Every CVE Search/ Get API key

CVE-2026-61794

Capsule: Malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex can bypass Tenant validation and trigger namespace admission panic

6.8 MediumFix available

Capsule is a multi-tenancy and policy-based framework for Kubernetes. From 0.13.0 until 0.13.7, the Tenant update validation in internal/webhook/tenant/validation/forbidden_annotations_regex.go compiles ForbiddenLabels.Regex for both the labels and annotations checks instead of validating ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex. An administrator who can update a Tenant can therefore persist a malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex while leaving the labels expression valid. Namespace creation or update later passes the stored expression through pkg/api/forbidden_list.go, where regexp.MustCompile can panic during forbidden metadata validation and deny namespace operations for the affected tenant. This issue is fixed in version 0.13.7.

Attack profile

How easy it is to exploit

Attack vector
Network
Complexity
Low
Privileges needed
High
User interaction
None

What an attacker can affect

Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Exploit likelihood

0.59%Up 0.3 points since Sep 19, 2026
90%50%10%1%

What each source reports

CVE List Score used 6.8

Capsule: Malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex can bypass Tenant validation and trigger namespace admission panic

Capsule is a multi-tenancy and policy-based framework for Kubernetes. From 0.13.0 until 0.13.7, the Tenant update validation in internal/webhook/tenant/validation/forbidden_annotations_regex.go compiles ForbiddenLabels.Regex for both the labels and annotations checks instead of validating ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex. An administrator who can update a Tenant can therefore persist a malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex while leaving the labels expression valid. Namespace creation or update later passes the stored expression through pkg/api/forbidden_list.go, where regexp.MustCompile can panic during forbidden metadata validation and deny namespace operations for the affected tenant. This issue is fixed in version 0.13.7.

Record
CVE-2026-61794
CVSS 3.1
6.8 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-20
Updated
2026-11-02
EUVDEUVD-2026-83055 6.8

Capsule is a multi-tenancy and policy-based framework for Kubernetes. From 0.13.0 until 0.13.7, the Tenant update validation in internal/webhook/tenant/validation/forbidden_annotations_regex.go compiles ForbiddenLabels.Regex for both the labels and annotations checks instead of validating ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex. An administrator who can update a Tenant can therefore persist a malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex while leaving the labels expression valid. Namespace creation or update later passes the stored expression through pkg/api/forbidden_list.go, where regexp.MustCompile can panic during forbidden metadata validation and deny namespace operations for the affected tenant. This issue is fixed in version 0.13.7.

Record
EUVD-2026-83055
CVSS 3.1
6.8 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H
Updated
2026-11-02
GitHub AdvisoriesGHSA-gxjc-74v5-3vx3 4.9

Capsule: Malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex can bypass Tenant validation and trigger namespace admission panic

Summary

A validation bug in internal/webhook/tenant/validation/forbidden_annotations_regex.go allows an invalid ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex value to bypass Tenant admission on update. The webhook compiles ForbiddenLabels.Regex for both labels and annotations, so a malformed annotations regex can be persisted. Once stored, namespace admission later evaluates the bad regex through pkg/api/forbidden_list.go, where regexp.MustCompile can panic and cause admission failure.

Details

In internal/webhook/tenant/validation/forbidden_annotations_regex.go, OnUpdate validates the new Tenant object, but the loop compiles tnt.Spec.NamespaceOptions.ForbiddenLabels.Regex for both labels and annotations. That means an invalid ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex is never validated if ForbiddenLabels.Regex is valid.

Relevant paths:

  • internal/webhook/tenant/validation/forbidden_annotations_regex.go
  • internal/webhook/namespace/validation/user_metadata.go
  • pkg/api/forbidden_list.go

Namespace admission later calls api.ValidateForbidden(...), and ForbiddenListSpec.RegexMatch() uses regexp.MustCompile(in.Regex). If the malformed regex is present in the Tenant spec, any namespace request that reaches this check can panic or fail hard, causing denial of service for namespace operations in the affected tenant.

PoC

  1. Update a Tenant so that:
    • spec.namespaceOptions.forbiddenLabels.regex is valid
    • spec.namespaceOptions.forbiddenAnnotations.regex is malformed, for example: [invalid-regex(
  2. The Tenant update is accepted because the webhook compiles the labels regex for both fields.
  3. Create or update a Namespace that triggers forbidden metadata validation.
  4. The namespace admission path reaches regexp.MustCompile(...) and panics.
package main

import (
	"fmt"
	"regexp"
)

type ForbiddenListSpec struct {
	Regex string
}

type NamespaceOptions struct {
	ForbiddenLabels      ForbiddenListSpec
	ForbiddenAnnotations ForbiddenListSpec
}

type Tenant struct {
	NamespaceOptions *NamespaceOptions
}

func validateTenantUpdate(tnt *Tenant) error {
	if tnt.NamespaceOptions == nil {
		return nil
	}

	annotationsToCheck := map[string]string{
		"labels":      tnt.NamespaceOptions.ForbiddenLabels.Regex,
		"annotations": tnt.NamespaceOptions.ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex,
	}

	for scope, annotation := range annotationsToCheck {
		if _, err := regexp.Compile(tnt.NamespaceOptions.ForbiddenLabels.Regex); err != nil {
			return fmt.Errorf("deny update: unable to compile %s regex for forbidden %s", annotation, scope)
		}
	}

	return nil
}

func validateForbidden(metadata map[string]string, forbidden ForbiddenListSpec) error {
	for key := range metadata {
		if forbidden.Regex != "" {
			if regexp.MustCompile(forbidden.Regex).MatchString(key) {
				return fmt.Errorf("forbidden key matched: %s", key)
			}
		}
	}

	return nil
}

func main() {
	oldTenant := &Tenant{
		NamespaceOptions: &NamespaceOptions{
			ForbiddenLabels:      ForbiddenListSpec{Regex: `^[a-z0-9-]+$`},
			ForbiddenAnnotations: ForbiddenListSpec{Regex: `^[a-z0-9-]+$`},
		},
	}

	newTenant := &Tenant{
		NamespaceOptions: &NamespaceOptions{
			ForbiddenLabels:      ForbiddenListSpec{Regex: `^[a-z0-9-]+$`},
			ForbiddenAnnotations: ForbiddenListSpec{Regex: `[invalid-regex(`},
		},
	}

	fmt.Println("=== Update step ===")
	if err := validateTenantUpdate(newTenant); err != nil {
		fmt.Printf("unexpected deny: %v\n", err)
	} else {
		fmt.Println("allowed: malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex bypassed validation")
	}

	fmt.Println()
	fmt.Println("=== Namespace step ===")
	_ = oldTenant

	defer func() {
		if r := recover(); r != nil {
			fmt.Printf("panic reproduced from ValidateForbidden: %v\n", r)
		}
	}()

	_ = validateForbidden(map[string]string{"example": "value"}, ForbiddenListSpec{Regex: `[invalid-regex(`})
	fmt.Println("no panic, unexpected")
}

Expected output:

=== Update step ===
allowed: malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex bypassed…
Record
GHSA-gxjc-74v5-3vx3
CVSS 3.1
4.9 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-20
Updated
2026-11-02
NVD 6.8

Capsule is a multi-tenancy and policy-based framework for Kubernetes. From 0.13.0 until 0.13.7, the Tenant update validation in internal/webhook/tenant/validation/forbidden_annotations_regex.go compiles ForbiddenLabels.Regex for both the labels and annotations checks instead of validating ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex. An administrator who can update a Tenant can therefore persist a malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex while leaving the labels expression valid. Namespace creation or update later passes the stored expression through pkg/api/forbidden_list.go, where regexp.MustCompile can panic during forbidden metadata validation and deny namespace operations for the affected tenant. This issue is fixed in version 0.13.7.

Record
CVE-2026-61794
CVSS 3.1
6.8 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-20
Updated
2026-11-02
OSV 6.8

Capsule: Malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex can bypass Tenant validation and trigger namespace admission panic

Capsule is a multi-tenancy and policy-based framework for Kubernetes. From 0.13.0 until 0.13.7, the Tenant update validation in internal/webhook/tenant/validation/forbidden_annotations_regex.go compiles ForbiddenLabels.Regex for both the labels and annotations checks instead of validating ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex. An administrator who can update a Tenant can therefore persist a malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex while leaving the labels expression valid. Namespace creation or update later passes the stored expression through pkg/api/forbidden_list.go, where regexp.MustCompile can panic during forbidden metadata validation and deny namespace operations for the affected tenant. This issue is fixed in version 0.13.7.

Record
CVE-2026-61794
CVSS 3.1
6.8 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-20
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGHSA-gxjc-74v5-3vx3 4.9

Capsule: Malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex can bypass Tenant validation and trigger namespace admission panic

Summary

A validation bug in internal/webhook/tenant/validation/forbidden_annotations_regex.go allows an invalid ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex value to bypass Tenant admission on update. The webhook compiles ForbiddenLabels.Regex for both labels and annotations, so a malformed annotations regex can be persisted. Once stored, namespace admission later evaluates the bad regex through pkg/api/forbidden_list.go, where regexp.MustCompile can panic and cause admission failure.

Details

In internal/webhook/tenant/validation/forbidden_annotations_regex.go, OnUpdate validates the new Tenant object, but the loop compiles tnt.Spec.NamespaceOptions.ForbiddenLabels.Regex for both labels and annotations. That means an invalid ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex is never validated if ForbiddenLabels.Regex is valid.

Relevant paths:

  • internal/webhook/tenant/validation/forbidden_annotations_regex.go
  • internal/webhook/namespace/validation/user_metadata.go
  • pkg/api/forbidden_list.go

Namespace admission later calls api.ValidateForbidden(...), and ForbiddenListSpec.RegexMatch() uses regexp.MustCompile(in.Regex). If the malformed regex is present in the Tenant spec, any namespace request that reaches this check can panic or fail hard, causing denial of service for namespace operations in the affected tenant.

PoC

  1. Update a Tenant so that:
    • spec.namespaceOptions.forbiddenLabels.regex is valid
    • spec.namespaceOptions.forbiddenAnnotations.regex is malformed, for example: [invalid-regex(
  2. The Tenant update is accepted because the webhook compiles the labels regex for both fields.
  3. Create or update a Namespace that triggers forbidden metadata validation.
  4. The namespace admission path reaches regexp.MustCompile(...) and panics.
package main

import (
	"fmt"
	"regexp"
)

type ForbiddenListSpec struct {
	Regex string
}

type NamespaceOptions struct {
	ForbiddenLabels      ForbiddenListSpec
	ForbiddenAnnotations ForbiddenListSpec
}

type Tenant struct {
	NamespaceOptions *NamespaceOptions
}

func validateTenantUpdate(tnt *Tenant) error {
	if tnt.NamespaceOptions == nil {
		return nil
	}

	annotationsToCheck := map[string]string{
		"labels":      tnt.NamespaceOptions.ForbiddenLabels.Regex,
		"annotations": tnt.NamespaceOptions.ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex,
	}

	for scope, annotation := range annotationsToCheck {
		if _, err := regexp.Compile(tnt.NamespaceOptions.ForbiddenLabels.Regex); err != nil {
			return fmt.Errorf("deny update: unable to compile %s regex for forbidden %s", annotation, scope)
		}
	}

	return nil
}

func validateForbidden(metadata map[string]string, forbidden ForbiddenListSpec) error {
	for key := range metadata {
		if forbidden.Regex != "" {
			if regexp.MustCompile(forbidden.Regex).MatchString(key) {
				return fmt.Errorf("forbidden key matched: %s", key)
			}
		}
	}

	return nil
}

func main() {
	oldTenant := &Tenant{
		NamespaceOptions: &NamespaceOptions{
			ForbiddenLabels:      ForbiddenListSpec{Regex: `^[a-z0-9-]+$`},
			ForbiddenAnnotations: ForbiddenListSpec{Regex: `^[a-z0-9-]+$`},
		},
	}

	newTenant := &Tenant{
		NamespaceOptions: &NamespaceOptions{
			ForbiddenLabels:      ForbiddenListSpec{Regex: `^[a-z0-9-]+$`},
			ForbiddenAnnotations: ForbiddenListSpec{Regex: `[invalid-regex(`},
		},
	}

	fmt.Println("=== Update step ===")
	if err := validateTenantUpdate(newTenant); err != nil {
		fmt.Printf("unexpected deny: %v\n", err)
	} else {
		fmt.Println("allowed: malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex bypassed validation")
	}

	fmt.Println()
	fmt.Println("=== Namespace step ===")
	_ = oldTenant

	defer func() {
		if r := recover(); r != nil {
			fmt.Printf("panic reproduced from ValidateForbidden: %v\n", r)
		}
	}()

	_ = validateForbidden(map[string]string{"example": "value"}, ForbiddenListSpec{Regex: `[invalid-regex(`})
	fmt.Println("no panic, unexpected")
}

Expected output:

=== Update step ===
allowed: malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex bypassed…
Record
GHSA-gxjc-74v5-3vx3
CVSS 3.1
4.9 MediumCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weakness
CWE-20
Updated
2026-11-02
OSVGO-2026-6521 No score

Capsule: Malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex can bypass Tenant validation and trigger namespace admission panic in github.com/projectcapsule/capsule

Capsule: Malformed ForbiddenAnnotations.Regex can bypass Tenant validation and trigger namespace admission panic in github.com/projectcapsule/capsule

Record
GO-2026-6521
Updated
2026-11-02

Affected products

Affected packages

Affected packages
PackageAffectedFixed
github.com/projectcapsule/capsule
Go
0.13.0 up to 0.13.7
0.13.7

History

History
RecordedChangedSources
first indexedCVE List, EUVD, GitHub Advisories, NVD, OSV

Dates are when Every CVE recorded each change. Upstream dates may differ.

In short

CVE-2026-61794 is a medium vulnerability (CVSS 6.8) in Projectcapsule Capsule, published September 18, 2026. No source lists public exploit code. EPSS puts the chance of exploitation in the next 30 days at 0.59%, the 48th percentile. Fixed in github.com/projectcapsule/capsule 0.13.7.

References

This page doesn't list everything

Left out here: the rest of 2 source descriptions. The JSON record has them.

MoveEnter Open