CVE-2026-86760

Snipe-IT versions 8.2.0 through 8.6.x (fixed in 8.7.0) contain an incorrect authorization flaw in app/Http/Controllers/Users/UsersController::update(). The single-user edit route assigned the activated field from the request payload before evaluating the canEditAuthFields authorization gate, so an authenticated non-admin user holding the users.edit permission in the target's company scope can submit a full valid PUT request to /users/{id} and toggle the activated flag on any user, including admin and superuser accounts. Deactivating an admin locks that account out of the application until another admin or superuser re-enables it. Only the activated field is affected; username, email, password and permissions remain protected by the gate, no data is disclosed, and the API (Api\UsersController::update) and bulk-edit paths are not affected.

Snipe-IT versions 8.2.0 through 8.6.x (fixed in 8.7.0) contain an incorrect authorization flaw in app/Http/Controllers/Users/UsersController::update(). The single-user edit route assigned the activated field from the request payload before evaluating the canEditAuthFields authorization gate, so an authenticated non-admin user holding the users.edit permission in the target's company scope can submit a full valid PUT request to /users/{id} and toggle the activated flag on any user, including admin and superuser accounts. Deactivating an admin locks that account out of the application until another admin or superuser re-enables it. Only the activated field is affected; username, email, password and permissions remain protected by the gate, no data is disclosed, and the API (Api\UsersController::update) and bulk-edit paths are not affected.

Snipe-IT versions 8.2.0 through 8.6.x (fixed in 8.7.0) contain an incorrect authorization flaw in app/Http/Controllers/Users/UsersController::update(). The single-user edit route assigned the activated field from the request payload before evaluating the canEditAuthFields authorization gate, so an authenticated non-admin user holding the users.edit permission in the target's company scope can submit a full valid PUT request to /users/{id} and toggle the activated flag on any user, including admin and superuser accounts. Deactivating an admin locks that account out of the application until another admin or superuser re-enables it. Only the activated field is affected; username, email, password and permissions remain protected by the gate, no data is disclosed, and the API (Api\UsersController::update) and bulk-edit paths are not affected.

Snipe-IT versions 8.2.0 through 8.6.x (fixed in 8.7.0) contain an incorrect authorization flaw in app/Http/Controllers/Users/UsersController::update(). The single-user edit route assigned the activated field from the request payload before evaluating the canEditAuthFields authorization gate, so an authenticated non-admin user holding the users.edit permission in the target's company scope can submit a full valid PUT request to /users/{id} and toggle the activated flag on any user, including admin and superuser accounts. Deactivating an admin locks that account out of the application until another admin or superuser re-enables it. Only the activated field is affected; username, email, password and permissions remain protected by the gate, no data is disclosed, and the API (Api\UsersController::update) and bulk-edit paths are not affected.

Snipe-IT versions 8.2.0 through 8.6.x (fixed in 8.7.0) contain an incorrect authorization flaw in app/Http/Controllers/Users/UsersController::update(). The single-user edit route assigned the activated field from the request payload before evaluating the canEditAuthFields authorization gate, so an authenticated non-admin user holding the users.edit permission in the target's company scope can submit a full valid PUT request to /users/{id} and toggle the activated flag on any user, including admin and superuser accounts. Deactivating an admin locks that account out of the application until another admin or superuser re-enables it. Only the activated field is affected; username, email, password and permissions remain protected by the gate, no data is disclosed, and the API (Api\UsersController::update) and bulk-edit paths are not affected.