CVE-2026-100621

Capgo (capgo.app) contains an incomplete access-control/content-lock enforcement issue affecting all versions; no patch is available at the time of publication. The enforce_encrypted_bundle_trigger / check_encrypted_bundle_on_insert content lock in supabase/schemas/prod.sql exempts app_versions rows whose previous storage_provider is r2-direct, so delivery-critical columns (name, app_id, session_key, key_id, storage_provider, r2_path, external_url, checksum, manifest, native_packages) remain mutable while a row is in that state. Separately, the channel/version join used by the /updates endpoint (supabase/functions/_backend/utils/pg.ts) filters only deleted versions and does not exclude r2-direct versions, so such rows remain OTA-selectable. An attacker holding a Capgo API key with bundle write/upload permission can create or keep a bundle version in the r2-direct state, assign it to a channel, and then modify these fields via direct PostgREST requests, causing altered bundle metadata (for example checksum and session_key) to be served to devices through /updates. This bypasses the post-upload content immutability hardening added for a previous app_versions metadata-tampering issue.

Capgo (capgo.app) contains an incomplete access-control/content-lock enforcement issue affecting all versions; no patch is available at the time of publication. The enforce_encrypted_bundle_trigger / check_encrypted_bundle_on_insert content lock in supabase/schemas/prod.sql exempts app_versions rows whose previous storage_provider is r2-direct, so delivery-critical columns (name, app_id, session_key, key_id, storage_provider, r2_path, external_url, checksum, manifest, native_packages) remain mutable while a row is in that state. Separately, the channel/version join used by the /updates endpoint (supabase/functions/_backend/utils/pg.ts) filters only deleted versions and does not exclude r2-direct versions, so such rows remain OTA-selectable. An attacker holding a Capgo API key with bundle write/upload permission can create or keep a bundle version in the r2-direct state, assign it to a channel, and then modify these fields via direct PostgREST requests, causing altered bundle metadata (for example checksum and session_key) to be served to devices through /updates. This bypasses the post-upload content immutability hardening added for a previous app_versions metadata-tampering issue.

Capgo (capgo.app) contains an incomplete access-control/content-lock enforcement issue affecting all versions; no patch is available at the time of publication. The enforce_encrypted_bundle_trigger / check_encrypted_bundle_on_insert content lock in supabase/schemas/prod.sql exempts app_versions rows whose previous storage_provider is r2-direct, so delivery-critical columns (name, app_id, session_key, key_id, storage_provider, r2_path, external_url, checksum, manifest, native_packages) remain mutable while a row is in that state. Separately, the channel/version join used by the /updates endpoint (supabase/functions/_backend/utils/pg.ts) filters only deleted versions and does not exclude r2-direct versions, so such rows remain OTA-selectable. An attacker holding a Capgo API key with bundle write/upload permission can create or keep a bundle version in the r2-direct state, assign it to a channel, and then modify these fields via direct PostgREST requests, causing altered bundle metadata (for example checksum and session_key) to be served to devices through /updates. This bypasses the post-upload content immutability hardening added for a previous app_versions metadata-tampering issue.

Capgo (capgo.app) contains an incomplete access-control/content-lock enforcement issue affecting all versions; no patch is available at the time of publication. The enforce_encrypted_bundle_trigger / check_encrypted_bundle_on_insert content lock in supabase/schemas/prod.sql exempts app_versions rows whose previous storage_provider is r2-direct, so delivery-critical columns (name, app_id, session_key, key_id, storage_provider, r2_path, external_url, checksum, manifest, native_packages) remain mutable while a row is in that state. Separately, the channel/version join used by the /updates endpoint (supabase/functions/_backend/utils/pg.ts) filters only deleted versions and does not exclude r2-direct versions, so such rows remain OTA-selectable. An attacker holding a Capgo API key with bundle write/upload permission can create or keep a bundle version in the r2-direct state, assign it to a channel, and then modify these fields via direct PostgREST requests, causing altered bundle metadata (for example checksum and session_key) to be served to devices through /updates. This bypasses the post-upload content immutability hardening added for a previous app_versions metadata-tampering issue.