records.

• Template Elements editing: editing authorized against a template whose ID matched the template-element ID, rather than the element’s actual parent template, enabling unauthorized edits to another organization’s template elements.

• Decaying Model editing and mappings: write paths loaded models using view-scope access but did not verify edit ownership, enabling users to edit or remap visible models owned by another organization. 

Successful exploitation could allow an authenticated user with subsystem-specific permissions to perform unauthorized cross-organization modifications or deletions of MISP data, resulting in integrity loss, unauthorized tampering with shared intelligence, and disruption of analyst workflows.

MISP core contained multiple broken access-control flaws where authorization checks were performed against the wrong entity, or where ownership/editability checks were missing on write paths. In affected subsystems, a lower-privileged authenticated user with the relevant feature permission could cause the application to authorize one object but mutate another, or could modify objects that were merely visible rather than editable by the user’s organization.

The affected paths included:

• Event Reports tag removal: the route-authorized report could differ from the report ID used for tag detachment, enabling cross-organization tag removal from another event report

• Collection Elements bulk deletion: bulk deletion authorized against a collection whose ID matched the collection-element row ID, rather than the element’s actual parent collection, enabling deletion of elements from collections the user did not own.

• Analyst Data capture/update: nested analyst data updates could overwrite an existing record without applying the normal canEditAnalystData ownership check, enabling cross-organization overwrite of analyst data records.

• Template Elements editing: editing authorized against a template whose ID matched the template-element ID, rather than the element’s actual parent template, enabling unauthorized edits to another organization’s template elements.

• Decaying Model editing and mappings: write paths loaded models using view-scope access but did not verify edit ownership, enabling users to edit or remap visible models owned by another organization. 

Successful exploitation could allow an authenticated user with subsystem-specific permissions to perform unauthorized cross-organization modifications or deletions of MISP data, resulting in integrity loss, unauthorized tampering with shared intelligence, and disruption of analyst workflows.

MISP core contained multiple broken access-control flaws where authorization checks were performed against the wrong entity, or where ownership/editability checks were missing on write paths. In affected subsystems, a lower-privileged authenticated user with the relevant feature permission could cause the application to authorize one object but mutate another, or could modify objects that were merely visible rather than editable by the user’s organization.

The affected paths included:

• Event Reports tag removal: the route-authorized report could differ from the report ID used for tag detachment, enabling cross-organization tag removal from another event report

• Collection Elements bulk deletion: bulk deletion authorized against a collection whose ID matched the collection-element row ID, rather than the element’s actual parent collection, enabling deletion of elements from collections the user did not own.

• Analyst Data capture/update: nested analyst data updates could overwrite an existing record without applying the normal canEditAnalystData ownership check, enabling cross-organization overwrite of analyst data records.

• Template Elements editing: editing authorized against a template whose ID matched the template-element ID, rather than the element’s actual parent template, enabling unauthorized edits to another organization’s template elements.

• Decaying Model editing and mappings: write paths loaded models using view-scope access but did not verify edit ownership, enabling users to edit or remap visible models owned by another organization. 

Successful exploitation could allow an authenticated user with subsystem-specific permissions to perform unauthorized cross-organization modifications or deletions of MISP data, resulting in integrity loss, unauthorized tampering with shared intelligence, and disruption of analyst workflows.

MISP core contained multiple broken access-control flaws where authorization checks were performed against the wrong entity, or where ownership/editability checks were missing on write paths. In affected subsystems, a lower-privileged authenticated user with the relevant feature permission could cause the application to authorize one object but mutate another, or could modify objects that were merely visible rather than editable by the user’s organization.

The affected paths included:

• Event Reports tag removal: the route-authorized report could differ from the report ID used for tag detachment, enabling cross-organization tag removal from another event report

• Collection Elements bulk deletion: bulk deletion authorized against a collection whose ID matched the collection-element row ID, rather than the element’s actual parent collection, enabling deletion of elements from collections the user did not own.

• Analyst Data capture/update: nested analyst data updates could overwrite an existing record without applying the normal canEditAnalystData ownership check, enabling cross-organization overwrite of analyst data records.

• Template Elements editing: editing authorized against a template whose ID matched the template-element ID, rather than the element’s actual parent template, enabling unauthorized edits to another organization’s template elements.

• Decaying Model editing and mappings: write paths loaded models using view-scope access but did not verify edit ownership, enabling users to edit or remap visible models owned by another organization. 

Successful exploitation could allow an authenticated user with subsystem-specific permissions to perform unauthorized cross-organization modifications or deletions of MISP data, resulting in integrity loss, unauthorized tampering with shared intelligence, and disruption of analyst workflows.