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CVE-2026-55534

PraisonAI serve agents --api-key is ignored, allowing unauthenticated remote agent execution

8.6 HighFix available

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From praisonai 4.6.34 until 4.6.58, praisonai serve agents accepts --api-key but _create_agents_app() does not authenticate POST /agents or POST /agents/{agent_name}. A network caller can invoke configured agents without credentials even when an API key was supplied. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.58.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
None
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
Low
Availability
High

Exploit likelihood

0.45%Up 0.2 points since Aug 26, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 8.6

PraisonAI serve agents --api-key is ignored, allowing unauthenticated remote agent execution

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From praisonai 4.6.34 until 4.6.58, praisonai serve agents accepts --api-key but _create_agents_app() does not authenticate POST /agents or POST /agents/{agent_name}. A network caller can invoke configured agents without credentials even when an API key was supplied. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.58.

Record
CVE-2026-55534
CVSS 3.1
8.6 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H
Weakness
CWE-306
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-65500 8.6

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From praisonai 4.6.34 until 4.6.58, praisonai serve agents accepts --api-key but _create_agents_app() does not authenticate POST /agents or POST /agents/{agent_name}. A network caller can invoke configured agents without credentials even when an API key was supplied. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.58.

Record
EUVD-2026-65500
CVSS 3.1
8.6 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-7ww9-85pg-cv4x 8.6

PraisonAI serve agents --api-key is ignored, allowing unauthenticated remote agent execution

Summary

PraisonAI's praisonai serve agents command exposes --api-key as the documented authentication control for production/external deployments, but the configured key is not enforced on the public agent invocation compatibility endpoints.

An operator can start the server with --api-key and bind it to 0.0.0.0, but any network- reachable caller can still invoke agents through POST /agents or POST /agents/ {agent_name} without Authorization, X-API-Key, a query token, or any other credential.

Confirmed vulnerable:

  • v4.6.48 / commit d5f1114aaf1a2e9f121a6e66b929149ca2201f1d
  • v4.6.34 / commit e5928449f73f66cc8af1de61621aa974ab255133

Likely affected range: >= 4.6.34, <= 4.6.48.

This is distinct from CVE-2026-44338 / GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj, which covered the legacy Flask api_server.py path before 4.6.34. This report concerns the newer FastAPI serve agents --api-key code path and is confirmed in v4.6.48.

Details

The CLI accepts and forwards an API key:

  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:156 defines praisonai serve agents
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:162 exposes --api-key
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:175-176 forwards the supplied key
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:191 handles the agents subcommand
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:199 parses api_key into the config

However, _create_agents_app() never uses config["api_key"] to create middleware or a FastAPI auth dependency:

  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:228 creates the FastAPI app
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:287 registers POST {path} with no auth dependency
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:346 registers POST /agents/{agent_name} with no auth dependency
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:356-370 executes the registered agent directly

The same app also mounts praisonai.api.agent_invoke, whose /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/ invoke route is protected separately by CALL_SERVER_TOKEN. That means the protected / api/v1 route and the unauthenticated /agents compatibility routes coexist in the same server. Setting --api-key does not protect the compatibility routes.

PoC

This local-only PoC does not open a network listener and does not call an LLM provider. It constructs the FastAPI app through the real ServeHandler._create_agents_app() path with api_key set, registers a fake agent, and sends an unauthenticated request using FastAPI TestClient.

#!/usr/bin/env python3
from __future__ import annotations

import sys
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path

REPO = Path("/path/to/PraisonAI")
sys.path[:0] = [
    str(REPO / "src" / "praisonai"),
    str(REPO / "src" / "praisonai-agents"),
]

class FakeAgent:
    def __init__(self):
        self.calls = []

    def start(self, query):
        self.calls.append(query)
        return f"fake-agent-ran:{query}"

def main() -> None:
    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
    from praisonai.cli.features.serve import ServeHandler
    from praisonai.api import agent_invoke

    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
        agents_yaml = Path(tmp) / "agents.yaml"
        agents_yaml.write_text(
            "roles:\n"
            "  placeholder:\n"
            "    role: Placeholder\n"
            "    goal: Placeholder\n"
            "    backstory: Placeholder\n",
            encoding="utf-8",
        )

        handler = ServeHandler()
        app = handler._create_agents_app(
            {
                "file": str(agents_yaml),
                "host": "0.0.0.0",
                "port": 8000,
                "path": "/agents",
                "reload": False,
                "api_key": "operator-secret-api-key",
            }
       …
Record
GHSA-7ww9-85pg-cv4x
CVSS 3.1
8.6 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H
Weakness
CWE-306
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 8.6

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From praisonai 4.6.34 until 4.6.58, praisonai serve agents accepts --api-key but _create_agents_app() does not authenticate POST /agents or POST /agents/{agent_name}. A network caller can invoke configured agents without credentials even when an API key was supplied. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.58.

Record
CVE-2026-55534
CVSS 3.1
8.6 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H
Weakness
CWE-306
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV 8.6

PraisonAI serve agents --api-key is ignored, allowing unauthenticated remote agent execution

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From praisonai 4.6.34 until 4.6.58, praisonai serve agents accepts --api-key but _create_agents_app() does not authenticate POST /agents or POST /agents/{agent_name}. A network caller can invoke configured agents without credentials even when an API key was supplied. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.58.

Record
CVE-2026-55534
CVSS 3.1
8.6 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H
Weakness
CWE-306
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-7ww9-85pg-cv4x 8.6

PraisonAI serve agents --api-key is ignored, allowing unauthenticated remote agent execution

Summary

PraisonAI's praisonai serve agents command exposes --api-key as the documented authentication control for production/external deployments, but the configured key is not enforced on the public agent invocation compatibility endpoints.

An operator can start the server with --api-key and bind it to 0.0.0.0, but any network- reachable caller can still invoke agents through POST /agents or POST /agents/ {agent_name} without Authorization, X-API-Key, a query token, or any other credential.

Confirmed vulnerable:

  • v4.6.48 / commit d5f1114aaf1a2e9f121a6e66b929149ca2201f1d
  • v4.6.34 / commit e5928449f73f66cc8af1de61621aa974ab255133

Likely affected range: >= 4.6.34, <= 4.6.48.

This is distinct from CVE-2026-44338 / GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj, which covered the legacy Flask api_server.py path before 4.6.34. This report concerns the newer FastAPI serve agents --api-key code path and is confirmed in v4.6.48.

Details

The CLI accepts and forwards an API key:

  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:156 defines praisonai serve agents
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:162 exposes --api-key
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:175-176 forwards the supplied key
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:191 handles the agents subcommand
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:199 parses api_key into the config

However, _create_agents_app() never uses config["api_key"] to create middleware or a FastAPI auth dependency:

  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:228 creates the FastAPI app
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:287 registers POST {path} with no auth dependency
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:346 registers POST /agents/{agent_name} with no auth dependency
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:356-370 executes the registered agent directly

The same app also mounts praisonai.api.agent_invoke, whose /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/ invoke route is protected separately by CALL_SERVER_TOKEN. That means the protected / api/v1 route and the unauthenticated /agents compatibility routes coexist in the same server. Setting --api-key does not protect the compatibility routes.

PoC

This local-only PoC does not open a network listener and does not call an LLM provider. It constructs the FastAPI app through the real ServeHandler._create_agents_app() path with api_key set, registers a fake agent, and sends an unauthenticated request using FastAPI TestClient.

#!/usr/bin/env python3
from __future__ import annotations

import sys
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path

REPO = Path("/path/to/PraisonAI")
sys.path[:0] = [
    str(REPO / "src" / "praisonai"),
    str(REPO / "src" / "praisonai-agents"),
]

class FakeAgent:
    def __init__(self):
        self.calls = []

    def start(self, query):
        self.calls.append(query)
        return f"fake-agent-ran:{query}"

def main() -> None:
    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
    from praisonai.cli.features.serve import ServeHandler
    from praisonai.api import agent_invoke

    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
        agents_yaml = Path(tmp) / "agents.yaml"
        agents_yaml.write_text(
            "roles:\n"
            "  placeholder:\n"
            "    role: Placeholder\n"
            "    goal: Placeholder\n"
            "    backstory: Placeholder\n",
            encoding="utf-8",
        )

        handler = ServeHandler()
        app = handler._create_agents_app(
            {
                "file": str(agents_yaml),
                "host": "0.0.0.0",
                "port": 8000,
                "path": "/agents",
                "reload": False,
                "api_key": "operator-secret-api-key",
            }
       …
Record
GHSA-7ww9-85pg-cv4x
CVSS 3.1
8.6 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H
Weakness
CWE-306
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVPYSEC-2026-3887 8.6

PraisonAI serve agents --api-key is ignored, allowing unauthenticated remote agent execution

Summary

PraisonAI's praisonai serve agents command exposes --api-key as the documented authentication control for production/external deployments, but the configured key is not enforced on the public agent invocation compatibility endpoints.

An operator can start the server with --api-key and bind it to 0.0.0.0, but any network- reachable caller can still invoke agents through POST /agents or POST /agents/ {agent_name} without Authorization, X-API-Key, a query token, or any other credential.

Confirmed vulnerable:

  • v4.6.48 / commit d5f1114aaf1a2e9f121a6e66b929149ca2201f1d
  • v4.6.34 / commit e5928449f73f66cc8af1de61621aa974ab255133

Likely affected range: >= 4.6.34, <= 4.6.48.

This is distinct from CVE-2026-44338 / GHSA-6rmh-7xcm-cpxj, which covered the legacy Flask api_server.py path before 4.6.34. This report concerns the newer FastAPI serve agents --api-key code path and is confirmed in v4.6.48.

Details

The CLI accepts and forwards an API key:

  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:156 defines praisonai serve agents
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:162 exposes --api-key
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/serve.py:175-176 forwards the supplied key
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:191 handles the agents subcommand
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:199 parses api_key into the config

However, _create_agents_app() never uses config["api_key"] to create middleware or a FastAPI auth dependency:

  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:228 creates the FastAPI app
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:287 registers POST {path} with no auth dependency
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:346 registers POST /agents/{agent_name} with no auth dependency
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/serve.py:356-370 executes the registered agent directly

The same app also mounts praisonai.api.agent_invoke, whose /api/v1/agents/{agent_id}/ invoke route is protected separately by CALL_SERVER_TOKEN. That means the protected / api/v1 route and the unauthenticated /agents compatibility routes coexist in the same server. Setting --api-key does not protect the compatibility routes.

PoC

This local-only PoC does not open a network listener and does not call an LLM provider. It constructs the FastAPI app through the real ServeHandler._create_agents_app() path with api_key set, registers a fake agent, and sends an unauthenticated request using FastAPI TestClient.

#!/usr/bin/env python3
from __future__ import annotations

import sys
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path

REPO = Path("/path/to/PraisonAI")
sys.path[:0] = [
    str(REPO / "src" / "praisonai"),
    str(REPO / "src" / "praisonai-agents"),
]

class FakeAgent:
    def __init__(self):
        self.calls = []

    def start(self, query):
        self.calls.append(query)
        return f"fake-agent-ran:{query}"

def main() -> None:
    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
    from praisonai.cli.features.serve import ServeHandler
    from praisonai.api import agent_invoke

    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
        agents_yaml = Path(tmp) / "agents.yaml"
        agents_yaml.write_text(
            "roles:\n"
            "  placeholder:\n"
            "    role: Placeholder\n"
            "    goal: Placeholder\n"
            "    backstory: Placeholder\n",
            encoding="utf-8",
        )

        handler = ServeHandler()
        app = handler._create_agents_app(
            {
                "file": str(agents_yaml),
                "host": "0.0.0.0",
                "port": 8000,
                "path": "/agents",
                "reload": False,
                "api_key": "operator-secret-api-key",
            }
       …
Record
PYSEC-2026-3887
CVSS 3.1
8.6 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
praisonai
PyPI
4.6.34 up to 4.6.58
4.6.58
praisonai
PyPI
4.6.34 up to 4.6.58, plus listed versions
4.6.354.6.364.6.374.6.384.6.39
Show 17 moreShow less
4.6.404.6.414.6.424.6.434.6.444.6.454.6.464.6.474.6.484.6.504.6.514.6.524.6.534.6.544.6.554.6.564.6.57
4.6.58

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-55534 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.6) in Mervinpraison Praisonai, published August 25, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.45%, the 39th percentile. Fixed in praisonai 4.6.58.

References

This page doesn't list everything

Left out here: the rest of 3 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.

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