CVE-2026-54155

node-opcua is an OPC UA implementation for TypeScript and Node.js. Prior to 2.166.0, the UserNameIdentityToken authentication handler in packages/node-opcua-server/source/opcua_server.ts decrypts an RSA-OAEP password blob but does not verify that the trailing bytes match the current session serverNonce. An unauthenticated remote attacker can obtain the server public key through GetEndpoints and forge a blob whose little-endian length produces an empty password passed to isValidUser, compromising accounts that accept an empty password. Missing nonce binding also allows a captured UserNameIdentityToken ciphertext to be replayed in another session, and SecurityMode=None removes the separate client-signature safeguard. This issue is fixed in version 2.166.0.

node-opcua is an OPC UA implementation for TypeScript and Node.js. Prior to 2.166.0, the UserNameIdentityToken authentication handler in packages/node-opcua-server/source/opcua_server.ts decrypts an RSA-OAEP password blob but does not verify that the trailing bytes match the current session serverNonce. An unauthenticated remote attacker can obtain the server public key through GetEndpoints and forge a blob whose little-endian length produces an empty password passed to isValidUser, compromising accounts that accept an empty password. Missing nonce binding also allows a captured UserNameIdentityToken ciphertext to be replayed in another session, and SecurityMode=None removes the separate client-signature safeguard. This issue is fixed in version 2.166.0.

Summary A missing nonce verification in the UserNameIdentityToken authentication handler allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to forge a password token that extracts as an empty string, and to replay captured authentication tokens across sessions.

Affected versions: <= 2.165.0 Tested version: 2.165.0 CVSS Score: 8.1 (High) CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L CWE: CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

Root Cause

In packages/node-opcua-server/source/opcua_server.ts at line 1886-1887, after RSA-OAEP decrypting the UserNameIdentityToken password blob, the server reads a 4-byte little-endian length field and extracts buff[4 : 4+length] as the password. It never verifies that the trailing bytes equal session.nonce.

This has two consequences:

1. Forged empty password: An attacker who retrieves the server's public key via an unauthenticated GetEndpoints call can craft a token where the 4-byte length field equals serverNonce.length (32). The server computes length = 32 - 32 = 0 and calls isValidUser(username, ""). Any account that accepts an empty password is compromised.

2. Unconditional replay attack: Because nonce binding is structurally absent, any captured UserNameIdentityToken ciphertext can be replayed in a different session unconditionally.

The impact is compounded by a second issue: when the channel uses SecurityMode=None, verifyClientSignature returns true unconditionally (security_policy.ts:697-700), bypassing the channel-level signature check entirely.

Proof of Concept (logic, no exploit code)

1. GetEndpoints (unauthenticated) → retrieve server public key and RSA token policy
2. OpenSecureChannel (SecurityMode=None)
3. CreateSession
4. Craft plaintext: [0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00]  (readUInt32LE = 32 = serverNonce.length)
5. RSA-OAEP encrypt with server public key → 256-byte ciphertext
6. ActivateSession with crafted UserNameIdentityToken
7. Server decrypts → length = 32 - 32 = 0 → password = ""
8. isValidUser(username, "") is called

Dynamically confirmed: decryption produces password = "" with no error and no nonce verification.

Suggested Fix

After decrypting the password blob, verify that buff.slice(4 + passwordLength) equals session.nonce before extracting the password. Reject the token if verification fails.

I am following a 90-day responsible disclosure policy. I am happy to provide additional technical details under embargo. Please confirm receipt at your earliest convenience.

Reporter: Stanley Tobias Discovery date: 2026-03-23

node-opcua is an OPC UA implementation for TypeScript and Node.js. Prior to 2.166.0, the UserNameIdentityToken authentication handler in packages/node-opcua-server/source/opcua_server.ts decrypts an RSA-OAEP password blob but does not verify that the trailing bytes match the current session serverNonce. An unauthenticated remote attacker can obtain the server public key through GetEndpoints and forge a blob whose little-endian length produces an empty password passed to isValidUser, compromising accounts that accept an empty password. Missing nonce binding also allows a captured UserNameIdentityToken ciphertext to be replayed in another session, and SecurityMode=None removes the separate client-signature safeguard. This issue is fixed in version 2.166.0.

node-opcua is an OPC UA implementation for TypeScript and Node.js. Prior to 2.166.0, the UserNameIdentityToken authentication handler in packages/node-opcua-server/source/opcua_server.ts decrypts an RSA-OAEP password blob but does not verify that the trailing bytes match the current session serverNonce. An unauthenticated remote attacker can obtain the server public key through GetEndpoints and forge a blob whose little-endian length produces an empty password passed to isValidUser, compromising accounts that accept an empty password. Missing nonce binding also allows a captured UserNameIdentityToken ciphertext to be replayed in another session, and SecurityMode=None removes the separate client-signature safeguard. This issue is fixed in version 2.166.0.

Summary A missing nonce verification in the UserNameIdentityToken authentication handler allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to forge a password token that extracts as an empty string, and to replay captured authentication tokens across sessions.

Affected versions: <= 2.165.0 Tested version: 2.165.0 CVSS Score: 8.1 (High) CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L CWE: CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

Root Cause

In packages/node-opcua-server/source/opcua_server.ts at line 1886-1887, after RSA-OAEP decrypting the UserNameIdentityToken password blob, the server reads a 4-byte little-endian length field and extracts buff[4 : 4+length] as the password. It never verifies that the trailing bytes equal session.nonce.

This has two consequences:

1. Forged empty password: An attacker who retrieves the server's public key via an unauthenticated GetEndpoints call can craft a token where the 4-byte length field equals serverNonce.length (32). The server computes length = 32 - 32 = 0 and calls isValidUser(username, ""). Any account that accepts an empty password is compromised.

2. Unconditional replay attack: Because nonce binding is structurally absent, any captured UserNameIdentityToken ciphertext can be replayed in a different session unconditionally.

The impact is compounded by a second issue: when the channel uses SecurityMode=None, verifyClientSignature returns true unconditionally (security_policy.ts:697-700), bypassing the channel-level signature check entirely.

Proof of Concept (logic, no exploit code)

1. GetEndpoints (unauthenticated) → retrieve server public key and RSA token policy
2. OpenSecureChannel (SecurityMode=None)
3. CreateSession
4. Craft plaintext: [0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00]  (readUInt32LE = 32 = serverNonce.length)
5. RSA-OAEP encrypt with server public key → 256-byte ciphertext
6. ActivateSession with crafted UserNameIdentityToken
7. Server decrypts → length = 32 - 32 = 0 → password = ""
8. isValidUser(username, "") is called

Dynamically confirmed: decryption produces password = "" with no error and no nonce verification.

Suggested Fix

After decrypting the password blob, verify that buff.slice(4 + passwordLength) equals session.nonce before extracting the password. Reject the token if verification fails.

I am following a 90-day responsible disclosure policy. I am happy to provide additional technical details under embargo. Please confirm receipt at your earliest convenience.

Reporter: Stanley Tobias Discovery date: 2026-03-23