CVE-2026-57127

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.6.58, recipe serve installs APIKeyAuthMiddleware or JWTAuthMiddleware when an operator selects api-key or JWT authentication, but each middleware forwards requests when PRAISONAI_API_KEY or PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET and the corresponding recipe value are absent. Unauthenticated clients can then reach recipe execution, input, and output surfaces and may trigger connected tools despite the operator explicitly enabling authentication. This issue is fixed in 4.6.58.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.6.58, recipe serve installs APIKeyAuthMiddleware or JWTAuthMiddleware when an operator selects api-key or JWT authentication, but each middleware forwards requests when PRAISONAI_API_KEY or PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET and the corresponding recipe value are absent. Unauthenticated clients can then reach recipe execution, input, and output surfaces and may trigger connected tools despite the operator explicitly enabling authentication. This issue is fixed in 4.6.58.

praisonai: recipe serve authentication middleware silently disables itself when no secret is set

Researcher: Kai Aizen — SnailSploit (@SnailSploit), Adversarial & Offensive Security Research Target: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI

Package: praisonai on PyPI Version tested: 4.6.48. File: praisonai/recipe/serve.py (sha256 491bf8f29e399418260810ba4bf0f6802c6e4aa675628e2be68a9726c15d9b23).

TL;DR

praisonai/recipe/serve.py:312-410 defines two auth middlewares (APIKeyAuthMiddleware, JWTAuthMiddleware). Both contain the same "fail open when the secret is unset" branch at the top of their dispatch:

async def dispatch(self, request, call_next):
    if request.url.path == "/health":
        return await call_next(request)
    expected_key = api_key or os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_API_KEY")
    if not expected_key:
        # No key configured, allow request
        return await call_next(request)
    ...

async def dispatch(self, request, call_next):
    if request.url.path == "/health":
        return await call_next(request)
    secret = jwt_secret or os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET")
    if not secret:
        return await call_next(request)
    ...

The realistic mis-deploy:

1. operator sets auth: api-key (or auth: jwt) in their recipe YAML, expecting that line alone to enable auth,
2. operator does not set the corresponding api_key: / jwt_secret: value in the same YAML, AND
3. operator does not export PRAISONAI_API_KEY / PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET in the environment.

The middleware silently treats every request as authenticated and forwards it to the recipe-execution route.

Combined with the praisonai jobs API having zero auth (a separate finding), operators who paid attention to "I have to set auth: api-key to lock this down" still don't get auth on the recipe-serve surface unless they also remember the secret.

Root cause

   Expected behavior, after setting `auth: api-key` in the recipe YAML:
     "Now my recipe endpoints require an X-API-Key header."

   Actual behavior (serve.py:325-333):
     - middleware reads `expected_key = api_key or
       os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_API_KEY")`
     - if `expected_key` is None (neither YAML nor env supplied
       one), middleware logs nothing and forwards the request.
     - operator's recipe routes accept the request as if it were
       authenticated.  request.state.user is unset.

   Impact:
     The middleware's documented job is "validate the API key
     against the configured value".  The configured-value-is-None
     case is exactly the case the middleware should fail closed
     on — operator has signalled they want auth.  Failing open
     silently turns a documented authentication into a runtime
     no-op.

Empirical verification

poc/poc.py:

1. Imports the installed praisonai 4.6.48 praisonai.recipe.serve module (sha256 491bf8f29e399418260810ba4bf0f6802c6e4aa675628e2be68a9726c15d9b23).
2. Clears PRAISONAI_API_KEY / PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET env vars to simulate the mis-deploy.
3. Calls serve.create_auth_middleware('api-key', api_key=None, jwt_secret=None) and instantiates the returned middleware.
4. Builds a Starlette Request for /runs (the recipe-execution path) with empty headers — no X-API-Key, no Authorization.
5. await middleware.dispatch(request, fake_call_next) returns the sentinel 'REACHED-DOWNSTREAM (path=/runs)' from the fake call_next — proving the middleware passed the request through without authenticating.
6. Repeats the test for auth_type='jwt' — same bypass on the JWT path.

Run log (poc/run-log.txt) summary:

[2] auth_type='api-key', no api_key / no PRAISONAI_API_KEY env
    middleware.dispatch -> 'REACHED-DOWNSTREAM (path=/runs)'
[3] auth_type='jwt', no jwt_secret / no PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET env
    middleware.dispatch -> 'REACHED-DOWNSTREAM (path=/runs)'
    APIKeyAuthMiddleware allowed the request…

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.6.58, recipe serve installs APIKeyAuthMiddleware or JWTAuthMiddleware when an operator selects api-key or JWT authentication, but each middleware forwards requests when PRAISONAI_API_KEY or PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET and the corresponding recipe value are absent. Unauthenticated clients can then reach recipe execution, input, and output surfaces and may trigger connected tools despite the operator explicitly enabling authentication. This issue is fixed in 4.6.58.

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.6.58, recipe serve installs APIKeyAuthMiddleware or JWTAuthMiddleware when an operator selects api-key or JWT authentication, but each middleware forwards requests when PRAISONAI_API_KEY or PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET and the corresponding recipe value are absent. Unauthenticated clients can then reach recipe execution, input, and output surfaces and may trigger connected tools despite the operator explicitly enabling authentication. This issue is fixed in 4.6.58.

praisonai: recipe serve authentication middleware silently disables itself when no secret is set

Researcher: Kai Aizen — SnailSploit (@SnailSploit), Adversarial & Offensive Security Research Target: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI

Package: praisonai on PyPI Version tested: 4.6.48. File: praisonai/recipe/serve.py (sha256 491bf8f29e399418260810ba4bf0f6802c6e4aa675628e2be68a9726c15d9b23).

TL;DR

praisonai/recipe/serve.py:312-410 defines two auth middlewares (APIKeyAuthMiddleware, JWTAuthMiddleware). Both contain the same "fail open when the secret is unset" branch at the top of their dispatch:

async def dispatch(self, request, call_next):
    if request.url.path == "/health":
        return await call_next(request)
    expected_key = api_key or os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_API_KEY")
    if not expected_key:
        # No key configured, allow request
        return await call_next(request)
    ...

async def dispatch(self, request, call_next):
    if request.url.path == "/health":
        return await call_next(request)
    secret = jwt_secret or os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET")
    if not secret:
        return await call_next(request)
    ...

The realistic mis-deploy:

1. operator sets auth: api-key (or auth: jwt) in their recipe YAML, expecting that line alone to enable auth,
2. operator does not set the corresponding api_key: / jwt_secret: value in the same YAML, AND
3. operator does not export PRAISONAI_API_KEY / PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET in the environment.

The middleware silently treats every request as authenticated and forwards it to the recipe-execution route.

Combined with the praisonai jobs API having zero auth (a separate finding), operators who paid attention to "I have to set auth: api-key to lock this down" still don't get auth on the recipe-serve surface unless they also remember the secret.

Root cause

   Expected behavior, after setting `auth: api-key` in the recipe YAML:
     "Now my recipe endpoints require an X-API-Key header."

   Actual behavior (serve.py:325-333):
     - middleware reads `expected_key = api_key or
       os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_API_KEY")`
     - if `expected_key` is None (neither YAML nor env supplied
       one), middleware logs nothing and forwards the request.
     - operator's recipe routes accept the request as if it were
       authenticated.  request.state.user is unset.

   Impact:
     The middleware's documented job is "validate the API key
     against the configured value".  The configured-value-is-None
     case is exactly the case the middleware should fail closed
     on — operator has signalled they want auth.  Failing open
     silently turns a documented authentication into a runtime
     no-op.

Empirical verification

poc/poc.py:

1. Imports the installed praisonai 4.6.48 praisonai.recipe.serve module (sha256 491bf8f29e399418260810ba4bf0f6802c6e4aa675628e2be68a9726c15d9b23).
2. Clears PRAISONAI_API_KEY / PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET env vars to simulate the mis-deploy.
3. Calls serve.create_auth_middleware('api-key', api_key=None, jwt_secret=None) and instantiates the returned middleware.
4. Builds a Starlette Request for /runs (the recipe-execution path) with empty headers — no X-API-Key, no Authorization.
5. await middleware.dispatch(request, fake_call_next) returns the sentinel 'REACHED-DOWNSTREAM (path=/runs)' from the fake call_next — proving the middleware passed the request through without authenticating.
6. Repeats the test for auth_type='jwt' — same bypass on the JWT path.

Run log (poc/run-log.txt) summary:

[2] auth_type='api-key', no api_key / no PRAISONAI_API_KEY env
    middleware.dispatch -> 'REACHED-DOWNSTREAM (path=/runs)'
[3] auth_type='jwt', no jwt_secret / no PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET env
    middleware.dispatch -> 'REACHED-DOWNSTREAM (path=/runs)'
    APIKeyAuthMiddleware allowed the request…

praisonai: recipe serve authentication middleware silently disables itself when no secret is set

Researcher: Kai Aizen — SnailSploit (@SnailSploit), Adversarial & Offensive Security Research Target: https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI

Package: praisonai on PyPI Version tested: 4.6.48. File: praisonai/recipe/serve.py (sha256 491bf8f29e399418260810ba4bf0f6802c6e4aa675628e2be68a9726c15d9b23).

TL;DR

praisonai/recipe/serve.py:312-410 defines two auth middlewares (APIKeyAuthMiddleware, JWTAuthMiddleware). Both contain the same "fail open when the secret is unset" branch at the top of their dispatch:

async def dispatch(self, request, call_next):
    if request.url.path == "/health":
        return await call_next(request)
    expected_key = api_key or os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_API_KEY")
    if not expected_key:
        # No key configured, allow request
        return await call_next(request)
    ...

async def dispatch(self, request, call_next):
    if request.url.path == "/health":
        return await call_next(request)
    secret = jwt_secret or os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET")
    if not secret:
        return await call_next(request)
    ...

The realistic mis-deploy:

1. operator sets auth: api-key (or auth: jwt) in their recipe YAML, expecting that line alone to enable auth,
2. operator does not set the corresponding api_key: / jwt_secret: value in the same YAML, AND
3. operator does not export PRAISONAI_API_KEY / PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET in the environment.

The middleware silently treats every request as authenticated and forwards it to the recipe-execution route.

Combined with the praisonai jobs API having zero auth (a separate finding), operators who paid attention to "I have to set auth: api-key to lock this down" still don't get auth on the recipe-serve surface unless they also remember the secret.

Root cause

   Expected behavior, after setting `auth: api-key` in the recipe YAML:
     "Now my recipe endpoints require an X-API-Key header."

   Actual behavior (serve.py:325-333):
     - middleware reads `expected_key = api_key or
       os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_API_KEY")`
     - if `expected_key` is None (neither YAML nor env supplied
       one), middleware logs nothing and forwards the request.
     - operator's recipe routes accept the request as if it were
       authenticated.  request.state.user is unset.

   Impact:
     The middleware's documented job is "validate the API key
     against the configured value".  The configured-value-is-None
     case is exactly the case the middleware should fail closed
     on — operator has signalled they want auth.  Failing open
     silently turns a documented authentication into a runtime
     no-op.

Empirical verification

poc/poc.py:

1. Imports the installed praisonai 4.6.48 praisonai.recipe.serve module (sha256 491bf8f29e399418260810ba4bf0f6802c6e4aa675628e2be68a9726c15d9b23).
2. Clears PRAISONAI_API_KEY / PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET env vars to simulate the mis-deploy.
3. Calls serve.create_auth_middleware('api-key', api_key=None, jwt_secret=None) and instantiates the returned middleware.
4. Builds a Starlette Request for /runs (the recipe-execution path) with empty headers — no X-API-Key, no Authorization.
5. await middleware.dispatch(request, fake_call_next) returns the sentinel 'REACHED-DOWNSTREAM (path=/runs)' from the fake call_next — proving the middleware passed the request through without authenticating.
6. Repeats the test for auth_type='jwt' — same bypass on the JWT path.

Run log (poc/run-log.txt) summary:

[2] auth_type='api-key', no api_key / no PRAISONAI_API_KEY env
    middleware.dispatch -> 'REACHED-DOWNSTREAM (path=/runs)'
[3] auth_type='jwt', no jwt_secret / no PRAISONAI_JWT_SECRET env
    middleware.dispatch -> 'REACHED-DOWNSTREAM (path=/runs)'
    APIKeyAuthMiddleware allowed the request…