CVE-2026-54371

A set of tools for manipulating extended attributes on file system objects, in particular getfattr(1) and setfattr(1). An attr(1) command is also provided, which is largely compatible with the SGI IRIX tool of the same name.

Security Fix(es):

attr before version 2.6.0 contains a symlink traversal vulnerability in the getfattr and setfattr utilities that allows local attackers to escalate privileges by replacing a pathname component with a symbolic link during directory hierarchy traversal. Attackers who control a pathname component can redirect getfattr and setfattr operations to arbitrary files by substituting a symlink, leading to local privilege escalation when getfattr or setfattr is invoked by a privileged process over an attacker-controlled path.(CVE-2026-54371)

A set of tools for manipulating extended attributes on file system objects, in particular getfattr(1) and setfattr(1). An attr(1) command is also provided, which is largely compatible with the SGI IRIX tool of the same name.

Security Fix(es):

attr before version 2.6.0 contains a symlink traversal vulnerability in the getfattr and setfattr utilities that allows local attackers to escalate privileges by replacing a pathname component with a symbolic link during directory hierarchy traversal. Attackers who control a pathname component can redirect getfattr and setfattr operations to arbitrary files by substituting a symlink, leading to local privilege escalation when getfattr or setfattr is invoked by a privileged process over an attacker-controlled path.(CVE-2026-54371)

A set of tools for manipulating extended attributes on file system objects, in particular getfattr(1) and setfattr(1). An attr(1) command is also provided, which is largely compatible with the SGI IRIX tool of the same name.

Security Fix(es):

attr before version 2.6.0 contains a symlink traversal vulnerability in the getfattr and setfattr utilities that allows local attackers to escalate privileges by replacing a pathname component with a symbolic link during directory hierarchy traversal. Attackers who control a pathname component can redirect getfattr and setfattr operations to arbitrary files by substituting a symlink, leading to local privilege escalation when getfattr or setfattr is invoked by a privileged process over an attacker-controlled path.(CVE-2026-54371)

A set of tools for manipulating extended attributes on file system objects, in particular getfattr(1) and setfattr(1). An attr(1) command is also provided, which is largely compatible with the SGI IRIX tool of the same name.

Security Fix(es):

attr before version 2.6.0 contains a symlink traversal vulnerability in the getfattr and setfattr utilities that allows local attackers to escalate privileges by replacing a pathname component with a symbolic link during directory hierarchy traversal. Attackers who control a pathname component can redirect getfattr and setfattr operations to arbitrary files by substituting a symlink, leading to local privilege escalation when getfattr or setfattr is invoked by a privileged process over an attacker-controlled path.(CVE-2026-54371)

A set of tools for manipulating extended attributes on file system objects, in particular getfattr(1) and setfattr(1). An attr(1) command is also provided, which is largely compatible with the SGI IRIX tool of the same name.

Security Fix(es):

attr before version 2.6.0 contains a symlink traversal vulnerability in the getfattr and setfattr utilities that allows local attackers to escalate privileges by replacing a pathname component with a symbolic link during directory hierarchy traversal. Attackers who control a pathname component can redirect getfattr and setfattr operations to arbitrary files by substituting a symlink, leading to local privilege escalation when getfattr or setfattr is invoked by a privileged process over an attacker-controlled path.(CVE-2026-54371)

The attr packages provide extended attributes, which can be used to store system objects like capabilities of executables and access control lists, as well as user objects.

Security Fix(es):

• attr: Symlink Traversal Privilege Escalation via getfattr and setfattr (CVE-2026-54371)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

The attr packages provide extended attributes, which can be used to store system objects like capabilities of executables and access control lists, as well as user objects.

Security Fix(es):

• attr: Symlink Traversal Privilege Escalation via getfattr and setfattr (CVE-2026-54371)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

The attr packages provide extended attributes, which can be used to store system objects like capabilities of executables and access control lists, as well as user objects.

Security Fix(es):

• attr: Symlink Traversal Privilege Escalation via getfattr and setfattr (CVE-2026-54371)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

attr before version 2.6.0 contains a symlink traversal vulnerability in the getfattr and setfattr utilities that allows local attackers to escalate privileges by replacing a pathname component with a symbolic link during directory hierarchy traversal. Attackers who control a pathname component can redirect getfattr and setfattr operations to arbitrary files by substituting a symlink, leading to local privilege escalation when getfattr or setfattr is invoked by a privileged process over an attacker-controlled path.

The attr packages provide extended attributes, which can be used to store system objects like capabilities of executables and access control lists, as well as user objects.

Security Fix(es):

• attr: Symlink Traversal Privilege Escalation via getfattr and setfattr (CVE-2026-54371)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

The attr packages provide extended attributes, which can be used to store system objects like capabilities of executables and access control lists, as well as user objects.

Security Fix(es):

• attr: Symlink Traversal Privilege Escalation via getfattr and setfattr (CVE-2026-54371)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

The attr packages provide extended attributes, which can be used to store system objects like capabilities of executables and access control lists, as well as user objects.

Security Fix(es):

• attr: Symlink Traversal Privilege Escalation via getfattr and setfattr (CVE-2026-54371)

For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.

attr before version 2.6.0 contains a symlink traversal vulnerability in the getfattr and setfattr utilities that allows local attackers to escalate privileges by replacing a pathname component with a symbolic link during directory hierarchy traversal. Attackers who control a pathname component can redirect getfattr and setfattr operations to arbitrary files by substituting a symlink, leading to local privilege escalation when getfattr or setfattr is invoked by a privileged process over an attacker-controlled path.

attr before version 2.6.0 contains a symlink traversal vulnerability in the getfattr and setfattr utilities that allows local attackers to escalate privileges by replacing a pathname component with a symbolic link during directory hierarchy traversal. Attackers who control a pathname component can redirect getfattr and setfattr operations to arbitrary files by substituting a symlink, leading to local privilege escalation when getfattr or setfattr is invoked by a privileged process over an attacker-controlled path.

• CVE-2026-54371: symlink traversal in the recursive directory walk of getfattr, letting a local attacker who controls a path component swap it for a symlink and redirect extended-attribute reads to arbitrary files

• CVE-2026-54371: symlink traversal in the recursive directory walk of getfattr, letting a local attacker who controls a path component swap it for a symlink and redirect extended-attribute reads to arbitrary files

• Rebase to attr-2.6.0; CVE-2026-54371 fixed upstream
• setfattr: new -P/--physical option; --restore is symlink-safe only with -P
• setfattr --restore now warns on stderr when -P/-h are absent
• getfattr -Rh now recurses through a symlink argument (previously no output)

• Rebase to attr-2.6.0; CVE-2026-54371 fixed upstream
• setfattr: new -P/--physical option; --restore is symlink-safe only with -P
• setfattr --restore now warns on stderr when -P/-h are absent
• getfattr -Rh now recurses through a symlink argument (previously no output)

The updated acl and attr packages fix security issues.

These are all security issues fixed in the acl-2.4.0-1.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.

This update for acl, attr fixes the following issue:

• CVE-2026-54369,CVE-2026-54370,CVE-2026-54371: Symlink Traversal Privilege Escalation via getfattr/setfattr, getfacl/setfacl/chacl, libacl (bsc#1268867).

Changes for acl:

• Update to 2.4.0 (jsc#PED-16501): Major Issues Fixed:
• The libacl library functions acl_get_file(), acl_set_file(), acl_extended_file(), and acl_delete_def_file() take a pathname argument and follow symbolic links. When a privileged user calls one of those functions, an attacker that controls a pathname component can replace a file or directory with a symbolic link and redirect the operation to a different file. This can lead to local privilege escalation. (CVE-2026-54369, bsc#1268867) The library functions cannot be fixed without breaking compatibility; the described behaviour is by design. Instead, version 2.4.0 of the acl package introduces the additional functions acl_get_file_at(), acl_set_file_at(), acl_extended_file_at(), and acl_delete_def_file_at(). These functions each take a dirfd file descriptor argument and an at_flags argument and accept the AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW and AT_EMPTY_PATH flags. Use these functions to control when to follow symbolic links. (CVE-2026-54370, bsc#1268867) In addition, the libacl functions acl_get_fd(), acl_set_fd(), and acl_extended_fd() functions always operate on the access ACL; the library previously did not offer a way to operate on the default ACL of a directory file descriptor. The new functions remove that restriction. It will be up to each individual program to start using these new library functions where appropriate.
• When walking directory trees, the getfacl, setfacl, chacl, and getfattr utilities constructed the full pathname of each file in the tree and use that pathname to access the file. When a privileged user used those utilities, an attacker that controlled a pathname component could replace a directory with a symbolic link and redirect the operation to a different file, leading to a local privilege escalation. (CVE-2026-54371, bsc#1268867) This is fixed by using directory file descriptors and operating relative to those directory file descriptors.
• When resolving the final pathname component, the getfacl, setfacl, chacl, getfattr, and setfattr utilities in some cases used functions that resolve symbolic links. This includes the above mentioned libacl functions, but also stat(), chmod(), and chown(). This is fixed by using symlink-safe functions throughout the code.
• When restoring a backup, the setfacl and setfattr utilities read the full pathnames of files from the backup. When those pathnames were resolved, pathname components that are symbolic links were traversed. An attacker that controlled a pathname component could replace it with a symbolic link, causing a privileged user to operate on a file other than the one intended. This could lead to the same kind of local privilege escalation as discussed before. This is fixed by using openat2(RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS) to resolve the directory components of a pathname, but see Compatibility Notes below for the details. Minor Issues Fixed:
• When a symbolic link was specified on the command line but symbolic link traversal was disabled using option -P (--physical), the getfacl and setfacl utilities previously silently ignored the symlink. Now, an ELOOP ("Too many levels of symbolic links") error will result instead.
• acl_delete_entry() now verifies that the specified entry belongs to the specified acl.
• Numeric uids and gids that cannot be represented in types uid_t and gid_t are checked more carefully and invalid numbers are rejected.
• Functions acl_get_file(), acl_get_file_at(), and acl_get_fd() will retry several times when the size of an ACL grows unexpectedly; previously, they only grew the allocated buffer once before giving up.
• When passed a directory file descriptor, function perm_copy_fd() didn't copy the default ACL from one…

Root has patched CVE-2026-54371 in the attr package for Root:Debian:11. Multiple fixed versions available.

Root has patched CVE-2026-54371 in the attr package for Root:Debian:12. Multiple fixed versions available.

Root has patched CVE-2026-54371 in the attr package for Root:Debian:13. Multiple fixed versions available.

This update for acl, attr fixes the following issue:

• CVE-2026-54369,CVE-2026-54370,CVE-2026-54371: Symlink Traversal Privilege Escalation via getfattr/setfattr, getfacl/setfacl/chacl, libacl (bsc#1268867).

Changes for acl:

• Update to 2.4.0 (jsc#PED-16501): Major Issues Fixed:
• The libacl library functions acl_get_file(), acl_set_file(), acl_extended_file(), and acl_delete_def_file() take a pathname argument and follow symbolic links. When a privileged user calls one of those functions, an attacker that controls a pathname component can replace a file or directory with a symbolic link and redirect the operation to a different file. This can lead to local privilege escalation. (CVE-2026-54369, bsc#1268867) The library functions cannot be fixed without breaking compatibility; the described behaviour is by design. Instead, version 2.4.0 of the acl package introduces the additional functions acl_get_file_at(), acl_set_file_at(), acl_extended_file_at(), and acl_delete_def_file_at(). These functions each take a dirfd file descriptor argument and an at_flags argument and accept the AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW and AT_EMPTY_PATH flags. Use these functions to control when to follow symbolic links. (CVE-2026-54370, bsc#1268867) In addition, the libacl functions acl_get_fd(), acl_set_fd(), and acl_extended_fd() functions always operate on the access ACL; the library previously did not offer a way to operate on the default ACL of a directory file descriptor. The new functions remove that restriction. It will be up to each individual program to start using these new library functions where appropriate.
• When walking directory trees, the getfacl, setfacl, chacl, and getfattr utilities constructed the full pathname of each file in the tree and use that pathname to access the file. When a privileged user used those utilities, an attacker that controlled a pathname component could replace a directory with a symbolic link and redirect the operation to a different file, leading to a local privilege escalation. (CVE-2026-54371, bsc#1268867) This is fixed by using directory file descriptors and operating relative to those directory file descriptors.
• When resolving the final pathname component, the getfacl, setfacl, chacl, getfattr, and setfattr utilities in some cases used functions that resolve symbolic links. This includes the above mentioned libacl functions, but also stat(), chmod(), and chown(). This is fixed by using symlink-safe functions throughout the code.
• When restoring a backup, the setfacl and setfattr utilities read the full pathnames of files from the backup. When those pathnames were resolved, pathname components that are symbolic links were traversed. An attacker that controlled a pathname component could replace it with a symbolic link, causing a privileged user to operate on a file other than the one intended. This could lead to the same kind of local privilege escalation as discussed before. This is fixed by using openat2(RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS) to resolve the directory components of a pathname, but see Compatibility Notes below for the details. Minor Issues Fixed:
• When a symbolic link was specified on the command line but symbolic link traversal was disabled using option -P (--physical), the getfacl and setfacl utilities previously silently ignored the symlink. Now, an ELOOP ("Too many levels of symbolic links") error will result instead.
• acl_delete_entry() now verifies that the specified entry belongs to the specified acl.
• Numeric uids and gids that cannot be represented in types uid_t and gid_t are checked more carefully and invalid numbers are rejected.
• Functions acl_get_file(), acl_get_file_at(), and acl_get_fd() will retry several times when the size of an ACL grows unexpectedly; previously, they only grew the allocated buffer once before giving up.
• When passed a directory file descriptor, function perm_copy_fd() didn't copy the default ACL from one…

This update for acl, attr fixes the following issue:

• CVE-2026-54369,CVE-2026-54370,CVE-2026-54371: Symlink Traversal Privilege Escalation via getfattr/setfattr, getfacl/setfacl/chacl, libacl (bsc#1268867).

Changes for acl:

• Update to 2.4.0 (jsc#PED-16501): Major Issues Fixed:
• The libacl library functions acl_get_file(), acl_set_file(), acl_extended_file(), and acl_delete_def_file() take a pathname argument and follow symbolic links. When a privileged user calls one of those functions, an attacker that controls a pathname component can replace a file or directory with a symbolic link and redirect the operation to a different file. This can lead to local privilege escalation. (CVE-2026-54369, bsc#1268867) The library functions cannot be fixed without breaking compatibility; the described behaviour is by design. Instead, version 2.4.0 of the acl package introduces the additional functions acl_get_file_at(), acl_set_file_at(), acl_extended_file_at(), and acl_delete_def_file_at(). These functions each take a dirfd file descriptor argument and an at_flags argument and accept the AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW and AT_EMPTY_PATH flags. Use these functions to control when to follow symbolic links. (CVE-2026-54370, bsc#1268867) In addition, the libacl functions acl_get_fd(), acl_set_fd(), and acl_extended_fd() functions always operate on the access ACL; the library previously did not offer a way to operate on the default ACL of a directory file descriptor. The new functions remove that restriction. It will be up to each individual program to start using these new library functions where appropriate.
• When walking directory trees, the getfacl, setfacl, chacl, and getfattr utilities constructed the full pathname of each file in the tree and use that pathname to access the file. When a privileged user used those utilities, an attacker that controlled a pathname component could replace a directory with a symbolic link and redirect the operation to a different file, leading to a local privilege escalation. (CVE-2026-54371, bsc#1268867) This is fixed by using directory file descriptors and operating relative to those directory file descriptors.
• When resolving the final pathname component, the getfacl, setfacl, chacl, getfattr, and setfattr utilities in some cases used functions that resolve symbolic links. This includes the above mentioned libacl functions, but also stat(), chmod(), and chown(). This is fixed by using symlink-safe functions throughout the code.
• When restoring a backup, the setfacl and setfattr utilities read the full pathnames of files from the backup. When those pathnames were resolved, pathname components that are symbolic links were traversed. An attacker that controlled a pathname component could replace it with a symbolic link, causing a privileged user to operate on a file other than the one intended. This could lead to the same kind of local privilege escalation as discussed before. This is fixed by using openat2(RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS) to resolve the directory components of a pathname, but see Compatibility Notes below for the details. Minor Issues Fixed:
• When a symbolic link was specified on the command line but symbolic link traversal was disabled using option -P (--physical), the getfacl and setfacl utilities previously silently ignored the symlink. Now, an ELOOP ("Too many levels of symbolic links") error will result instead.
• acl_delete_entry() now verifies that the specified entry belongs to the specified acl.
• Numeric uids and gids that cannot be represented in types uid_t and gid_t are checked more carefully and invalid numbers are rejected.
• Functions acl_get_file(), acl_get_file_at(), and acl_get_fd() will retry several times when the size of an ACL grows unexpectedly; previously, they only grew the allocated buffer once before giving up.
• When passed a directory file descriptor, function perm_copy_fd() didn't copy the default ACL from one…

This update for acl, attr fixes the following issue:

• CVE-2026-54369,CVE-2026-54370,CVE-2026-54371: Symlink Traversal Privilege Escalation via getfattr/setfattr, getfacl/setfacl/chacl, libacl (bsc#1268867).

Changes for acl:

• Update to 2.4.0 (jsc#PED-16501): Major Issues Fixed:
• The libacl library functions acl_get_file(), acl_set_file(), acl_extended_file(), and acl_delete_def_file() take a pathname argument and follow symbolic links. When a privileged user calls one of those functions, an attacker that controls a pathname component can replace a file or directory with a symbolic link and redirect the operation to a different file. This can lead to local privilege escalation. (CVE-2026-54369, bsc#1268867) The library functions cannot be fixed without breaking compatibility; the described behaviour is by design. Instead, version 2.4.0 of the acl package introduces the additional functions acl_get_file_at(), acl_set_file_at(), acl_extended_file_at(), and acl_delete_def_file_at(). These functions each take a dirfd file descriptor argument and an at_flags argument and accept the AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW and AT_EMPTY_PATH flags. Use these functions to control when to follow symbolic links. (CVE-2026-54370, bsc#1268867) In addition, the libacl functions acl_get_fd(), acl_set_fd(), and acl_extended_fd() functions always operate on the access ACL; the library previously did not offer a way to operate on the default ACL of a directory file descriptor. The new functions remove that restriction. It will be up to each individual program to start using these new library functions where appropriate.
• When walking directory trees, the getfacl, setfacl, chacl, and getfattr utilities constructed the full pathname of each file in the tree and use that pathname to access the file. When a privileged user used those utilities, an attacker that controlled a pathname component could replace a directory with a symbolic link and redirect the operation to a different file, leading to a local privilege escalation. (CVE-2026-54371, bsc#1268867) This is fixed by using directory file descriptors and operating relative to those directory file descriptors.
• When resolving the final pathname component, the getfacl, setfacl, chacl, getfattr, and setfattr utilities in some cases used functions that resolve symbolic links. This includes the above mentioned libacl functions, but also stat(), chmod(), and chown(). This is fixed by using symlink-safe functions throughout the code.
• When restoring a backup, the setfacl and setfattr utilities read the full pathnames of files from the backup. When those pathnames were resolved, pathname components that are symbolic links were traversed. An attacker that controlled a pathname component could replace it with a symbolic link, causing a privileged user to operate on a file other than the one intended. This could lead to the same kind of local privilege escalation as discussed before. This is fixed by using openat2(RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS) to resolve the directory components of a pathname, but see Compatibility Notes below for the details. Minor Issues Fixed:
• When a symbolic link was specified on the command line but symbolic link traversal was disabled using option -P (--physical), the getfacl and setfacl utilities previously silently ignored the symlink. Now, an ELOOP ("Too many levels of symbolic links") error will result instead.
• acl_delete_entry() now verifies that the specified entry belongs to the specified acl.
• Numeric uids and gids that cannot be represented in types uid_t and gid_t are checked more carefully and invalid numbers are rejected.
• Functions acl_get_file(), acl_get_file_at(), and acl_get_fd() will retry several times when the size of an ACL grows unexpectedly; previously, they only grew the allocated buffer once before giving up.
• When passed a directory file descriptor, function perm_copy_fd() didn't copy the default ACL from one…

This update for acl, attr fixes the following issue:

• CVE-2026-54369,CVE-2026-54370,CVE-2026-54371: Symlink Traversal Privilege Escalation via getfattr/setfattr, getfacl/setfacl/chacl, libacl (bsc#1268867).

Changes for acl:

• Update to 2.4.0 (jsc#PED-16501): Major Issues Fixed:
• The libacl library functions acl_get_file(), acl_set_file(), acl_extended_file(), and acl_delete_def_file() take a pathname argument and follow symbolic links. When a privileged user calls one of those functions, an attacker that controls a pathname component can replace a file or directory with a symbolic link and redirect the operation to a different file. This can lead to local privilege escalation. (CVE-2026-54369, bsc#1268867) The library functions cannot be fixed without breaking compatibility; the described behaviour is by design. Instead, version 2.4.0 of the acl package introduces the additional functions acl_get_file_at(), acl_set_file_at(), acl_extended_file_at(), and acl_delete_def_file_at(). These functions each take a dirfd file descriptor argument and an at_flags argument and accept the AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW and AT_EMPTY_PATH flags. Use these functions to control when to follow symbolic links. (CVE-2026-54370, bsc#1268867) In addition, the libacl functions acl_get_fd(), acl_set_fd(), and acl_extended_fd() functions always operate on the access ACL; the library previously did not offer a way to operate on the default ACL of a directory file descriptor. The new functions remove that restriction. It will be up to each individual program to start using these new library functions where appropriate.
• When walking directory trees, the getfacl, setfacl, chacl, and getfattr utilities constructed the full pathname of each file in the tree and use that pathname to access the file. When a privileged user used those utilities, an attacker that controlled a pathname component could replace a directory with a symbolic link and redirect the operation to a different file, leading to a local privilege escalation. (CVE-2026-54371, bsc#1268867) This is fixed by using directory file descriptors and operating relative to those directory file descriptors.
• When resolving the final pathname component, the getfacl, setfacl, chacl, getfattr, and setfattr utilities in some cases used functions that resolve symbolic links. This includes the above mentioned libacl functions, but also stat(), chmod(), and chown(). This is fixed by using symlink-safe functions throughout the code.
• When restoring a backup, the setfacl and setfattr utilities read the full pathnames of files from the backup. When those pathnames were resolved, pathname components that are symbolic links were traversed. An attacker that controlled a pathname component could replace it with a symbolic link, causing a privileged user to operate on a file other than the one intended. This could lead to the same kind of local privilege escalation as discussed before. This is fixed by using openat2(RESOLVE_NO_SYMLINKS) to resolve the directory components of a pathname, but see Compatibility Notes below for the details. Minor Issues Fixed:
• When a symbolic link was specified on the command line but symbolic link traversal was disabled using option -P (--physical), the getfacl and setfacl utilities previously silently ignored the symlink. Now, an ELOOP ('Too many levels of symbolic links') error will result instead.
• acl_delete_entry() now verifies that the specified entry belongs to the specified acl.
• Numeric uids and gids that cannot be represented in types uid_t and gid_t are checked more carefully and invalid numbers are rejected.
• Functions acl_get_file(), acl_get_file_at(), and acl_get_fd() will retry several times when the size of an ACL grows unexpectedly; previously, they only grew the allocated buffer once before giving up.
• When passed a directory file descriptor, function perm_copy_fd() didn't copy the default ACL from one…

It was discovered that attr incorrectly handled symbolic links while traversing directory paths. A local attacker who controlled a pathname component could possibly use this issue to redirect privileged attr operations to arbitrary files and gain elevated privileges.