CVE-2026-107843

Contao is an Open Source CMS. From version 4.1.0 until 5.3.50 and 5.7.12, ModuleRegistration::compile() enters its follow-up registration branch on any POST to a page containing the registration module without verifying FORM_SUBMIT or the preceding captcha result. resendActivationMail() can then invoke OptInToken::send() without rate limiting, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to cause repeated activation emails to be sent to an address with a pending registration and to determine whether that pending registration exists. The branch is reachable only when reg_activate is enabled and the target has an unconfirmed registration and opt-in token. This issue is fixed in versions 5.3.50 and 5.7.12.

Contao is an Open Source CMS. From version 4.1.0 until 5.3.50 and 5.7.12, ModuleRegistration::compile() enters its follow-up registration branch on any POST to a page containing the registration module without verifying FORM_SUBMIT or the preceding captcha result. resendActivationMail() can then invoke OptInToken::send() without rate limiting, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to cause repeated activation emails to be sent to an address with a pending registration and to determine whether that pending registration exists. The branch is reachable only when reg_activate is enabled and the target has an unconfirmed registration and opt-in token. This issue is fixed in versions 5.3.50 and 5.7.12.

ModuleRegistration::compile() reaches its follow-up registration branch on any POST to a page carrying the module. That branch checks neither FORM_SUBMIT nor the captcha result computed immediately above it, and resendActivationMail() leads to OptInToken::send(), which has no rate limit at all.

Impact

Anyone on the internet can make a Contao installation send unlimited mail to an address of their choosing, from the site's own sender and reputation, at one outbound message per HTTP request. That is both a nuisance for the recipient and a deliverability risk for the site operator. The same request is a reliable account oracle for "this address has a pending registration on this site", which is exactly the sort of membership fact a public site is usually expected not to disclose.

Honest bound. The target must have an unconfirmed registration, that is tl_member.disable = 1 together with an unconfirmed reg- opt-in token. An attacker can create that state for an arbitrary address, since registration requires no ownership proof, but on a site where reg_activate is off the branch is unreachable.

Contao is an Open Source CMS. From version 4.1.0 until 5.3.50 and 5.7.12, ModuleRegistration::compile() enters its follow-up registration branch on any POST to a page containing the registration module without verifying FORM_SUBMIT or the preceding captcha result. resendActivationMail() can then invoke OptInToken::send() without rate limiting, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to cause repeated activation emails to be sent to an address with a pending registration and to determine whether that pending registration exists. The branch is reachable only when reg_activate is enabled and the target has an unconfirmed registration and opt-in token. This issue is fixed in versions 5.3.50 and 5.7.12.

Contao is an Open Source CMS. From version 4.1.0 until 5.3.50 and 5.7.12, ModuleRegistration::compile() enters its follow-up registration branch on any POST to a page containing the registration module without verifying FORM_SUBMIT or the preceding captcha result. resendActivationMail() can then invoke OptInToken::send() without rate limiting, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to cause repeated activation emails to be sent to an address with a pending registration and to determine whether that pending registration exists. The branch is reachable only when reg_activate is enabled and the target has an unconfirmed registration and opt-in token. This issue is fixed in versions 5.3.50 and 5.7.12.

ModuleRegistration::compile() reaches its follow-up registration branch on any POST to a page carrying the module. That branch checks neither FORM_SUBMIT nor the captcha result computed immediately above it, and resendActivationMail() leads to OptInToken::send(), which has no rate limit at all.

Impact

Anyone on the internet can make a Contao installation send unlimited mail to an address of their choosing, from the site's own sender and reputation, at one outbound message per HTTP request. That is both a nuisance for the recipient and a deliverability risk for the site operator. The same request is a reliable account oracle for "this address has a pending registration on this site", which is exactly the sort of membership fact a public site is usually expected not to disclose.

Honest bound. The target must have an unconfirmed registration, that is tl_member.disable = 1 together with an unconfirmed reg- opt-in token. An attacker can create that state for an arbitrary address, since registration requires no ownership proof, but on a site where reg_activate is off the branch is unreachable.