CVE-2026-19594

Insufficient input sanitization in Snowflake Python API (snowflake.core) versions prior to 1.13.0 allowed confused-deputy privilege escalation through two related weaknesses: path traversal (CWE-22) via unencoded .. identifier path segments, and HTTP parameter pollution (CWE-141) via unencoded &/#/= characters in query string values. An attacker with access to a downstream application built on snowflake.core could exploit the path traversal by supplying .. as an object name, causing snowflake.core to issue REST requests against a parent resource or exploit the parameter pollution by injecting &/#/= into a free-form name field to override constraints on swap, clone, or rename operations — all executed under the application's privileged session. Successful exploitation requires the attacker to control an identifier or object-name string in an application built on snowflake.core that passes it to snowflake.core under a higher-privileged Snowflake session (e.g., an EXECUTE AS OWNER stored procedure, Streamlit app, or Native App). The fix is available in Snowflake Python API version 1.13.0, which also addresses several additional security findings. Users must manually upgrade.

Insufficient input sanitization in Snowflake Python API (snowflake.core) versions prior to 1.13.0 allowed confused-deputy privilege escalation through two related weaknesses: path traversal (CWE-22) via unencoded .. identifier path segments, and HTTP parameter pollution (CWE-141) via unencoded &/#/= characters in query string values. An attacker with access to a downstream application built on snowflake.core could exploit the path traversal by supplying .. as an object name, causing snowflake.core to issue REST requests against a parent resource or exploit the parameter pollution by injecting &/#/= into a free-form name field to override constraints on swap, clone, or rename operations — all executed under the application's privileged session. Successful exploitation requires the attacker to control an identifier or object-name string in an application built on snowflake.core that passes it to snowflake.core under a higher-privileged Snowflake session (e.g., an EXECUTE AS OWNER stored procedure, Streamlit app, or Native App). The fix is available in Snowflake Python API version 1.13.0, which also addresses several additional security findings. Users must manually upgrade.

Insufficient input sanitization in Snowflake Python API (snowflake.core) versions prior to 1.13.0 allowed confused-deputy privilege escalation through two related weaknesses: path traversal (CWE-22) via unencoded .. identifier path segments, and HTTP parameter pollution (CWE-141) via unencoded &/#/= characters in query string values. An attacker with access to a downstream application built on snowflake.core could exploit the path traversal by supplying .. as an object name, causing snowflake.core to issue REST requests against a parent resource or exploit the parameter pollution by injecting &/#/= into a free-form name field to override constraints on swap, clone, or rename operations — all executed under the application's privileged session. Successful exploitation requires the attacker to control an identifier or object-name string in an application built on snowflake.core that passes it to snowflake.core under a higher-privileged Snowflake session (e.g., an EXECUTE AS OWNER stored procedure, Streamlit app, or Native App). The fix is available in Snowflake Python API version 1.13.0, which also addresses several additional security findings. Users must manually upgrade.

Insufficient input sanitization in Snowflake Python API (snowflake.core) versions prior to 1.13.0 allowed confused-deputy privilege escalation through two related weaknesses: path traversal (CWE-22) via unencoded .. identifier path segments, and HTTP parameter pollution (CWE-141) via unencoded &/#/= characters in query string values. An attacker with access to a downstream application built on snowflake.core could exploit the path traversal by supplying .. as an object name, causing snowflake.core to issue REST requests against a parent resource or exploit the parameter pollution by injecting &/#/= into a free-form name field to override constraints on swap, clone, or rename operations — all executed under the application's privileged session. Successful exploitation requires the attacker to control an identifier or object-name string in an application built on snowflake.core that passes it to snowflake.core under a higher-privileged Snowflake session (e.g., an EXECUTE AS OWNER stored procedure, Streamlit app, or Native App). The fix is available in Snowflake Python API version 1.13.0, which also addresses several additional security findings. Users must manually upgrade.