CVE-2026-72770

n8n versions before 1.123.67 contain a path traversal vulnerability in the Git node's fetch, pull, and push-tags operations that allows authenticated users to bypass repository-path containment checks. Attackers with workflow create/execute rights can point allowlisted remote configurations at local paths outside the sandbox to pull arbitrary git repositories and read their files and history.

n8n versions before 1.123.67 contain a path traversal vulnerability in the Git node's fetch, pull, and push-tags operations that allows authenticated users to bypass repository-path containment checks. Attackers with workflow create/execute rights can point allowlisted remote configurations at local paths outside the sandbox to pull arbitrary git repositories and read their files and history.

Impact

Authenticated n8n users with workflow create/execute rights could use the Git node's fetch, pull, or push-tags operations to bypass the repository-path containment checks that already protected clone and push. By pointing an allowlisted remote configuration value at a local path outside the intended sandbox, an attacker could pull an arbitrary local git repository into the workspace and subsequently read its files and history.

Patches

The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.67, 2.31.5, and 2.32.1. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:

• Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only.
• Disable the Git node by adding n8n-nodes-base.git to the NODES_EXCLUDE environment variable.

These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.

n8n versions before 1.123.67 contain a path traversal vulnerability in the Git node's fetch, pull, and push-tags operations that allows authenticated users to bypass repository-path containment checks. Attackers with workflow create/execute rights can point allowlisted remote configurations at local paths outside the sandbox to pull arbitrary git repositories and read their files and history.

n8n versions before 1.123.67 contain a path traversal vulnerability in the Git node's fetch, pull, and push-tags operations that allows authenticated users to bypass repository-path containment checks. Attackers with workflow create/execute rights can point allowlisted remote configurations at local paths outside the sandbox to pull arbitrary git repositories and read their files and history.

n8n versions before 1.123.67 contain a path traversal vulnerability in the Git node's fetch, pull, and push-tags operations that allows authenticated users to bypass repository-path containment checks. Attackers with workflow create/execute rights can point allowlisted remote configurations at local paths outside the sandbox to pull arbitrary git repositories and read their files and history.

Impact

Authenticated n8n users with workflow create/execute rights could use the Git node's fetch, pull, or push-tags operations to bypass the repository-path containment checks that already protected clone and push. By pointing an allowlisted remote configuration value at a local path outside the intended sandbox, an attacker could pull an arbitrary local git repository into the workspace and subsequently read its files and history.

Patches

The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.67, 2.31.5, and 2.32.1. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:

• Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only.
• Disable the Git node by adding n8n-nodes-base.git to the NODES_EXCLUDE environment variable.

These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.

Root has patched GHSA-gf29-4f56-r2jf in the n8n package for Root:npm. Multiple fixed versions available.