CVE-2026-56268

Flowise before 3.1.2 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the /api/v1/chatflows/apikey/:apikey endpoint. When the keyonly query parameter is omitted (the default), the endpoint returns not only the chatflows bound to the supplied API key but also all chatflows across every workspace that have no API key assigned, because the underlying query lacks any workspace filter. An attacker with a valid API key for one workspace can therefore retrieve the full ChatFlow configuration (including flowData with system prompts and node configurations, chatbotConfig, apiConfig, and credential IDs) of unprotected chatflows belonging to other workspaces.

Flowise before 3.1.2 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the /api/v1/chatflows/apikey/:apikey endpoint. When the keyonly query parameter is omitted (the default), the endpoint returns not only the chatflows bound to the supplied API key but also all chatflows across every workspace that have no API key assigned, because the underlying query lacks any workspace filter. An attacker with a valid API key for one workspace can therefore retrieve the full ChatFlow configuration (including flowData with system prompts and node configurations, chatbotConfig, apiConfig, and credential IDs) of unprotected chatflows belonging to other workspaces.

Summary

The /api/v1/chatflows/apikey/:apikey endpoint (whitelisted, accessible with API key auth only) returns all chatflows bound to the provided API key AND all chatflows across the entire system that have no API key assigned. This crosses workspace boundaries, allowing a user in Workspace A who has a valid API key to read the full configuration (including flowData, chatbotConfig, system prompts, and node configurations) of chatflows from Workspace B, Workspace C, and all other workspaces, as long as those chatflows have no API key assigned.

Details

The controller at packages/server/src/controllers/chatflows/index.ts:90-107 validates the API key and calls the service:

const getChatflowByApiKey = async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
    try {
        const apikey = await apiKeyService.getApiKey(req.params.apikey)
        if (\!apikey) {
            return res.status(401).send("Unauthorized")
        }
        const apiResponse = await chatflowsService.getChatflowByApiKey(apikey.id, req.query.keyonly)
        return res.json(apiResponse)  // Returns full chatflow objects with flowData
    } catch (error) {
        next(error)
    }
}

The service at packages/server/src/services/chatflows/index.ts:223-245 builds the database query:

const getChatflowByApiKey = async (apiKeyId: string, keyonly?: unknown): Promise<any> => {
    const appServer = getRunningExpressApp()
    let query = appServer.AppDataSource.getRepository(ChatFlow)
        .createQueryBuilder("cf")
        .where("cf.apikeyid = :apikeyid", { apikeyid: apiKeyId })
    if (keyonly === undefined) {
        // When keyonly is not set (default), also return ALL chatflows with no API key
        query = query.orWhere("cf.apikeyid IS NULL").orWhere("cf.apikeyid = ''")
    }
    const dbResponse = await query.orderBy("cf.name", "ASC").getMany()
    return dbResponse  // Returns full ChatFlow entities including flowData
}

When keyonly is not provided as a query parameter (which is the default case), the query expands to include:

• All chatflows bound to the provided API key (same workspace, expected behavior)
• ALL chatflows with apikeyid IS NULL (any workspace, no workspace filter)
• ALL chatflows with empty apikeyid (any workspace, no workspace filter)

There is NO workspaceId filter in this query. The response includes the full ChatFlow entity, which contains:

• flowData - the complete workflow graph including system prompts, model names, internal URLs, custom code
• chatbotConfig - chatbot configuration including allowed origins
• apiConfig - API configuration and override settings
• textToSpeech / speechToText - TTS/STT configuration including credential IDs
• analytic - analytics configuration

PoC

# Step 1: Attacker has a valid API key for Workspace A
API_KEY="<attacker-workspace-a-api-key>"

# Step 2: Query the chatflows/apikey endpoint WITHOUT keyonly parameter
# Returns the attacker chatflows PLUS all chatflows without API keys from ALL workspaces
curl -s "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/chatflows/apikey/" | jq ".[].workspaceId"

# Step 3: With keyonly parameter, only chatflows bound to the API key are returned
curl -s "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/chatflows/apikey/?keyonly=true" | jq ".[].workspaceId"

Impact

• Cross-Workspace Information Disclosure: A user in any workspace can read the full configuration of chatflows from all other workspaces that do not have an API key assigned. This breaks workspace isolation.
• Intellectual Property Exposure: System prompts, custom function code, and workflow architecture of chatflows from other workspaces/organizations are exposed.
• Credential Reference Leakage: The textToSpeech and speechToText fields include credential IDs, which can be abused via the TTS generate endpoint.
• Amplified by Default: Most chatflows are created without an API key assigned (API keys are opt-in), so the…

Flowise before 3.1.2 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the /api/v1/chatflows/apikey/:apikey endpoint. When the keyonly query parameter is omitted (the default), the endpoint returns not only the chatflows bound to the supplied API key but also all chatflows across every workspace that have no API key assigned, because the underlying query lacks any workspace filter. An attacker with a valid API key for one workspace can therefore retrieve the full ChatFlow configuration (including flowData with system prompts and node configurations, chatbotConfig, apiConfig, and credential IDs) of unprotected chatflows belonging to other workspaces.

Flowise before 3.1.2 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the /api/v1/chatflows/apikey/:apikey endpoint. When the keyonly query parameter is omitted (the default), the endpoint returns not only the chatflows bound to the supplied API key but also all chatflows across every workspace that have no API key assigned, because the underlying query lacks any workspace filter. An attacker with a valid API key for one workspace can therefore retrieve the full ChatFlow configuration (including flowData with system prompts and node configurations, chatbotConfig, apiConfig, and credential IDs) of unprotected chatflows belonging to other workspaces.

Summary

The /api/v1/chatflows/apikey/:apikey endpoint (whitelisted, accessible with API key auth only) returns all chatflows bound to the provided API key AND all chatflows across the entire system that have no API key assigned. This crosses workspace boundaries, allowing a user in Workspace A who has a valid API key to read the full configuration (including flowData, chatbotConfig, system prompts, and node configurations) of chatflows from Workspace B, Workspace C, and all other workspaces, as long as those chatflows have no API key assigned.

Details

The controller at packages/server/src/controllers/chatflows/index.ts:90-107 validates the API key and calls the service:

const getChatflowByApiKey = async (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => {
    try {
        const apikey = await apiKeyService.getApiKey(req.params.apikey)
        if (\!apikey) {
            return res.status(401).send("Unauthorized")
        }
        const apiResponse = await chatflowsService.getChatflowByApiKey(apikey.id, req.query.keyonly)
        return res.json(apiResponse)  // Returns full chatflow objects with flowData
    } catch (error) {
        next(error)
    }
}

The service at packages/server/src/services/chatflows/index.ts:223-245 builds the database query:

const getChatflowByApiKey = async (apiKeyId: string, keyonly?: unknown): Promise<any> => {
    const appServer = getRunningExpressApp()
    let query = appServer.AppDataSource.getRepository(ChatFlow)
        .createQueryBuilder("cf")
        .where("cf.apikeyid = :apikeyid", { apikeyid: apiKeyId })
    if (keyonly === undefined) {
        // When keyonly is not set (default), also return ALL chatflows with no API key
        query = query.orWhere("cf.apikeyid IS NULL").orWhere("cf.apikeyid = ''")
    }
    const dbResponse = await query.orderBy("cf.name", "ASC").getMany()
    return dbResponse  // Returns full ChatFlow entities including flowData
}

When keyonly is not provided as a query parameter (which is the default case), the query expands to include:

• All chatflows bound to the provided API key (same workspace, expected behavior)
• ALL chatflows with apikeyid IS NULL (any workspace, no workspace filter)
• ALL chatflows with empty apikeyid (any workspace, no workspace filter)

There is NO workspaceId filter in this query. The response includes the full ChatFlow entity, which contains:

• flowData - the complete workflow graph including system prompts, model names, internal URLs, custom code
• chatbotConfig - chatbot configuration including allowed origins
• apiConfig - API configuration and override settings
• textToSpeech / speechToText - TTS/STT configuration including credential IDs
• analytic - analytics configuration

PoC

# Step 1: Attacker has a valid API key for Workspace A
API_KEY="<attacker-workspace-a-api-key>"

# Step 2: Query the chatflows/apikey endpoint WITHOUT keyonly parameter
# Returns the attacker chatflows PLUS all chatflows without API keys from ALL workspaces
curl -s "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/chatflows/apikey/" | jq ".[].workspaceId"

# Step 3: With keyonly parameter, only chatflows bound to the API key are returned
curl -s "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/chatflows/apikey/?keyonly=true" | jq ".[].workspaceId"

Impact

• Cross-Workspace Information Disclosure: A user in any workspace can read the full configuration of chatflows from all other workspaces that do not have an API key assigned. This breaks workspace isolation.
• Intellectual Property Exposure: System prompts, custom function code, and workflow architecture of chatflows from other workspaces/organizations are exposed.
• Credential Reference Leakage: The textToSpeech and speechToText fields include credential IDs, which can be abused via the TTS generate endpoint.
• Amplified by Default: Most chatflows are created without an API key assigned (API keys are opt-in), so the…