CVE-2026-54560

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. From 4.12.0 until 4.16.1, Cloudreve's OAuth access tokens are issued without the OAuth client_id claim, so the JWT verifier does not load token scopes into request context and RequiredScopes treats the request like non-scoped session authentication, allowing a low-scope OAuth access token to call APIs requiring higher scopes such as file, share, workflow, user setting, WebDAV account, and potentially admin scopes. This issue is fixed in version 4.16.1.

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. From 4.12.0 until 4.16.1, Cloudreve's OAuth access tokens are issued without the OAuth client_id claim, so the JWT verifier does not load token scopes into request context and RequiredScopes treats the request like non-scoped session authentication, allowing a low-scope OAuth access token to call APIs requiring higher scopes such as file, share, workflow, user setting, WebDAV account, and potentially admin scopes. This issue is fixed in version 4.16.1.

Summary

Cloudreve's OAuth access tokens can bypass OAuth scope enforcement.

This does not appear to be the intended design. The documentation describes OAuth client permissions/scopes, the API has an insufficient-scope error code, and the code comments say RequiredScopes(...) should verify scopes when a token has scopes, while skipping checks only for non-scoped session-based authentication.

However, OAuth access tokens are issued without the OAuth client_id claim. Later, the JWT verifier only loads scopes into the request context when claims.ClientID != "". Because the OAuth access token has no client_id, its scopes are not loaded, and RequiredScopes(...) treats the request like a non-scoped first-party/session token and skips scope checks.

As a result, a low-scope OAuth access token, for example one granted only openid, can call APIs requiring higher scopes such as file, share, workflow, user setting, WebDAV account, and potentially admin scopes when the authorizing user is an administrator.

Why this seems unintended

Cloudreve appears to have an explicit OAuth scope model:

1. The official docs describe OAuth client permissions/scopes and require the authorization request to include requested scopes.
2. The API error code list includes an OAuth insufficient-scope error.
3. RequiredScopes(...) is used across sensitive API groups such as files, shares, workflows, user settings, WebDAV devices, and admin APIs.
4. The middleware comment says scope checks are skipped only when hasScopes is false, for example session-based authentication.
5. Default OAuth clients created during migration explicitly list scopes such as Files.Write, Workflow.Write, and Shares.Write.

This suggests the intended design is:

• First-party/session tokens may be non-scoped and skip OAuth scope checks.
• OAuth access tokens should carry scope metadata and be checked against RequiredScopes(...).

The current implementation makes OAuth access tokens fall into the first category by mistake.

Affected code

In the OAuth authorization code exchange, Cloudreve passes both ClientID and Scopes into token issuance:

token, err := tokenAuth.Issue(c, &auth.IssueTokenArgs{
    User:               user,
    ClientID:           s.ClientID,
    Scopes:             authCode.Scopes,
    RefreshTTLOverride: refreshTTLOverride,
})

Location:

- service/oauth/oauth.go

In Issue(...), the access token includes Scopes but does not include ClientID:

accessToken, err := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, Claims{
    TokenType: TokenTypeAccess,
    RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
        Subject:   uidEncoded,
        NotBefore: jwt.NewNumericDate(issueDate),
        ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(accessTokenExpired),
    },
    Scopes: args.Scopes,
}).SignedString(t.secret)

By contrast, the refresh token does include both:

Scopes:   args.Scopes,
ClientID: args.ClientID,

Location:

- pkg/auth/jwt.go

During request authentication, scopes are only inserted into request context if ClientID is present:

if claims.ClientID != "" {
    util.WithValue(c, ScopeContextKey{}, claims.Scopes)
}

Location:

- pkg/auth/jwt.go

Then CheckScope(...) skips scope enforcement if no scopes are present in context:

hasScopes, tokenScopes := GetScopesFromContext(c)
if !hasScopes {
    return nil
}

Location:

- pkg/auth/jwt.go

RequiredScopes(...) relies on this check:

if err := auth.CheckScope(c, requiredScopes...); err != nil {
    c.JSON(200, serializer.Err(c, err))
    c.Abort()
    return
}

Location:

- middleware/auth.go

Sensitive route groups protected by RequiredScopes(...) include:

- Files: Files.Read / Files.Write
- Shares: Shares.Read / Shares.Write
- Workflows: Workflow.Read / Workflow.Write
- User settings and security info
- WebDAV device/account management
-…

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. From 4.12.0 until 4.16.1, Cloudreve's OAuth access tokens are issued without the OAuth client_id claim, so the JWT verifier does not load token scopes into request context and RequiredScopes treats the request like non-scoped session authentication, allowing a low-scope OAuth access token to call APIs requiring higher scopes such as file, share, workflow, user setting, WebDAV account, and potentially admin scopes. This issue is fixed in version 4.16.1.

Cloudreve is a self-hosted file management and sharing system. From 4.12.0 until 4.16.1, Cloudreve's OAuth access tokens are issued without the OAuth client_id claim, so the JWT verifier does not load token scopes into request context and RequiredScopes treats the request like non-scoped session authentication, allowing a low-scope OAuth access token to call APIs requiring higher scopes such as file, share, workflow, user setting, WebDAV account, and potentially admin scopes. This issue is fixed in version 4.16.1.

Summary

Cloudreve's OAuth access tokens can bypass OAuth scope enforcement.

This does not appear to be the intended design. The documentation describes OAuth client permissions/scopes, the API has an insufficient-scope error code, and the code comments say RequiredScopes(...) should verify scopes when a token has scopes, while skipping checks only for non-scoped session-based authentication.

However, OAuth access tokens are issued without the OAuth client_id claim. Later, the JWT verifier only loads scopes into the request context when claims.ClientID != "". Because the OAuth access token has no client_id, its scopes are not loaded, and RequiredScopes(...) treats the request like a non-scoped first-party/session token and skips scope checks.

As a result, a low-scope OAuth access token, for example one granted only openid, can call APIs requiring higher scopes such as file, share, workflow, user setting, WebDAV account, and potentially admin scopes when the authorizing user is an administrator.

Why this seems unintended

Cloudreve appears to have an explicit OAuth scope model:

1. The official docs describe OAuth client permissions/scopes and require the authorization request to include requested scopes.
2. The API error code list includes an OAuth insufficient-scope error.
3. RequiredScopes(...) is used across sensitive API groups such as files, shares, workflows, user settings, WebDAV devices, and admin APIs.
4. The middleware comment says scope checks are skipped only when hasScopes is false, for example session-based authentication.
5. Default OAuth clients created during migration explicitly list scopes such as Files.Write, Workflow.Write, and Shares.Write.

This suggests the intended design is:

• First-party/session tokens may be non-scoped and skip OAuth scope checks.
• OAuth access tokens should carry scope metadata and be checked against RequiredScopes(...).

The current implementation makes OAuth access tokens fall into the first category by mistake.

Affected code

In the OAuth authorization code exchange, Cloudreve passes both ClientID and Scopes into token issuance:

token, err := tokenAuth.Issue(c, &auth.IssueTokenArgs{
    User:               user,
    ClientID:           s.ClientID,
    Scopes:             authCode.Scopes,
    RefreshTTLOverride: refreshTTLOverride,
})

Location:

- service/oauth/oauth.go

In Issue(...), the access token includes Scopes but does not include ClientID:

accessToken, err := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, Claims{
    TokenType: TokenTypeAccess,
    RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
        Subject:   uidEncoded,
        NotBefore: jwt.NewNumericDate(issueDate),
        ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(accessTokenExpired),
    },
    Scopes: args.Scopes,
}).SignedString(t.secret)

By contrast, the refresh token does include both:

Scopes:   args.Scopes,
ClientID: args.ClientID,

Location:

- pkg/auth/jwt.go

During request authentication, scopes are only inserted into request context if ClientID is present:

if claims.ClientID != "" {
    util.WithValue(c, ScopeContextKey{}, claims.Scopes)
}

Location:

- pkg/auth/jwt.go

Then CheckScope(...) skips scope enforcement if no scopes are present in context:

hasScopes, tokenScopes := GetScopesFromContext(c)
if !hasScopes {
    return nil
}

Location:

- pkg/auth/jwt.go

RequiredScopes(...) relies on this check:

if err := auth.CheckScope(c, requiredScopes...); err != nil {
    c.JSON(200, serializer.Err(c, err))
    c.Abort()
    return
}

Location:

- middleware/auth.go

Sensitive route groups protected by RequiredScopes(...) include:

- Files: Files.Read / Files.Write
- Shares: Shares.Read / Shares.Write
- Workflows: Workflow.Read / Workflow.Write
- User settings and security info
- WebDAV device/account management
-…

Cloudreve: OAuth access tokens bypass scope enforcement due to missing client_id claim in github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve

This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:

• Update to version 0.0.20260723T184607 2026-07-23T18:46:07Z (jsc#PED-11136).

Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:

• GO-2026-4730 CVE-2026-33022 GHSA-cv4x-93xx-wgfj
• GO-2026-4761 CVE-2026-33211 GHSA-j5q5-j9gm-2w5c
• GO-2026-5102 CVE-2026-45021 GHSA-3vcp-chfh-f6r2
• GO-2026-5272 CVE-2026-40938 GHSA-94jr-7pqp-xhcq
• GO-2026-5486 CVE-2026-40924 GHSA-m2cx-gpqf-qf74
• GO-2026-5542 CVE-2026-40090 GHSA-pj97-4p9w-gx3q
• GO-2026-5630 CVE-2026-25542 GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr
• GO-2026-5643 CVE-2026-40923 GHSA-rx35-6rhx-7858
• GO-2026-5675 CVE-2026-41492 GHSA-vvf7-6rmr-m29q
• GO-2026-5711 CVE-2026-40161 GHSA-wjxp-xrpv-xpff
• GO-2026-5746 CVE-2026-41567 GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r
• GO-2026-5749 CVE-2026-41328 GHSA-x92x-px7w-4gx4
• GO-2026-5837 CVE-2026-44840 GHSA-q2m9-6jp9-c6mc
• GO-2026-5929 CVE-2026-44342 GHSA-26v7-h57m-gh9m
• GO-2026-5930 CVE-2026-33655 GHSA-6qcr-qxgr-m7fv
• GO-2026-5933 GHSA-3g4q-2f67-2gvh
• GO-2026-5934 GHSA-59qp-cfj3-rp64
• GO-2026-5935 GHSA-7856-g3gv-9wq8
• GO-2026-5936 CVE-2026-53552 GHSA-26rh-24rg-j3vv
• GO-2026-5937 CVE-2026-53508 GHSA-2jcc-mxv7-p3f9
• GO-2026-5938 CVE-2026-53553 GHSA-4g5x-hcwm-82jw
• GO-2026-5939 CVE-2026-10517 GHSA-698x-9w2p-7vvp
• GO-2026-5940 CVE-2026-53572 GHSA-6w3m-4hhp-775q
• GO-2026-5941 CVE-2026-53487 GHSA-gvhc-wv3v-7pf8
• GO-2026-5942 CVE-2026-46600
• GO-2026-5944 CVE-2026-50197 GHSA-659f-rgp5-w4wf
• GO-2026-5945 CVE-2026-6815 GHSA-rmxx-v9rj-vpvg
• GO-2026-5946 CVE-2026-52831 GHSA-v5px-423j-pf7p
• GO-2026-5947 CVE-2026-53649 GHSA-xqhv-chqm-fhcc
• GO-2026-5948 CVE-2026-50554 GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf
• GO-2026-5949 CVE-2026-50553 GHSA-rqrh-8wpv-x7hh
• GO-2026-5950 CVE-2026-53602 GHSA-339v-266x-79xr
• GO-2026-5951 CVE-2026-10219 GHSA-6jm8-4fhr-5w64
• GO-2026-5952 CVE-2026-49834 GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6
• GO-2026-5953 CVE-2026-9094 GHSA-c9w5-qp6m-m395
• GO-2026-5956 CVE-2026-55252 GHSA-h5g6-xmh4-hc37
• GO-2026-5957 CVE-2026-54158 GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r
• GO-2026-5958 CVE-2026-54068 GHSA-gcm7-57gf-953c
• GO-2026-5959 CVE-2026-54072 GHSA-h29v-hj44-q8cv
• GO-2026-5961 CVE-2026-54069 GHSA-hvr9-72v2-fff3
• GO-2026-5962 CVE-2026-54088 GHSA-m93h-4hw7-5qcm
• GO-2026-5963 CVE-2026-54067 GHSA-mvjr-vv3c-w4qv
• GO-2026-5964 CVE-2026-54066 GHSA-p4m3-mgmm-c664
• GO-2026-5965 CVE-2026-54070 GHSA-w7cg-whh7-xp28
• GO-2026-5966 CVE-2026-54089 GHSA-xqp3-jq6g-x3qm
• GO-2026-5967 CVE-2026-50551 GHSA-56mp-4f3v-fgj2
• GO-2026-5968 CVE-2026-54174 GHSA-fpg8-7664-jc5q
• GO-2026-5969 GHSA-g936-7jqj-mwv8
• GO-2026-5970 CVE-2026-56852
• GO-2026-5973 CVE-2026-54250 GHSA-jxr7-mqhw-9p98
• GO-2026-5974 CVE-2026-44300 GHSA-wmj8-9953-vff5
• GO-2026-5975 CVE-2026-50018 GHSA-42j2-w334-qxw7
• GO-2026-5976 CVE-2026-50141 GHSA-g7mm-9vx7-jm7h
• GO-2026-5977 CVE-2026-50013 GHSA-qrh4-p6v4-mrfg
• GO-2026-5978 CVE-2026-50125 GHSA-qw5r-ppcg-f8rj
• GO-2026-5979 CVE-2026-50006 GHSA-xrcf-6jh3-ggvx
• GO-2026-5980 CVE-2026-50158 GHSA-2c7f-fxww-6w6c
• GO-2026-5981 GHSA-mqxv-9rm6-w8qc
• GO-2026-5982 GHSA-pqg7-v6wh-3pfp
• GO-2026-5984 CVE-2026-53604 GHSA-2p2f-px33-4vv5
• GO-2026-5985 GHSA-7rx3-5wx3-5v76
• GO-2026-5986 CVE-2026-61699 GHSA-cm26-5974-52h8
• GO-2026-5987 CVE-2026-55513 GHSA-g4x6-jcvr-9m3g
• GO-2026-5988 CVE-2026-54628 GHSA-hwrq-8wxh-q4xv
• GO-2026-5989 CVE-2026-55512 GHSA-m3cx-mwpg-32jg
• GO-2026-5990 CVE-2026-54629 GHSA-mf78-3rpf-r784
• GO-2026-5991 CVE-2026-53603 GHSA-q4vm-pq3q-8wgq
• GO-2026-5992 CVE-2026-61549 GHSA-qf34-295c-26v8
• GO-2026-5996 CVE-2026-54450 GHSA-pph6-vfjv-vpjw
• GO-2026-5997 CVE-2026-54452 GHSA-xgch-x3mx-cm3c
• GO-2026-5998 CVE-2026-54495 GHSA-398h-7f66-3h4p
• GO-2026-5999 CVE-2026-10814 GHSA-jh6h-v6mp-h22v
• GO-2026-6002 CVE-2026-58196 GHSA-pr64-jmmf-jp54
• GO-2026-6003 CVE-2026-53714 GHSA-22xc-xg2r-9j7v
• GO-2026-6004 CVE-2026-52833 GHSA-3v79-m2cg-89ww
• GO-2026-6005 CVE-2026-53715 GHSA-8fv2-88gg-hm7q
• GO-2026-6006 CVE-2026-53716 GHSA-cxpq-8v7q-cg56 *…