CVE-2026-47361

In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v541-5.9.2, BubbleChatActivity is exported with no permission guard and accepts a SEND intent with a caller-supplied conversation_id. When the activity closes and no in-process session matches that ID, it unconditionally cancels notification ID 9201 (the Bits AI chat notification), with no check on the caller's identity or ownership of the conversation. This requires a malicious application co-installed on the victim's device. Impact: A co-installed application can silently dismiss the victim's Bits AI chat notification. No chat content is exposed; conversation data remains server-authentication gated and is never returned to the caller.

In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v541-5.9.2, BubbleChatActivity is exported with no permission guard and accepts a SEND intent with a caller-supplied conversation_id. When the activity closes and no in-process session matches that ID, it unconditionally cancels notification ID 9201 (the Bits AI chat notification), with no check on the caller's identity or ownership of the conversation. This requires a malicious application co-installed on the victim's device. Impact: A co-installed application can silently dismiss the victim's Bits AI chat notification. No chat content is exposed; conversation data remains server-authentication gated and is never returned to the caller.

BubbleChatActivity in the Datadog Android application is declared android:exported="true" with no permission guard and accepts a SEND intent with mimeType text/plain. The activity reads a conversation_id from Intent extras and, on onDestroy, calls BubbleChatNotification.dismiss whenever no active in-process session matches the caller-supplied conversation_id. BubbleChatNotification.dismiss unconditionally cancels notification ID 9201 — the hard-coded Bits AI chat notification — using NotificationManager.cancel, with no validation of the caller's identity or ownership of the supplied conversation_id. A zero-permission co-installed application can therefore launch BubbleChatActivity with any random conversation_id; when the activity is finished, the Bits AI chat notification is cancelled on the victim device. No data exposure: chat content is server-authentication gated and is never returned to the caller. Shortcut removal is scoped to the attacker-supplied conversation ID, which is a random string and is not reachable without prior knowledge. Impact is confined to denial of the Bits AI chat notification (a nuisance and a potential aid to phishing of in-app workflows).

In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v541-5.9.2, BubbleChatActivity is exported with no permission guard and accepts a SEND intent with a caller-supplied conversation_id. When the activity closes and no in-process session matches that ID, it unconditionally cancels notification ID 9201 (the Bits AI chat notification), with no check on the caller's identity or ownership of the conversation. This requires a malicious application co-installed on the victim's device. Impact: A co-installed application can silently dismiss the victim's Bits AI chat notification. No chat content is exposed; conversation data remains server-authentication gated and is never returned to the caller.