CVE-2026-89406

The Modula Image Gallery – Photo Grid & Video Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized disclosure of private gallery contents in versions up to, and including, 3.0.1. This is due to the Modula_Meta::add_metas() function being hooked to wp_head on every frontend request and looking up any post via get_post( $_GET['modula_gallery_id'] ) without verifying the gallery's post_status or the requester's capability to read it — the gallery-side input guard is bugged (empty('modula_gallery_id') tests a nonempty string literal instead of the GET parameter, so it is always false), the only object validation is a post_type === 'modula-gallery' check, and no is_user_logged_in()/current_user_can('read_post', $gallery_id) check is performed. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to enumerate private modula-gallery posts and their member attachments and recover the image's title, description, dimensions, and original upload URL via Open Graph/Twitter meta tags emitted in the response, which then allows direct unauthenticated download of the original private image bytes.

The Modula Image Gallery – Photo Grid & Video Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized disclosure of private gallery contents in versions up to, and including, 3.0.1. This is due to the Modula_Meta::add_metas() function being hooked to wp_head on every frontend request and looking up any post via get_post( $_GET['modula_gallery_id'] ) without verifying the gallery's post_status or the requester's capability to read it — the gallery-side input guard is bugged (empty('modula_gallery_id') tests a nonempty string literal instead of the GET parameter, so it is always false), the only object validation is a post_type === 'modula-gallery' check, and no is_user_logged_in()/current_user_can('read_post', $gallery_id) check is performed. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to enumerate private modula-gallery posts and their member attachments and recover the image's title, description, dimensions, and original upload URL via Open Graph/Twitter meta tags emitted in the response, which then allows direct unauthenticated download of the original private image bytes.

The Modula Image Gallery – Photo Grid & Video Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized disclosure of private gallery contents in versions up to, and including, 3.0.1. This is due to the Modula_Meta::add_metas() function being hooked to wp_head on every frontend request and looking up any post via get_post( $_GET['modula_gallery_id'] ) without verifying the gallery's post_status or the requester's capability to read it — the gallery-side input guard is bugged (empty('modula_gallery_id') tests a nonempty string literal instead of the GET parameter, so it is always false), the only object validation is a post_type === 'modula-gallery' check, and no is_user_logged_in()/current_user_can('read_post', $gallery_id) check is performed. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to enumerate private modula-gallery posts and their member attachments and recover the image's title, description, dimensions, and original upload URL via Open Graph/Twitter meta tags emitted in the response, which then allows direct unauthenticated download of the original private image bytes.

The Modula Image Gallery – Photo Grid & Video Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized disclosure of private gallery contents in versions up to, and including, 3.0.1. This is due to the Modula_Meta::add_metas() function being hooked to wp_head on every frontend request and looking up any post via get_post( $_GET['modula_gallery_id'] ) without verifying the gallery's post_status or the requester's capability to read it — the gallery-side input guard is bugged (empty('modula_gallery_id') tests a nonempty string literal instead of the GET parameter, so it is always false), the only object validation is a post_type === 'modula-gallery' check, and no is_user_logged_in()/current_user_can('read_post', $gallery_id) check is performed. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to enumerate private modula-gallery posts and their member attachments and recover the image's title, description, dimensions, and original upload URL via Open Graph/Twitter meta tags emitted in the response, which then allows direct unauthenticated download of the original private image bytes.