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CVE-2026-57894

Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration

8.5 HighFix available

Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
Low
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
High
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

Exploit likelihood

0.36%Up 0.2 points since Aug 14, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 8.5

Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration

Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration

Record
CVE-2026-57894
CVSS 3.1
8.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Weakness
CWE-918
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-58148 8.5

Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration

Record
EUVD-2026-58148
CVSS 3.1
8.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-82f7-87hm-852x 8.5

Gitea: Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration

Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration

Summary

Gitea validates the user-supplied repository migration URL, but the actual clone and later mirror fetch operations are performed by the Git command-line client without disabling HTTP redirects. Git's default http.followRedirects=initial follows the first redirect and then uses the redirected URL as the base for later repository object requests.

This creates a URL-policy bypass, SSRF, and repository exfiltration primitive. A low-privileged authenticated user can submit an allowed public Git URL that redirects the Gitea server to an otherwise blocked or internal Git HTTP(S) endpoint. Local validation confirmed that Git followed a first-hop redirect to 127.0.0.1, fetched Git objects, and completed the clone; git -c http.followRedirects=false clone blocked the same path.

The main impact is internal Git repository exfiltration into an attacker-controlled Gitea repository. Pull mirrors increase risk because scheduled git fetch --tags operations can keep following the redirect and collect future internal commits.

This is High severity by default for internet-accessible instances with migrations enabled, and can become Critical where internal repositories contain deploy keys, CI/CD secrets, cloud credentials, Terraform state, kubeconfigs, signing material, or production configuration. Direct unauthenticated exploitation, direct Gitea server RCE, arbitrary file:// import, and default Actions runner execution are not confirmed.

Technical Root Cause Analysis

The root cause is a validation/enforcement mismatch across a trust boundary. This should be treated as a product security issue rather than a pure deployment misconfiguration: deployment choices influence reachability and impact, but Gitea applies policy to the originally submitted URL while the Git subprocess is allowed to reach a different effective URL after redirection.

Gitea validates the original migration URL:

  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\routers\web\repo\migrate.go:180 parses the submitted web migration clone address.
  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\routers\web\repo\migrate.go:182 calls migrations.IsMigrateURLAllowed.
  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\routers\api\v1\repo\migrate.go:101 parses the submitted API migration clone address.
  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\routers\api\v1\repo\migrate.go:103 calls migrations.IsMigrateURLAllowed.

The URL validator resolves and checks the initially supplied host:

  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\services\migrations\migrate.go:44 defines IsMigrateURLAllowed.
  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\services\migrations\migrate.go:75 rejects unsupported schemes.
  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\services\migrations\migrate.go:79 extracts the host.
  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\services\migrations\migrate.go:85 performs DNS resolution.
  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\services\migrations\migrate.go:86 enforces the allow/block list on the originally resolved host.

After this validation, the actual repository data transfer is delegated to Git:

  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\services\repository\migrate.go:93 calls gitrepo.CloneExternalRepo with opts.CloneAddr.
  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\modules\gitrepo\clone.go:13 delegates to git.Clone.
  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\modules\git\repo.go:123 constructs a git clone command.
  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\modules\git\repo.go:125 conditionally sets only http.sslVerify=false.
  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\modules\git\repo.go:154 appends the source and destination arguments.

No equivalent network policy is applied to the final URL reached by Git after HTTP redirection. The protected migration HTTP client exists for service-specific migration API calls, but it is not used for the raw Git…

Record
GHSA-82f7-87hm-852x
CVSS 3.1
8.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Weakness
CWE-918
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 8.5

Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration

Record
CVE-2026-57894
CVSS 3.1
8.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Weakness
CWE-918
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV 8.5

Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration

Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration

Record
CVE-2026-57894
CVSS 3.1
8.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Weakness
CWE-918
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-82f7-87hm-852x 8.5

Gitea: Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration

Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration

Summary

Gitea validates the user-supplied repository migration URL, but the actual clone and later mirror fetch operations are performed by the Git command-line client without disabling HTTP redirects. Git's default http.followRedirects=initial follows the first redirect and then uses the redirected URL as the base for later repository object requests.

This creates a URL-policy bypass, SSRF, and repository exfiltration primitive. A low-privileged authenticated user can submit an allowed public Git URL that redirects the Gitea server to an otherwise blocked or internal Git HTTP(S) endpoint. Local validation confirmed that Git followed a first-hop redirect to 127.0.0.1, fetched Git objects, and completed the clone; git -c http.followRedirects=false clone blocked the same path.

The main impact is internal Git repository exfiltration into an attacker-controlled Gitea repository. Pull mirrors increase risk because scheduled git fetch --tags operations can keep following the redirect and collect future internal commits.

This is High severity by default for internet-accessible instances with migrations enabled, and can become Critical where internal repositories contain deploy keys, CI/CD secrets, cloud credentials, Terraform state, kubeconfigs, signing material, or production configuration. Direct unauthenticated exploitation, direct Gitea server RCE, arbitrary file:// import, and default Actions runner execution are not confirmed.

Technical Root Cause Analysis

The root cause is a validation/enforcement mismatch across a trust boundary. This should be treated as a product security issue rather than a pure deployment misconfiguration: deployment choices influence reachability and impact, but Gitea applies policy to the originally submitted URL while the Git subprocess is allowed to reach a different effective URL after redirection.

Gitea validates the original migration URL:

  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\routers\web\repo\migrate.go:180 parses the submitted web migration clone address.
  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\routers\web\repo\migrate.go:182 calls migrations.IsMigrateURLAllowed.
  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\routers\api\v1\repo\migrate.go:101 parses the submitted API migration clone address.
  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\routers\api\v1\repo\migrate.go:103 calls migrations.IsMigrateURLAllowed.

The URL validator resolves and checks the initially supplied host:

  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\services\migrations\migrate.go:44 defines IsMigrateURLAllowed.
  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\services\migrations\migrate.go:75 rejects unsupported schemes.
  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\services\migrations\migrate.go:79 extracts the host.
  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\services\migrations\migrate.go:85 performs DNS resolution.
  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\services\migrations\migrate.go:86 enforces the allow/block list on the originally resolved host.

After this validation, the actual repository data transfer is delegated to Git:

  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\services\repository\migrate.go:93 calls gitrepo.CloneExternalRepo with opts.CloneAddr.
  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\modules\gitrepo\clone.go:13 delegates to git.Clone.
  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\modules\git\repo.go:123 constructs a git clone command.
  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\modules\git\repo.go:125 conditionally sets only http.sslVerify=false.
  • C:\Users\One\Desktop\gitea_new\gitea\modules\git\repo.go:154 appends the source and destination arguments.

No equivalent network policy is applied to the final URL reached by Git after HTTP redirection. The protected migration HTTP client exists for service-specific migration API calls, but it is not used for the raw Git…

Record
GHSA-82f7-87hm-852x
CVSS 3.1
8.5 HighCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Weakness
CWE-918
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGO-2026-6027 No score

Gitea: Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration in gitea.dev

Gitea: Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration in gitea.dev

Record
GO-2026-6027
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVopenSUSE-SU-2026:21483-1 No score

Security update for govulncheck-vulndb

This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:

  • Update to version 0.0.20260723T184607 2026-07-23T18:46:07Z (jsc#PED-11136).

Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:

  • GO-2026-4730 CVE-2026-33022 GHSA-cv4x-93xx-wgfj
  • GO-2026-4761 CVE-2026-33211 GHSA-j5q5-j9gm-2w5c
  • GO-2026-5102 CVE-2026-45021 GHSA-3vcp-chfh-f6r2
  • GO-2026-5272 CVE-2026-40938 GHSA-94jr-7pqp-xhcq
  • GO-2026-5486 CVE-2026-40924 GHSA-m2cx-gpqf-qf74
  • GO-2026-5542 CVE-2026-40090 GHSA-pj97-4p9w-gx3q
  • GO-2026-5630 CVE-2026-25542 GHSA-rmx9-2pp3-xhcr
  • GO-2026-5643 CVE-2026-40923 GHSA-rx35-6rhx-7858
  • GO-2026-5675 CVE-2026-41492 GHSA-vvf7-6rmr-m29q
  • GO-2026-5711 CVE-2026-40161 GHSA-wjxp-xrpv-xpff
  • GO-2026-5746 CVE-2026-41567 GHSA-x86f-5xw2-fm2r
  • GO-2026-5749 CVE-2026-41328 GHSA-x92x-px7w-4gx4
  • GO-2026-5837 CVE-2026-44840 GHSA-q2m9-6jp9-c6mc
  • GO-2026-5929 CVE-2026-44342 GHSA-26v7-h57m-gh9m
  • GO-2026-5930 CVE-2026-33655 GHSA-6qcr-qxgr-m7fv
  • GO-2026-5933 GHSA-3g4q-2f67-2gvh
  • GO-2026-5934 GHSA-59qp-cfj3-rp64
  • GO-2026-5935 GHSA-7856-g3gv-9wq8
  • GO-2026-5936 CVE-2026-53552 GHSA-26rh-24rg-j3vv
  • GO-2026-5937 CVE-2026-53508 GHSA-2jcc-mxv7-p3f9
  • GO-2026-5938 CVE-2026-53553 GHSA-4g5x-hcwm-82jw
  • GO-2026-5939 CVE-2026-10517 GHSA-698x-9w2p-7vvp
  • GO-2026-5940 CVE-2026-53572 GHSA-6w3m-4hhp-775q
  • GO-2026-5941 CVE-2026-53487 GHSA-gvhc-wv3v-7pf8
  • GO-2026-5942 CVE-2026-46600
  • GO-2026-5944 CVE-2026-50197 GHSA-659f-rgp5-w4wf
  • GO-2026-5945 CVE-2026-6815 GHSA-rmxx-v9rj-vpvg
  • GO-2026-5946 CVE-2026-52831 GHSA-v5px-423j-pf7p
  • GO-2026-5947 CVE-2026-53649 GHSA-xqhv-chqm-fhcc
  • GO-2026-5948 CVE-2026-50554 GHSA-588f-fvcv-xhvf
  • GO-2026-5949 CVE-2026-50553 GHSA-rqrh-8wpv-x7hh
  • GO-2026-5950 CVE-2026-53602 GHSA-339v-266x-79xr
  • GO-2026-5951 CVE-2026-10219 GHSA-6jm8-4fhr-5w64
  • GO-2026-5952 CVE-2026-49834 GHSA-9vcr-p3rj-q5q6
  • GO-2026-5953 CVE-2026-9094 GHSA-c9w5-qp6m-m395
  • GO-2026-5956 CVE-2026-55252 GHSA-h5g6-xmh4-hc37
  • GO-2026-5957 CVE-2026-54158 GHSA-5xfx-xj4h-5p7r
  • GO-2026-5958 CVE-2026-54068 GHSA-gcm7-57gf-953c
  • GO-2026-5959 CVE-2026-54072 GHSA-h29v-hj44-q8cv
  • GO-2026-5961 CVE-2026-54069 GHSA-hvr9-72v2-fff3
  • GO-2026-5962 CVE-2026-54088 GHSA-m93h-4hw7-5qcm
  • GO-2026-5963 CVE-2026-54067 GHSA-mvjr-vv3c-w4qv
  • GO-2026-5964 CVE-2026-54066 GHSA-p4m3-mgmm-c664
  • GO-2026-5965 CVE-2026-54070 GHSA-w7cg-whh7-xp28
  • GO-2026-5966 CVE-2026-54089 GHSA-xqp3-jq6g-x3qm
  • GO-2026-5967 CVE-2026-50551 GHSA-56mp-4f3v-fgj2
  • GO-2026-5968 CVE-2026-54174 GHSA-fpg8-7664-jc5q
  • GO-2026-5969 GHSA-g936-7jqj-mwv8
  • GO-2026-5970 CVE-2026-56852
  • GO-2026-5973 CVE-2026-54250 GHSA-jxr7-mqhw-9p98
  • GO-2026-5974 CVE-2026-44300 GHSA-wmj8-9953-vff5
  • GO-2026-5975 CVE-2026-50018 GHSA-42j2-w334-qxw7
  • GO-2026-5976 CVE-2026-50141 GHSA-g7mm-9vx7-jm7h
  • GO-2026-5977 CVE-2026-50013 GHSA-qrh4-p6v4-mrfg
  • GO-2026-5978 CVE-2026-50125 GHSA-qw5r-ppcg-f8rj
  • GO-2026-5979 CVE-2026-50006 GHSA-xrcf-6jh3-ggvx
  • GO-2026-5980 CVE-2026-50158 GHSA-2c7f-fxww-6w6c
  • GO-2026-5981 GHSA-mqxv-9rm6-w8qc
  • GO-2026-5982 GHSA-pqg7-v6wh-3pfp
  • GO-2026-5984 CVE-2026-53604 GHSA-2p2f-px33-4vv5
  • GO-2026-5985 GHSA-7rx3-5wx3-5v76
  • GO-2026-5986 CVE-2026-61699 GHSA-cm26-5974-52h8
  • GO-2026-5987 CVE-2026-55513 GHSA-g4x6-jcvr-9m3g
  • GO-2026-5988 CVE-2026-54628 GHSA-hwrq-8wxh-q4xv
  • GO-2026-5989 CVE-2026-55512 GHSA-m3cx-mwpg-32jg
  • GO-2026-5990 CVE-2026-54629 GHSA-mf78-3rpf-r784
  • GO-2026-5991 CVE-2026-53603 GHSA-q4vm-pq3q-8wgq
  • GO-2026-5992 CVE-2026-61549 GHSA-qf34-295c-26v8
  • GO-2026-5996 CVE-2026-54450 GHSA-pph6-vfjv-vpjw
  • GO-2026-5997 CVE-2026-54452 GHSA-xgch-x3mx-cm3c
  • GO-2026-5998 CVE-2026-54495 GHSA-398h-7f66-3h4p
  • GO-2026-5999 CVE-2026-10814 GHSA-jh6h-v6mp-h22v
  • GO-2026-6002 CVE-2026-58196 GHSA-pr64-jmmf-jp54
  • GO-2026-6003 CVE-2026-53714 GHSA-22xc-xg2r-9j7v
  • GO-2026-6004 CVE-2026-52833 GHSA-3v79-m2cg-89ww
  • GO-2026-6005 CVE-2026-53715 GHSA-8fv2-88gg-hm7q
  • GO-2026-6006 CVE-2026-53716 GHSA-cxpq-8v7q-cg56 *…
Record
openSUSE-SU-2026:21483-1
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
code.gitea.io/gitea
Go
 before 1.27.0
1.27.0
gitea.dev
Go
 before 1.27.0
1.27.0
govulncheck-vulndb
openSUSE:Leap 16.0
From an advisory covering 1734 CVEs
 before 0.0.20260723T184607-160000.1.1
0.0.20260723T184607-160000.1.1

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
affected, facts
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-57894 is a high vulnerability (CVSS 8.5) in Gitea Open Source Git Server, published July 21, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.36%, the 29th percentile. Fixed in code.gitea.io/gitea 1.27.0.

References

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